

JPRS-WER-86-062

25 JUNE 1986

West Europe Report



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLL INDICATES LARGE GAINS FOR GREENS, SETBACK FOR LEFT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Apr 86 p 8

/Text/ A public opinion survey carried out by M-Tietokeskus predicts gains for the Greens in the parliamentary elections. They register an increase from 1.5 to nearly 7 percent. Loss of voters were, primarily, registered by the People's Democrats and the Rural Party. Even the Social Democrats have lost voter support but their party still remains the largest. The poll was sponsored by the newspaper KALEVA in Uleaborg and indicated a decrease in support for leftist parties from 40.7 to 36.2 percent, while the nonsocialist block increased from just below 60 percent to 63.8 percent. The poll was taken at the end of February and beginning of March.

The poll shows that both the People's Democrats and the Social Democrats will lose 2 percent of the voters. The People's Democrats get 12.1 percent of the vote, compared to 14 percent in the parliamentary elections 1983. The Social Democrats are supported by 24.1 percent compared to 26.7 in the last elections.

The support for the Centre Party has increased from 16.6 to 18.2 percent and that for the Coalition Party from 22.1 to 23 percent.

To the Rural Party it looks like the Green Party will advance from 1.5 percent to 6.9 percent. The rest of the changes are only marginal.

The public opinion institute also measured party loyalty by comparing the votes of those interviewed with how they voted in the last local election in 1984 and how they intend to vote in the next parliamentary election. It appears that the Rural Party loses votes to all other parties, above all to the Social Democrats, whereas some of the People's Democrats' supporters will vote for the Social Democrats or the Greens. The voters of the National Coalition /Conservative/ Party are the most loyal and 94 percent of them will remain faithful to their party.

The poll also shows that 88 percent of the voters in the People's Democratic League will vote for a member of their party in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

9349/12228

CSO: 3650/197

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS AIRS TERRORISM

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 27 Apr 86 p 9

[Article by Marit Ingves: "Ehrnrooth: 'Resolutions Do Not Control Terrorism'"]

[Text] "We, as well as the majority of the French, ought to understand that terrorism cannot be controlled by resolutions, nor by economic sanctions," Georg C. Ehrnrooth, the Constitutional Conservative Party chairman maintained in his political overview during the seventh Party Congress in Helsinki.

Ehrnrooth felt that the President of the United States could not continue to sit with his arms crossed waiting for still another terrorist attack, which would have cost the lives of more Americans.

"The American attack was contrary to international law," he said, "but it is also against the law--although often excused--to exaggerate the self-defense the one who is attacked resorts to."

Ehrnrooth also, without naming names, attacked Christoffer Taxell, the minister of justice. He considered it "outrageous that the country's minister of justice" can stand up and warn that the fight against terrorism can hurt a state governed by law.

"Something entirely different ought to be expected from justice minister than a speech that could encourage the terrorists and the political dictators who are behind them and who instruct and finance them."

Ehrnrooth also gave a boost to the [Conservative] Coalition Party in his overview. After the American retaliation attack, the leaders of the Coalition party condemned the action. But their statement did not mention one word about the terrorist actions carried out by the Libyan leader.

"Everyone, who is interested in Finland's future as a Nordic Western state, should ask himself where we will end up if we, in our country, do not have a Conservative party "with a spine but only parties vying for the favors of a Socialist superpower," said Ehrnrooth.

"Everyone, who is interested in Finland's future as a Nordic Western state, should ask himself where we will end up if we, in our country, do not have a Conservative party "with a spine but only parties vying for the favors of a Socialist superpower," said Ehrnrooth.

Furthermore, he accused the Finnish parties of maintaining a low profile in questions concerning human rights. He wondered if a conservative party in Finland could, "without losing its soul," remain silent about human rights violations, when they occur in countries that are close to us.

"Not until now, at least in speeches, have those questions begun to have the status in foreign policy that they ought to have in a civilized country. But translating words into deeds is still far off.

"We, the Constitutional Conservatives, emphasize the credibility of a neutrality policy, which requires consistency," said Ehrnrooth.

He was of the opinion that our foreign policy credibility will be harmed if Finland joins the group of countries that demand that all ties with South Africa be severed, while refraining from voting on Afghanistan in the UN.

At this point in his speech, Ehrnrooth was met with loud applause. The applause became louder later in the day, when two representatives of the freedom movement in Afghanistan honored the Congress with their presence.

"With God's help and your support and that of the rest of the world, we will expel the socialist imperialists from our country," the freedom fighters promised and the audience gave them the support they were seeking.

"We do not see the President of the United States as a threat to world peace. On the contrary, we have noticed that there have been more serious negotiations between the superpowers during his term as president. The new Soviet leader, of course, has contributed his share," said the party chairman.

In the domestic policy part of his overview, Ehrnrooth also touched on the presidential election. According to him, each and everyone's thoughts about the election are, even today, their own business. "We are not in a position to take a stand, either as the first party or at an early stage-- not even after Paavo Vayrynen is chosen as the candidate of the Center Party."

Ehrnrooth also scrutinized his own party and thought that, in spite of the fact that the question, on the basis of which the Constitutional Conservative Party was founded, has not been of interest for many years, the party still has great objectives, for which the current modest personnel and other resources are not sufficient.

"If the Constitutional Conservative Party disappeared, the void in politics not least in the debate that is part of a democratically functioning society, would be greater than if one of our many parties were joined with another."

The central theme of the general policy debate at the seventh Party Congress in Helsinki was the future of the party.

The younger delegates, in particular, were discussing the need for a party that more and more resembles "a modern Western Conservative party." The Constitutional Conservative Party ought to be a party that is "classically liberal and constitutes an alternative to collective thought"--a freedom alternative.

During the debate, the audience of about 100 people was also encouraged to engage more actively in working for the party. It was said that we need vote-getters.

Nils Meder also wanted to explain the Soviet desire for peace by the fact that the country can no longer expand its influence and by the fact that the Soviet Union can only maintain its present position in peacetime.

He insisted on talking about Russia, even after his party members pointed out to him that the name of the country is the Soviet Union--a word that according to him is a "monster." He also let the audience know that always talks about Petersburg.

The elections were unanimous during the Congress. Georg C. Ehrnrooth continues as party chairman. Panu Toivonen remains as party secretary. However, a "rejuvenation operation" was performed on the two vice-chairman positions.

The chairman for the Helsinki district, Markku Pietikainen, became first vice-chairman, Tuula Heiman became the second.

12339/9190
CSO: 3650/199

PAPER COMMENTS ON CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR 'CATASTROPHE'

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 30 Apr 86 p 2

/Editorial by Rafael Paro: "The Catastrophe in the Ukraine"; a reminder to people in densely populated Europe that the risks of nuclear power cut across all national borders. Such catastrophes point to the tremendous needs for cooperation and exchange of information in order to avoid similar disasters in the future/

/Text/ Wherever there is a nuclear power plant in this world there is now also an enormous need to find out what caused the accident at the Soviet nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. The Soviet authorities would provide a service to the entire world if they put their cards on the table, considering the fact that experiences in this field are hard to come by--both in regard to human lives and property values.

It is a fact that the Soviet Union, in many ways, has been a leading country with respect to nuclear power. It was the Soviet Union which really became serious about the mass production of nuclear power stations for civilian use in the 1960's. The expansion of nuclear power stations was not even a subject for debate for a couple of decades. It is only recently that there has been an increase in remarks of critical nature. Many of these have been generated by biologists in regard to the problems caused in water by the release of large amounts of cooling water.

The Soviet nuclear power program has probably suffered a number of serious setbacks in the course of the years. There are a number of reports in the West about Soviet reactor accidents. One of them refers to statements made by the minister of energy, at that time, Pjotr Neporosjnyj, who is supposed to have confided to the American Congressman Robert Michel --in connection with the Harrisburg accident in the United States 1979--that there had been several accidents in Soviet power plants, including an explosion accident and one involving radiation leakage.

It is not in line with Soviet style to give out information to the world at large about such problems. Not even Soviet citizens themselves were given any more detailed information about what had occurred.

People who are part of the culture which regards freedom of information as a golden rule always find it difficult to comprehend the rationale and objective reasons for withholding relevant information from the citizenry.

It is difficult to understand why, apparently, several days went by before Soviet citizens were notified on TV through a short TASS report. It stated that a reactor had been damaged in an accident at Chernobyl and that measures had been taken to "eliminate the consequences of the accident" and that those "affected" had received treatment.

There is an enormous difference in the reactions of how the Soviet authorities acted and how the Swedish authorities came to decide that it was necessary to evacuate the nuclear power station in Forsmark when there, initially, was no way of discovering the reasons for the high level of radiation.

It is difficult to know what kind of consequences the Chernobyl accident will have on the Soviet nuclear program as long as the extent of it remains unknown. The new 5-year plan and the long-range program up to the year 2000 assumes that half of the energy needs at the end of the century will be met by nuclear power production. A certain amount of worry can, however, be read between the lines, in regard to safety questions. The program states that "there must be guarantees for continued improvement in the construction of energy units."

Even though traditional Soviet reticence continues to manifest itself during the last couple of days there are also signs of new thinking. This is particularly reflected in the agreement signed by the Soviet Union in February last year with the International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA in regard to inspections of Soviet power stations. Radio Moscow stated at that time that the Soviet Union will open up more power stations to international inspection. There are some 40 nuclear power stations in the Soviet Union which are intended for civilian use and several are in the process of being built.

The original intent of these inspections was to prevent the use of atomic energy produced for peaceful purposes to be used for military purposes. This system of inspection is one of the mainstays in the international agreement against proliferation of nuclear weapons which was signed by 120 nations in 1970.

It is easy to arrive at some premature conclusions in regard to the future of nuclear power, especially, while there are no relevant facts from the Chernobyl accident. Everyone has been aware that this technology demands that great safety needs be met. The determined opponents to nuclear power in our country, for example, have helped to raise the consciousness on the part of the decision-makers for the need of making high demands on the builders of nuclear power stations.

Today many ask themselves if nuclear power has received the death blow in the world because of the accident in Ukraine. Certainly there will be many who review their attitude toward nuclear power. One can also expect that the accident will lead to a higher level of activity on energy markets in the world at this time. It would not be surprising if "safe" alternatives like oil and coal were to register increases in price.

The only way that nuclear power would come to an end, once and for all, Chernobyl would have to reveal, fundamentally, new knowledge that--not even in theory--is it possible to control the technology on which nuclear power is based.

If, on the other hand, it is clear that only sins of omission or negligence are involved, it is uncertain that countries lacking economically viable alternatives would be deterred by the accident.

Nevertheless, densely populated Europe has been reminded of the fact that the risks of nuclear power cut across national borders. The radioactive fallout has spread across several nations. The need for cooperation and exchange of information is alarmingly great if catastrophes of this kind are to be avoided in the future.

9349/12228

CSO: 3650/197

NATIONAL FRONT ADAPTATION TO POLITICAL CHANGE EXAMINED

Paris INTERVENTION in French Jan-Mar 86 pp 25-32

[Article by Guy Birenbaum: "National Front: Changes in a Splinter Group"]

[Text] Beginning as a surprising competitor at the time of the 1984 European elections, the National Front, since that astonishing appearance on the political scene, has changed noticeably.

This splinter group of yesterday, stimulated by its own successes in the elections and in the media, has become a political party adapted to the demands of French political life. It has learned how to "become an institution," changing from a political group, which was "out of the running" into a group which is "in the political game."¹

However, this process of change did not take place in the course of a single election. In effect, as we look back at them, we can now interpret the elections of June 1984 correctly and thus understand to what extent the emergence of the National Front represents a coincidence of views between an organization and the electorate, through the operation of an election system suitable to it and in a particular political and social context.

First of all, the implementation of the proportional representation system has had an influence on voter habits.² Proportional representation changes the breakdown of the vote,³ making it possible for small parties, such as the National Front, to be represented. Furthermore, when the electoral issues are perceived as having limited importance and voters do not have strong reasons for voting, the consequent lack of interest among the voters⁴ may give rise to surprising results.

A Deceptive Election

On the other hand, the system of electoral lists,⁵ the differences of view and the problems which this system brought out within the RPR-UDF opposition played a decisive role in lending strength to the anti "establishment" position of the National Front, strengthening its denunciations of the way the political system functioned and the political actors on the scene.

Finally, the seizure of the immigration issue by Jean-Marie Le Pen's party⁶ made it possible to mobilize a substantial number of voters.

Therefore, the vote for the National Front was more than a real protest vote. We find here an election characterized by "freeing voters of their complexes." This tendency was amplified by a number of circumstances favorable to the National Front, offering it an unexpected but deceptive springboard.

It was deceptive because, paradoxically, the 10.95 percent of the vote obtained in the European elections of 1984 was neither the reflection of a well-developed strategy nor was it an index of a committed, partisan "reality." The electoral potential reflected, therefore, was beyond the reach of an organization which had neither the structure nor the means to achieve this result, nor did the party try to attract so many votes.¹⁰ The "party of Jean-Marie Le Pen" had not even become the "National Front." The European elections gave birth to a party which did not even know itself. It remained for this group to give itself "a kind of existence,"¹¹ confirming its new status. The National Front had to adjust itself to its electoral potential. This requirement led it to reach beyond itself, adjusting its means of adapting itself to the circumstances of the political struggle and field.

To achieve this objective, real procedures, imposed on the party by its political leadership, were going to have an impact on the changes within the organization. The electoral schedule made this unavoidable. Thus, the cantonal elections of 1985 and the legislative elections of 1986 were going to lead the party to provide itself with a structure, to place a favorable gloss both on its statements as well as on its image, and to diversify itself.

A Truly National Front

As Jean-Marie Le Pen admitted on the evening of the European elections: "Everything starts from today." This admission contained the nucleus of the future evolution of his organization. This largely Parisian splinter group had to become a party with a structure at the national level. In effect, just 9 months before the 1985 cantonal elections the National Front was totally unadapted to the local "terrain."

Therefore, J.-P. Stirbois¹² had the task of establishing a real party structure at all of these artificial levels.

--First, the leadership bodies of the National Front, including the congress,¹³ the national council, the central committee, and the political bureau, evolved from having a completely symbolic kind of existence to having a relatively functional status. However, real political power within the party remained the sole prerogative of an oligarchical political bureau¹⁴ and even a limited core of its members, when it was not in the hands of Jean-Marie Le Pen alone.¹⁵

--The local levels of the party were then taken in hand by the party machine in Paris. In fact, a kind of Parisian style national cohesion was developed, adapting the organization to the existing electoral structure of the party, which was considered anarchical and ineffective in the framework of a political struggle of national scope.¹⁶ For there were already in existence independent political structures at the departmental level, at times divided into skeleton-like party sections. In most cases their leaders had proclaimed

themselves local leaders of the National Front. These "embryo" party units were marking time, without any resources at their disposal and beyond the control of the party leadership.

However, the overall confusion was supposed to be set in order by the establishment of party sections and departmental organizations (in Paris and in the immediately surrounding area) by party members or sympathizers who were "recognized" by party headquarters on the Rue de Bernouilli.¹⁷ The party as a whole was to be set up on a federal basis, following the model of the most effective departmental units and particularly the federation in the Department of Val-de-Marne, under the leadership of J.-P. Schenardi.

On the basis of the organizational model which emerged and by providing support for the most effective local organizers, J.-P. Stirbois adapted the party to the needs of the political campaign. Thus, at every level of the national administrative system there was a party structure (a section¹⁸ for the cantons and communes, a federation for the departments, and assemblies¹⁹ for the various regions of the country). These structures had a leader (the secretary of a section or department and a regional secretary) responsible for his particular organization.

This strictly vertical structure was to ensure the adaptation of the party to the political scene. However, later on it also provided evidence of the support and allegiance of local party levels to Paris headquarters.

--Thus, deprived of any powers of decision in terms of the local orientation of the National Front,²⁰ the secretaries of party sections only had authority regarding the administrative organization of their offices.²¹ Furthermore, they saw themselves as restricted to performing a single role, which gave them authority "politically" but to a negligible extent. They were responsible for the recruitment of new party members. For the rest, they were largely "under the influence" of higher party levels. The "Stirbois system" placed them under the supervision of the departmental secretary and prohibited any form of "horizontal" cooperation between party sections.

At the same time, by placing the departmental secretaries under the regional secretaries party headquarters in Paris controlled its troops even more closely. The more so, as these regional secretaries themselves were directly under J.-P. Stirbois!

Therefore, and at all echelons of the National Front, any challenges to the leaders were avoided, and simple discussions or debates on the "official line" were neutralized, through this skillful use of "nearby" controls on the party. Party discipline made this necessary!

However, the submission of these local figures of the National Front to Paris headquarters was made more bearable by the new interest shown by the political bureau of the party in nominations and electoral candidacies.

--Nominations to new positions in the party and appointments to electoral lists are real powers which lead to continuing competition within the National Front. Party cadres, placed in competitive positions by these possible promotions, devote themselves to their duties "with increasing energy"²² and

are promoted through "efficiency reports" sent to a sovereign political bureau, which evaluates their efforts as party members, the number of new members in their section, or their length of service in the party. As a secretary of a Paris section explained it to us, "the sole criteria the hierarchy of the National Front uses with us are: the results of the elections and the number of our members. In the political bureau the various candidates for office are considered on the basis of these criteria." Therefore, in this context the allocation by the political bureau of various positions and responsibilities is subject to these criteria of internal effectiveness and the ability to "perform."

Although there is no doubt that the situation was seen in this way by many local party officials, this is because this myth of promotion based on merit was widely believed among party leaders. However, in reality this single type of criterion was not decisive by itself--far from it.

--In effect, we saw a process of change in the National Front: the system of designating party leaders, previously based on merit and on seniority in the party, was going to change.

The new electoral constraints led the political bureau to set down new rules of operation, largely based on a distinction between partisan and electoral functions.²³ The development and changes in recruitment were to become vital imperatives.

The National Front is going to appoint and place responsibilities on a new category of actors who are more specialized, more competent, and more "presentable."

This internal "revolution," which was justified by the process of preparing the organization for the cantonal elections, created a certain amount of trouble among the oldest members of the National Front.²⁴

However, this process of change was to turn out to be effective.

After successfully nominating 1,521 candidates²⁵ (for three-quarters of the cantons where elections were being held), the National Front obtained 8.8 percent of the vote. Even though this was below its vote in the European elections, the result was not negligible. After carrying out a careful reorganization of the party the National Front succeeded in keeping the voters whom it had won over by surprise. It had been able to develop a "faithful" electorate of about 10 percent of the total vote.

--Moreover, this group of voters appears to have a specific point of view (as Pascal Perrigault has shown²⁶ (on the basis of the poll taken among voters on 10 March 1985)).

The fact remains that the concentration of Jean-Marie Le Pen's party on this group of voters was not simply made possible by its organizational adaptation to the rules of political competition. A "major job of work" was done in terms of speeches and the image of the National Front.

Making the National Front Look Presentable in a 'Controlled Way'

Initially, the National Front "functioned" on the basis of a single strategy, that is, the total emphasis given to a point of view latently held in society as a whole. In effect, it was by investing in beliefs or aspirations, without any fear of violating taboos, that the National Front broke the routine of the established political discourse. It did this, in particular, on themes which were social realities to a high degree (immigration and insecurity). Therefore, by playing on prejudices, even though irrational, it strengthened them politically, forcing their inclusion--or their reinclusion--in the political agenda.

Was this demagoguery? Jean-Marie Le Pen never hid it. He said: "My ideas are the same as yours"; "I say out loud what the French people think among themselves";²⁸ and, "Politics consists of translating the aspirations of the people in forms which are governmentally possible."²⁹ In the event the National Front surged into a space not occupied by any other political party.

Therefore, parodying the view expressed by G. Miller on the Petainist slogan, "Travail-Famille-Patrie" [Work, Family, Fatherland] ("Vichy did not³⁰ invent this slogan but breathed it in from the air around it at the time,"³⁰), we might state that the National Front did not "invent" its political position but rather "received" it and then strengthened it by "saying it out loud," in the words of an old song.

However, the fact remains that, as P. Bourdieu notes, "the access" (of a party) to political realities "depends" on its "strengthening," that is, on "broadening the base of its supporters," even at the price of entering into political schemes and making concessions or even engaging in methodically jamming everything which is too exclusive in the original positions adopted by the party."³¹

By orienting itself toward this kind of political realism,³² The National Front strengthened its organizational structure with a strategy of euphemization, with the objective of "clearing" itself of its negative aspects. It strengthened its "low grade" populism with improved language and (correspondingly) an improved image.

--However, before the European elections this strategy was the "exclusive concern" of Jean-Marie Le Pen. As the only figure authorized to speak in the name of the National Front, he monopolized this innovative role and drew from it all possible benefits. (See his first appearance on "Heure de Verite" [French TV interview show].) However, as they implied a complete local orientation, the cantonal elections made it necessary to hold meetings in all four corners of the country. Jean-Marie Le Pen could no longer make all of the political speeches by himself, nor could he personally support all of his candidates. Having to give up his monopoly on making speeches, he delegated this responsibility, on condition that other speakers reproduce faithfully a political speech couched in euphemistic terms. The National Front had to appear as a responsible party. Certainly, it was anti-communist,³³ but it was devoted to the law, was democratic and liberal, and above all supported an economic form of ultra-liberalism which closely followed President Reagan. Above all, it was neither racist nor anti-semitic but simply vigilant in the

face of the rising wave of "anti-French racism" (sic) and concerned about restoring to French citizens "national preference." Finally, he certainly wanted "to reverse the flow of immigration" but under "conditions of human dignity."³⁴ Regarding party leaders, it was imperative that they show themselves to be professional politicians, representing themselves as "occasionally involved in politics"³⁵ and having been successful in their respective occupations. This stance as non-professional politicians³⁶ fit in perfectly with the deprecating and anti-political language used by the National Front, while ideally meeting the expectations of public opinion, for which the image of politicians as a class is negative.³⁷ Hence, National Front leaders would emphasize their competence as technicians and as shareholders, appearing (as much as possible!) as models of entrepreneurial success³⁸ and with a respectability not open to attack. In short, they would "not be men of the Right but be extremely right-thinking."³⁹

This kind of talk, dictated and endorsed by the party leadership, was to be taken up and spread around.

--Therefore, the emancipation of the National Front concerned its principal leaders (members of the political bureau and members of the European Parliament). The latter, often denounced for their appearance or their past, as much as for their excesses, were "requested" to submit themselves to this new "requirement to appear reserved," which was appropriate to national leaders of a political party which wanted to be seen as respectable. The uncontrolled verbal excesses were to disappear, as R. Holeindre explained to us:⁴⁰ "In the National Front, you shut your mouth. You have a leader and you follow him!"

The fact remains that the strategy of improving the party image, in order to be politically worthwhile, should not be limited to the top levels of the party. Cadres and members of the National Front have also been called on to appear moderate, to be reassuring at their own level, on the ground.

Therefore, in order to make the whole party speak the same kind of decorous language, the headquarters of the National Front set up a restrictive, internal kind of ideological discipline. A kind of real, vital, euphemistic and "official" language was adopted, to be applicable both to party cadres and ordinary members. Different leadership styles aimed at educating the lower levels of the party were used. For example, about 15 committees with various responsibilities were set up under B. Gollnisch, a university professor.⁴¹ Initially, they were assigned the task of preparing speech outlines intended in particular for party candidates in the cantonal elections.⁴² In addition to providing "easily understandable" ideological "ammunition," this material clearly set the tone and outlined the behavior which candidates were required to adopt, from the very beginning.

The outline stated: "This document has the sole objective of helping the leaders, candidates, and members of the National Front to answer some objections or questions which are very frequently asked by observers of good faith who, without being hostile to us, still have some reservations regarding us. These reservations, even without their knowing it, are often the result of the disinformation efforts going on in the areas where they live. Attacking them brusquely when they have been subjected to misinformation by

the media could simply annoy them, as it is so true that no one wants to be considered a person who is easily influenced. Therefore, all of the members of the National Front are invited to join in a long persuasive effort with the public."

The undeniable, formal moderation of this document is further strengthened in terms of substance by the tone of the answers suggested to the candidates. For example, in response to the question, "So, would you like to throw the immigrants into the sea?" the candidates are advised to reply, "We are opposed to the policy of immigration but not to the immigrants as such." In a different area, the question is asked: "I am a civil servant. Now, Jean-Marie Le Pen often attacks civil servants. What can I expect from the National Front?" The outline recommends remarking, "Jean-Marie Le Pen is denouncing a general situation. In his mind this does not mean that there are no conscientious civil servants."

Beyond this kind of outline which is directly aimed at electoral situations, the Gollnish committees are preparing more timely outlines which set out the exact party position on major subjects of interest in order to avoid "interpretations" by the members which are too extreme in tone.⁴³

In the same way the committees were charged with drafting the doctrine and the program of the National Front. In these documents excesses in language were avoided, and unexpected values appeared (assistance to others, cooperation, solidarity, and liberty)⁴⁴ which are in notable contrast to the traditional doctrines of "work-family-fatherland." Furthermore, whereas in previous programs published by the National Front references were made to "defending", "asserting," and "reestablishing,"⁴⁵ the program now finds it sufficient to refer to "investing," "assuring," and "building."⁴⁶

Finally, university seminars and other study programs provide in the last analysis for the training of party members and officials. Their programs of training and then the respect for the toned down language of party pronouncements are evidence of the change in the National Front.

However, this process of change is not yet complete. In the context of the forthcoming legislative elections of March 1986 further diversification around several themes will be added to the reorganization and toning down of the party's statements undertaken in the period prior to the cantonal elections.

The Year of All the Compromises

The legislative elections of 1986 and the kind of election system that will be used for them are presenting the National Front with an "historic" opportunity: the probable representation in Parliament of the Extreme Right. This is a still unusual scenario under the Fifth Republic. This elections campaign has further deepened the changes going on within the party, changing its label even more clearly and turning it into a kind of National Rally.

The "spearhead of the national opposition"⁴⁷ will henceforth see itself as "the locomotive of a rally of various Right wing groups, social and professional elements, and independents."⁴⁸ The party is opening itself up and broadening its base by diversifying its range. This movement to the

center is arousing a certain amount of gnashing of teeth (so far limited) as much involving the most conservative groups, which are returning to their originally small splinter groups, as certain local leaders who are disappointed⁴⁹ at seeing people from other parts of France "parachuted in" to replace them.

--On the ground the process of change is beginning with a request for contributions from the association "Modern Enterprise and Freedom," which was established in 1985. Although this organization is officially autonomous, it is directed by European deputies from the National Front. Recruiting its members in business circles, among skilled workers, and among business proprietors, it calls on "all leaders of private enterprise to join in the reestablishment of free enterprise." Several levels of groups (covering various professions and sectoral and geographic organizations) function around "Modern Enterprise and Freedom." In reality, they are developing for the National Front a new network of groups which are really voices for the expression of its ideas. Added to this structure is another center made up of members of the liberal professions. The members of all of these groups are called on to support party activity and to expand the impact of the National Front in the professional circles in which they move. A committee has been set up to identify the most dynamic and most representative individuals in these groups. These individuals will then become active antennas for the party in their companies, organizations, and even orders or bar groups. Under this heading we note recent recruits to the party, including P. Descaves, former vice president of the SNPMI; P. Forestier, formerly the secretary general of the CID-UNATI; Doctor Bachelot, former delegate general of the Chamber of Liberal Professions; and finally A. Arette-Landresse, former president of the French Federation of Agriculture. Moreover, since 1985 the National Front has been sending people like these a bimonthly "Letter from Jean-Marie Le Pen," which is an integral part of the "charm offensive" aimed at this important group "of hidden voters."⁵⁰

Beyond these social and professional groups, other circles are being organized (women, veterans, serving military personnel, etc) and are being included in this structure which has the objective of making the best use for the National Assembly of those points of access among voters groups considered most likely to support its ideas and then to join its ranks.

--More directly political is the impact of the membership in the party of a certain number of persons active in politics and in Right wing opposition groups. Thus, the Comites d'action republicaines [Republican Action Committees] have joined the party, and B. Megret, its president, has been placed at the head of the National Front list in the Department of Isere. Similarly, J.-Y. Le Gallou, former secretary general and chief thinker of the Club de l'horloge, is second on the list headed by J.-P. Stirbois in the Department of Hauts-de-Seine. The Rassemblement pour les libertes [Rally for Freedom] is also represented in the party by H. Lavenir, its president. On the other hand, the negotiations undertaken with the CNI [National Center of Independents] of Ph. Malaud broke down in the middle of "the Demarquet affair." However, certain members of the CNI, dissatisfied that their party did not join in the National Rally, instead joined the National Front, breaking with their leader. These include M. de Rostolan, national secretary of the CNI, who is on the list of the National Rally. Other such people have

joined, including a certain number of local leaders of the RPR who were better "remunerated"⁵¹ (in terms of positions or places on candidates' lists) by the party of Jean-Marie Le Pen than by the party of Jacques Chirac.

All of these recently-joined figures--active in social and professional or political groups--are therefore real evidence of the diversification of the party, both in terms of its supporters as well as in terms of its potential.

However, this process of diversification, which is aimed at providing the National Front with the image of a less exclusive and more constructive organization,⁵² involves major "slowdowns" in the preparations for the legislative elections. It is true that an additional straphanger in the National Assembly is well worth a few compromises!

Changes in the organizational structure, toning down the stridency of its statements and, at the same time, its image, and, finally, the diversification of its membership are three strategies which play a role in the changes in the National Front, facilitating its adaptation to the political arena.

However, these efforts should not distract us too much.

Originally a splinter group of the Extreme Right,⁵³ the National Front, even if it has become a political party, remains an organization of the Extreme Right. Several indications provide evidence of this.

--Most of the oldest leaders of the party⁵⁴ followed the "royal path," the traditional "obstacle course" of every self-respecting French Right wing extremist! Although few of them were associated with Vichy,⁵⁵ it was the wars in Indochina and Algeria,⁵⁶ support for the UDCA led by Pierre Poujade, participation in the committees led by Tixier-Vignancourt, and the muscular opposition to the riots and demonstrations of May 1968⁵⁷ which constituted the principal stages in their political commitment. This commitment found⁵⁸ a conclusion which, after all, was quite logical in the timely establishment of the National Front. The National Front was the inevitable objective for those who were going to miss their targets in any case. This shortcut may seem hastily prepared or a suitable subject for caricature. However, it faithfully summarizes the path followed by a number of National Front leaders (even though some of them⁵⁹ cut corners or joined rather lately). Jean-Marie Le Pen is the "ideal type"⁶⁰ of member and then leader of the Extreme Right.

--This active past under the standards of conservative activism presupposes support for and the defense of specific values. Thus, although in the "pantheon" of leaders of the National Front the nation has an important place, the slogan of "work-family-fatherland" (in this order or in another order) is the real credo. Regarding order and morality, they share a common respect for the Catholic faith, which they often practice in its most traditional form.⁶⁰

--In addition to these well-marked values, we may find in the themes which the leaders of the National Front have "excavated" from the past the heritage of the French Extreme Right. From xenophobia to virulent anti-communism, involving also rampant anti-parliamentary views, the National Front follows an (extreme!) Right wing view. Furthermore, the denunciation of those who are

"against France," as well as the theme of a "plot" (more recently led by Islamic and Marxist elements), are part of the same tradition. This tradition is symbolized by fidelity to Joan of Arc, the perpetual myth of French nationalism.

-- Finally, its statements and the incitation to the exclusion of "the other" makes the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen a natural and spiritual heir of the "founding fathers" of French Right wing extremism.

Then isn't it striking to note that the National Front, on the eve of the legislative elections of March 1986, is generally conceded 10 percent of the vote, although the changes described above have not completely effaced its extremist features, which only yesterday were considered illegitimate and reasons for rejecting or excluding it from the political field?

A review of the past leads us to the conclusion that we are in the presence of one of the perverse effects of the alternation of political parties in power. The brusque reversal of the balance of political forces in 1981 had the consequent effect of liberating the Extreme Right of the French political field from a kind of reflex of criticism, progressively opening the way for its joining a party, a providential outlet for all this discontent: the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Therefore, the consolidation of the National Front depends as much on the balance of forces between the Left and the "classical" Right as on its ability to manage the new, strategic imperatives of its presence in the National Assembly.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the same sense, on the institutionalization of political groups, see Charlot, J. and M., "Les groupes politiques dans leur environnement" [Political Groups in Their Environment], in Grawitz, M., and Leca, J. (editor), "Traite de science politique" [Treatise on Political Science], published by PUF, 1985, Volume 3, pp 429-485.
2. As Matonti, F., notes, the natural effect of the proportional representation system "is to accentuate the representation of small parties by allowing the voter to avoid having his decision on how he will vote affected by the need to cast a useful vote in particular." See "L'extreme droite en France depuis 1981" [The Extreme Right in France Since 1981], a memorandum of the DEA [Department of Applied Economics], Paris I, 1984, p 62.
3. "Proportional representation replaces the binary logic of majority voting with a multipolar logic which profoundly affects electoral behavior," in Habib, L., "A la recherche de la cinquieme Republique" [In Search of the Fifth Republic], RPP No 919, September-October 1985, p 93.
4. Some 43 percent of the registered voters did not take part in the election.

5. As Matonti, F., notes, the system of electoral lists had "the effect of accentuating the attraction of a potential voter for the list of the National Front," op cit, p 62.
6. Some 64 percent of the voters for the National Front state that they voted "in order to speak in favor of reducing the number of immigrants in France." See "Les motivations de vote aux elections europeennes en faveur de la liste du Front national" [Voter Motivations in the European Elections in Favor of the National Front List], SOFRES, "L'opinion publique 1985" [Public Opinion in 1985], Paris, Gallimard, Table 4, p 181.
7. This is a classical phenomenon during off-year elections of minor importance.
8. We should add here the television appearance of Jean-Marie Le Pen on the "Heure de la Verite" [The Moment of Truth] (1984).
9. The only "tactic" of the National Front consisted of bringing forward personalities of all kinds who were respectable and legitimate. This tactic had the objective of reversing the extremist image of the party and of Le Pen's entourage.
10. Commentaries made at the time reported on the Le Pen "shock," the Le Pen "breakthrough," or even the Le Pen "effect." Rarely or never did they refer to a success by the National Front.
11. Charlot, J. and M., op cit, p 435.
12. The "administrative" organization of the party is really a prerogative delegated by Jean-Marie Le Pen to his "ultimate successor."
13. For more information on the organizational structure of the party and its manner of operation, see Birenbaum, G., "Les strategies du Front national: participation au champ politique et demarquage" [The Strategies of the National Front: Participation in the Political Arena and Borrowings from Other Groups], memorandum of the DEA, Paris I, 1985.
14. In effect, this bureau, which operates without sharing its powers over the party, replaces its members by cooptation, even though the party statutes provide for its election by the central committee. In fact, it is made up of a core of members present at the same time in the two cases where it designated (from among its own membership) the fortunate ones to be "elected."
15. At times the leader of the National Front makes decisions without consulting his subordinates. Thus, two members of the political bureau told us that the decision to withdraw candidates from the second round of the 1985 cantonal elections was made by Le Pen alone.
16. Jean-Marie Le Pen received 0.74 percent of the votes cast in the presidential elections of 1974; in 1981 he did not succeed in getting the 500 signatures necessary for his candidacy, nor to field more than 77 candidates in the legislative elections of that year.

17. The Paris headquarters of the party.
18. Above the party sections are the party sectors which include them.
19. Appointed by the responsible leader at the next highest level.
20. All political campaigns are orchestrated and controlled from Paris.
21. Moreover, and this is another form of Paris "domination," the bureaus of all local sections of the National Front are organized on the model of the political bureau of the party.
22. Within the party there are real, permanent "working class kingpins." They are party sympathizers. The National Front stimulates their "productivity" by repaying them in a largely honorary way. In effect, the slightest new responsibility, however limited or contingent on others, is sought after to the extent that it is perceived as a form of repayment.
23. As J.-P Schenardi (a regional secretary) explained it to us: "Performing the duties of a party section leader does not necessarily lead to nomination as a candidate in case of an election. A local leader is not necessarily the best candidate. It is necessary for local leaders on the ground, who fight the battle, to be different from the political leaders."
24. As a result, there are certain tensions within the party.
25. According to internal figures within the National Front, three-quarters of the candidates were running for the first time in an election.
26. See his article in the same issue.
27. Poll by Bull-BVA on the basis of a sample of 4,350 voters.
28. These are examples of typical Le Pen slogans.
29. Views expressed by the leader of the National Front at the time of his first appearance on "The Moment of Truth."
30. Miller, G., "Les pousse-au-jour du Marechal Petain" [The Pleasure Motives of Marshal Petain], Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1975, pp 109-110.
31. Bourdieu, P., "La representation politique" [Political Representation], "Actes de la recherche en Sciences sociales" [Social Science Research Proceedings], No 36-37, February-March 1981, p 13.
32. Ibid, p 13.
33. J.-P. Schenardi told us: "I am an anticommunist, first, second, viscerally, and any way you want it!"
34. All citations taken in the first place from Jean-Marie Le Pen are subsequently repeated in unison by all of the party leaders.

35. As Weber uses the term. See Weber, M., "Le savant et le politique" [The Scholar and the Politician], Plon, Paris, 1959, p 109.
36. The lack of professional political skills was the hallmark of National Assembly deputies who supported Pierre Poujade. The fact remains that they were really more lacking in political skills than are the leaders of the National Front, in fact. On this point see Birenbaum, G., op cit.
37. According to the poll carried out from 22 to 29 August 1984 by LE MONDE on "The Image of Politicians," 62 percent of the French people considered that politicians do not deal with the main subjects which concern the life of the French people. Some 82 percent believe that politicians do not tell the truth.
38. The example here, once again and always, is Jean-Marie Le Pen, whose professional experience as an editor is considered within the party the very incarnation of social success.
39. This is also an expression by Jean-Marie Le Pen, which has been included in the conversation of all of the party leaders.
40. A member of the political bureau, charged with the organization of Le Pen's public meetings.
41. The young dean of the University of Lyon.
42. The text of the outline was later printed in NATIONAL-HEBDO, the party journal (and then sold by news agents), in order to "familiarize" all party sympathizers with the official line.
43. For example, an outline may be devoted to the "right to vote for the immigrants."
44. "Un avenir d'espoir pour la France" [A Future of Hope for France], a pamphlet published by the party in 1985.
45. 1983 party program.
46. "A Future of Hope for France," op cit.
47. This is the name which the party gave itself in the 1983 version of its program.
48. Views expressed by Jean-Marie Le Pen to the first party Summer University Session (in September 1985 in Pau).
49. The most dissatisfied have gone so far as preparing dissident lists to make things difficult for the official list of the National Front.
50. That is how J.-M. Le Chevalier, a deputy in the European Parliament and the real right hand man of Le Pen, describes this publication.

51. One of the strengths of the National Front is knowing how to dangle tempting responsibilities before "disappointed" members of the RPR (and this is done at all levels of the party!).
 52. The program of the National Front has recently come out in a popular edition (for the first time).
 53. At the time it was established in 1972 the National Front for French Unity was the "electoral machine," the respectable antenna of "Ordre nouveau" [New Order], which was dissolved on 28 June 1973.
 54. At the moment these figures are still numerous within the political bureau.
 55. Only R. Gaucher (a member of the political bureau) was sentenced to 3 years in prison after the liberation in 1945 for having been active in the "Jeunesses populaires" [People's Youth] of Marcel Deat.
 56. Having fought for a French Algeria is a constant theme among the leaders of the National Front. Some of them have even defended illegal actions, such as R. Holeindre, sentenced to 3 years in prison for having belonged to the OAS [Secret Army Organization].
 57. In splinter groups like "Occident," which were properly dissolved shortly after the events of May 1968.
 58. As explained by P. Durand (a member of the political bureau) and one of the most faithful among Le Pen's supporters, "After the Tixier Committees, there was a long period when we had no particular political movement, and we all looked forward to the establishment of the National Front."
 59. May Max Weber pardon us for this distortion of his concept!
 60. R. Marie, a deputy in the European Parliament, brought together around the party a nebulous group of traditionalist associations, such as the Committees of Christianity and Solidarity or the General Alliance Against Racism and for the Respect of French and Christian Identity.
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FUTURE POTENTIAL OF NATIONAL FRONT VIEWED

Paris INTERVENTION in French Jan-Mar 86 pp 33-41

[Article by Pascal Perrineau]

[Text] The National Front seems to have settled down in French political life. The polls give it 8 to 9 percent of announced intentions to vote in the legislative elections of March 1986. The French electorate gave it 8.8 percent of their votes in the cantonal elections of March 1985 and nearly 11 percent at the time of the European elections on 17 June 1984. Jean-Marie Le Pen fills the television screens and the air waves. Nearly one-quarter of the French people agree with the ideas which he supports. Although the party which he leads has less of an impact than he does, it is no less present in all French regions, where its posters, decorated with the tricolored flame, are to be seen. The 60,000 claimed party members are different from those labelled Extreme Right wing in the 1970's. Candidates are flocking to the National Front: there were more than 1,500 of them defending the colors of the Extreme Right in March 1985. The preparation of National Assembly and regional assembly lists of the National Front is evidence of the power of attraction of the movement. There will be numerous recruits from the traditional Right wing, as well as provincial personalities, on the electoral lists of the National Front in March 1986.

So why do we see this sudden vigor on the part of a party which, since its creation in October 1972, had seemed to be losing its vigor? And what do the March 1986 elections teach us about the future of this political movement?

A Sudden Apparition

The explosion of the National Front in the European elections of June 1984 surprised all observers. In 3 years the Extreme Right went up from 0.29 percent of the vote (on 24 June 1981) to 10.95 percent of the valid votes. In 1983 there were four early signs of this exceptional upward movement. The Le Pen list received 11.26 percent of the valid votes in the 20th arrondissement of Paris in March 1983. In September 1983 the list headed by Jean-Pierre Stirbois, the second ranking leader of the National Front, obtained 16.72 percent of the valid votes in Dreux. In November 1983 a National Front list in Aulnay-sous-Bois, headed by a relatively unknown person, took 9.32 percent of the valid votes. These three municipal "successes" convinced Jean-Marie Le Pen that it was time to enter the National Assembly elections. On the

occasion of a legislative by-election in the second district of the Department of Morbihan he picked up 12.02 percent of the valid votes on 11 December 1983. After years of remaining on the sidelines, the Extreme Right seemed to have come out of the shadows. It remained to be seen whether it would take up the challenge of national elections. Its last previous experience, at the time of the European elections of 10 June 1979, had resulted in a shattering defeat: with 1.33 percent of the votes, the European Right wing list was last of the nine lists presenting themselves to the public in the polling places. Just 5 years later the Le Pen list was on an equal plane with the Communist Party and became the fifth party in what had previously been the "gang of four."

We might have thought that, after this bout of fever, the voters attracted by Jean-Marie Le Pen would return to a more peaceful outlook. The history of the three offensives by the Extreme Right since World War II argued that things would work out in this way. The Poujade protest of January 1956, the Right wing activist opposition to the government in April 1962, and the nostalgia expressed for Tixier-Vignancour in December 1965 had only been flashes in the pan. That does not seem to be the case with the eruption of Le Pen in the 1980's. However, 10 March 1985 does not seem to have been very favorable for the new arrivals on the political scene. The National Front had candidates in three-quarters of the cantons holding elections and attracted 8.8 percent of the valid votes. Still, this was a record for the Extreme Right in the cantonal elections which leads us to believe that the National Front has the support of about 10 percent of the voters in a national election. In effect, it was not able to find any supporters in about one-quarter of the cantons, and it presented no candidates there. In the cantons where it had candidates, it "held onto" its 1984 electoral support and made particular progress in the urban areas. For example, in the 90 cantons holding elections in the Rhone-Alps region where it presented candidates in 1985 the National Front went up from 7.1 percent of the registered voters in 1984 to 7.4 percent in 1985. For the first time in several decades the Extreme Right succeeded in "holding" its voters. The "bout of fever," far from disappearing, has continued. So why this appearance of the Extreme Right and the electoral confirmation of its strength in the France of 1983-86?

The 'Why's and Wherefore's'

There are many explanations. Certain observers look to the economy: the economic crisis, unemployment, and the insecurity flowing from them allegedly prepared the way for a French style neo-fascism. Others look for the answer in culture: the dominant system of values, under the effects of the crisis, reportedly has been changing since 1980 in the direction of a growing authoritarianism particularly suited to the outlook of the National Front. Others still look for answers in history: in their view the Jean-Marie Le Pen movement is nothing more than the reactivation of a very French tradition, that of a reactionary Right which for more than 3 decades has been effectively excluded from French political life since the liberation in 1944-45. Finally, the last group of observers looks to psychology: the reappearance in force of the Extreme Right is stated to be due to "the Le Pen effect," to the popularity of a demagogue, "overendowed with a simplistic outlook," who allegedly has occupied the space left vacant by the conversion of the Left to realism.

All of these explanations compete in throwing light on the breakthrough of the Extreme Right, but we must note their limitations. The present economic crisis developed in France over the period between 1973 and 1982 without leading to an increase in the political attraction of the Extreme Right, which won 0.52 percent of the vote in 1973, 0.76 percent in 1974, 0.75 percent in 1978, 1.33 percent in 1979, and 0.29 percent in 1981. The rigorous cultural movement back to the center at the beginning of the 1980's could just as easily have found a political outlet in the "Bonapartist" tradition which in some respects perpetuates the neo-Gaullism of Jacques Chirac. Regarding the resurgence of an old, slow moving, historical current, we know that history does not always evolve in the same way. The Boulanger style militarism of the late 19th century often drew strength from the socialist and radical traditions of the Extreme Left. This is not the case with the National Front. The French fascist organizations of the 1930's were marked with the seal of anti-capitalism, which has largely disappeared from the entourage of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Finally, regarding "the Le Pen psychological effect," how can we ignore the fact that the man has been active in French political life for the past 30 years? He was elected to the National Assembly on two occasions, in 1956 and 1958, and was a candidate in the 1974 presidential elections. He is not a new figure on the political scene and had not made much of an impact until recently. So why should a man and ideas which had not made much of a mark for decades have found such an echo in the period since 1983? A precise analysis of the electoral bases of the National Front makes it possible to provide a partial answer. An analysis of electoral returns and data obtained from polls² has led us to discover an electorate whose sociology is dynamic and whose political profile is rather diversified. On the other hand, this electorate is very homogenous in terms of the things it opposes, which bring it together, and the fears which nourish it.³

A Dynamic Sociology

In certain respects the portion of the electorate supporting the National Front is more of a sociological twin of the electorate of the Left than the electorate of the traditional Right. It is not an electorate where the social characteristics of the traditional Right: that is, mostly feminine, on in years, bourgeois, and devout, are particularly evident. On the contrary, the National Front electorate is very masculine, well represented among the young people, a mixture of social classes, and is not generally religious in outlook. Without a doubt, it is the most definitely "male" electorate: 60 percent of the voters of the Extreme Right are men, whereas men are a minority (48 percent) of the French electorate as a whole and of the electorate of the traditional Right (45 percent). This is an electorate which has not yet retired, on the whole. Moreover, people 75 years old and older have their reservations about the National Front and gave only 3 percent of their votes to it in the elections held on 10 March 1985. On the other hand, the Extreme Right is attractive to mature voters (35 to 64 years old) and to young people: 9.6 percent of the 18-24 year old age group and 10.4 percent of the students voted for the National Front. This electorate, which is younger than that of the traditional Right, also includes a mixture of social classes. The National Front is electorally well represented in all social groups. Bourgeois groups (the liberal professions and senior cadres) and working class groups (laborers, salaried employees) gave 8 to 10 percent of their votes to the National Front. Contrary to a widely held view, the working class is not

particularly attracted to the National Front: 8.2 percent of working class voters supported a candidate of the National Front on 10 March 1985. At the time of the European elections, on 17 June 1984, only 8.8 percent of them voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen's list, whereas the National Front obtained 11 percent of the votes among voters as a whole. On the other hand, one social group which was attracted to Poujade 30 years ago is once again listening to the sirens of the Extreme Right: the proprietors of small businesses, tradesmen, and factory owners. In 1984 some 21 percent of this group voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen. In 1985 14.6 percent of them supported the National Front. As distinguished from Poujadism, the National Front has not limited itself to this bastion of small merchants and craftsmen and has run up an appreciable vote in more "modern" social groups: 9.4 percent of salaried employees of the private sector and 9.6 percent of senior cadres and the liberal professional group. This aspect of "modernity" is found again in the cultural area. The voters supporting the National Front tend to be outside the religious tradition. It has its best percentage of the vote among non-practicing Catholics (9.9 percent) and is weaker among regularly practicing Catholics (7.2 percent). The message of tolerance of the French bishops has more of an impact than traditional activism among the Catholic faithful.

From the sociological point of view, the voters supporting the National Front are not typical of the voters of the traditional Right. Reflecting rather faithfully the diversity of French society, this new group of voters holds rather contrasting political views.

A Heterogeneous Political Profile

More than half of the electorate of the National Front comes from the traditional Right: 55 percent of those who voted on 10 March 1985 for the Extreme Right had voted for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on 10 May 1981. However, more than 40 percent of the voters for the National Front come from other groups: 22 percent voted in favor of François Mitterrand on 10 May 1981. Some 19 percent did not vote in that election because of age or because they wished to abstain. Therefore, some people who were "disappointed with socialism" did not hesitate to travel the long road which leads from the Left to the Extreme Right. Some observers concluded somewhat hastily that they thought they recognized many communist voters among these deserters from the Left. That was not the case at all. Among the elements of the Left which went over to the National Front, it was the communists who were the fewest: only 1.5 percent of the communist voters of 1981 voted in the European elections of 1984 for the National Front. Some 5 percent of the socialist voters of 1981, 10 percent of the UDF voters, and 16 percent of the RPR voters supported the National Front in the European elections of 1984.

A Vigorous Social Protest

This relatively heterogeneous character of the Extreme Right electorate had its greatest impact when it proved that the Extreme Right has succeeded in moving beyond its traditional sphere and sinking its roots in the electorate of the traditional Right and, to a lesser extent, in the electorate of the Left. This multi-faceted character of the Extreme Right may also be a source of weakness, to the extent that many voters of the Extreme Right continue to

vote for political parties other than the National Front. Only 52 percent of the voters of the Extreme Right say that they feel close to the National Front. On the other hand, some 18 percent support the RPR, 8 percent support the UDF, and 4 percent, the Socialist Party. There is sharp competition between the National Front and other parties from the parliamentary opposition group over these Extreme Right voters, who are split between various party allegiances. Therefore, the centrifugal forces operating on the National Front electorate are not inconsiderable. However, any dispersion of these voters seems unlikely because of their very strong and homogeneous motivations.

Whereas the triple motivations affecting the vote of the French people as a whole is highly economic--jobs, taxes, and purchasing power--the motivations of the voters for the National Front are much more oriented to social questions. Although 41 percent of the National Front voters consider that jobs are one of the subjects which have most influence on their vote, some 73 percent of them place the questions of insecurity, crime, and immigrants in first place. These are the three concerns of the voters of the National Front. Jean-Marie Le Pen's movement owes its success to the fact that it somewhat hastily amalgamated these three themes into a few formulas with a devastating impact: "3 Million Unemployed = 3 Million Too Many Immigrants" and "Immigration = Insecurity." The leader of the National Front politically crystallized the resentments and protests of many French who, irritated by 10 years of crisis, are looking for scapegoats: the state, immigrants, criminals, and minority groups. This political crystallization was made all the easier since the arrival of the Left in power made "these odds and sods, these black sheep who cause all the trouble" all the more visible. The recruitment of civil servants and the various acts of nationalization made the state budget that much larger. The laws of October 1981 on the entry and stay of foreigners and on the regularization of the status of illegal immigrants stabilized the immigrant population. Finally, the amnesty, the end of special criminal courts, and the abolition of the death penalty went against the grain of a society which, since 1980, has felt "a wind of authority"⁴ blowing through it. It remained for Jean-Marie Le Pen to offer a political outlet for all of these protests, which were particularly strongly rooted in urban concerns. For about the past 10 years the growth of the cities has stopped. The urban world is no longer the kind of "new frontier" which drew millions of French people in the 1950's and 1960's. The city is seen more and more as a finite, limited, immobile universe in which the various communities must learn how to live together. In a context of crisis this closed area is made to order for the accumulation of irritations and fears. The most popular of these issues appear to be feelings of insecurity and the rejection of immigrants.

The Area of Urban Concerns

A brief look at the voting map for the National Front shows that the bulk of its voters are in urban France to the East of a line from Rouen to Perpignan (see Map 1). In most elections western and west-central rural France is mission territory for the Extreme Right. The urban roots of the Extreme Right are new and mark a break with the rural base of Poujadism (see Map 4). Finally, it only partially overlaps the southern area of the map of those who are nostalgic for French Algeria (Maps 2 and 3). This urban France in which the National Front has its roots is also that part of France where the largest


communities of immigrants are concentrated. It is in this urban and cosmopolitan area that feelings of insecurity and the rejection of immigrants have developed in particular. These are two essential motivations for the Extreme Right vote.

However, may we conclude that this feeling of insecurity and this rejection of immigrants are closely related to objective insecurity and the presence of large numbers of immigrants with whom the National Front voters would be in closer contact than others? This is questionable. At times this view is expressed too hastily on the basis of a comparison between maps of departments showing the vote of the Extreme Right and those showing immigration and urbanization.


On the one hand recent studies⁵ have shown that the connection between objective insecurity and the feeling of insecurity was very tenuous. Often, the feeling of insecurity is not the result of individual experience but rather of collective experience. That is, the experience of groups of people of whom the individual is a part. Often making up these groups are urban neighbors whose fear is the fear of nearby border areas which these residents know very little about or only incompletely. A careful review of electoral returns for the Extreme Right in large cities leads to the conclusion that the Extreme Right vote does not always break records in residential areas where objective insecurity is the greatest.

On the other hand once you leave aside regional or departmental analysis and observe the commune or the residential quarter, the relationship between a strong Extreme Right vote and the presence of immigrants has a tendency to disappear. An analysis relating the percentage of immigrants and the percentage of votes in favor of the Extreme Right in the European elections of June 1984 in the 32 communes of the Grenoble metropolitan area confirms that there is no clear relationship between the two phenomena. Peaceful, residential communes, bourgeois in social composition and without any significant immigrant presence, gave from 11 to 17 percent of their votes to the Le Pen list in 1984: for example, the communes of Bresson, Corenc, Meylan, Biviers, Montbonnot, Le Fontanil, and Saint-Ismier. On the other hand, working class communes with large immigrant populations gave less than 11 percent of their votes to Jean-Marie Le Pen: for example, the communes of Fontaine, Saint-Martin-d'Heres, Froges, Villard-Bonnot, and Domene. The Extreme Right did not break any records in areas where the voters are living in close proximity to large immigrant communities. The immigrant presence seems to structure the Extreme Right vote, but only indirectly. Rather than being centers of large groups of immigrants, the areas where the Extreme Right made its greatest impact were often areas where there are large concentrations of immigrants on the periphery. It is in this kind of residential area, with quiet buildings and homes, with its settled population accustomed to feeling secure, that the immigrant is most rejected. He is not a neighbor, but one can see him on the edges of the neighborhood. The picture emerges here of what might be expected from an authoritarian electorate. Maps prepared under the influence of the National Front are largely a kind of cartography of fear in modern cities. This is what Anne Cauquelin used to say was related to the borders which open onto danger and "imagining those individuals who, on


the other side, organize themselves like enemies, with their customs, their language, and their skills in housebreaking, which are always exaggerated."




Map 1 - 1984 European Elections: the Le Pen List



Map 2 - First Round of 1965 Presidential Elections:
Tixier-Vignancourt Vote



Map 3 - April 1962 Referendum: the 'No' Vote



Map 4 - 1956 Legislative Elections: Poujade Plus the Extreme Right

Since 1982 Jean-Marie Le Pen has made use of these concerns of city dwellers, who are exasperated by the crisis and affected by political disillusionment. He has brought them together and has exploited them shamelessly. That is one of the keys to the success of the National Front. What is the future of this political movement, nourished on complex concerns and simplistic acts of exorcism?

The National Front and the Elections of March 1986

As the elections of 16 March 1986 approach, six major questions come up:

[Question] Will the breakthrough of the National Front cause trouble and, if so, at what level?

[Answer] The good performance of the National Front in the cantonal elections of March 1985 showed that this movement was something other than a passing phenomenon. The National Front seems to have gone beyond the analogy of a "bout of fever" which disappears quickly and which characterized all of the movements of the Extreme Right since 1945. After having proved itself in two elections in which no major national interests were involved, the European elections of 1984 and the cantonal elections of 1985, the National Front is faced for the first time with a decisive national election. The polls state that the National Front will have 8-9 percent of the vote, whatever the strategy of union or disunion adopted by the parties of the parliamentary opposition. Therefore, compared to its vote of 11 percent obtained at the time of the European elections, the National Front is going through a slight decline, due to the shift of some of its voters toward the RPR and the UDF lists. The competition with the RPR seems to be particularly strong. On the evening of 10 March 1985 some 16 percent of the National Front voters were considering voting for the party of Jacques Chirac in the legislative elections. Some 10 percent were considering voting for "various Right wing parties," and 8 percent for the UDF. Therefore, Jean-Marie Le Pen risks seeing rather deep inroads made into his supporters. However, since 1984 the National Front has tended to "hold onto" its voters more and more. Only 45 percent of Jean-Marie Le Pen's voters were considering voting for a National Front list in the legislative elections, as of 17 June 1984. Nevertheless, only a few months later, on 10 March 1985, 60 percent of the National Front voters were considering voting for a Jean-Marie Le Pen list. The level of influence of the Extreme Right on the evening of 16 March 1986 will depend largely on its capacity to turn its electors of that day into faithful supporters. Bringing together the party faithful and winning over the "lukewarm"--these are the two principal objectives of any political party during an election campaign.

[Question] What about the "lukewarm" supporters? Does the National Front have electoral reserves?

[Answer] The principal ideas hammered home by the National Front have attracted a current of sympathy going well beyond its 8 to 9 percent of the registered voters. About 31 percent of the French voters approve of the position of Jean-Marie Le Pen on immigration. About 29 percent of the voters approve of his position on security and justice, and 24 percent approve of his defense of traditional values. It is among these sympathizers that the National Front recruits new supporters. About 17 percent of the French voters consider, in effect, that it is not out of the question that they will vote for the National Front at some time in the future. A well conducted campaign can attract some of these potential voters to the Extreme Right. It will still be necessary for the National Front to provide itself with the image of a "respectable" party.

[Question] Will the National Front succeed in attracting "national leaders"?

[Answer] The National Front remains the party of a popular leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and old figures from the Extreme Right. The latter, including Roger Holeindre, Jean-Pierre Stirbois, Roland Gaucher, or Bernard Anthony will lead the lists of the National Front in the legislative elections in the Departments of Essone, Hauts-de-Seine, Somme, and Tarn. However, for the past year the National Front has no longer looked like a more or less emaciated group of former agitators. First of all, the membership has grown to the point where it succeeded in presenting more than 1,500 candidates in the cantonal elections of March 1985, whereas it was barely able to present 65 candidates in the elections of March 1982. In March 1986 the National Front will be present everywhere and will have more than 2,000 candidates. Finally, the National Front, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jean-Pierre Stirbois, has undertaken the job of bringing "major personalities" into the party by welcoming people from the traditional Right and distinguished persons in society and in the economy. Former deputies of the traditional Right, such as Pascal Arrighi, Gabriel Domenech, and Edouard-Frederic Dupont, will appear on the lists of the National Front. Figures who have transferred from the RPR (Bruno Chauviere in the Department of Nord and Georges de Cornois in the Department of Oise) or from the UDF (Jean Roussel, from the Department of Bouches-du-Rhone) will participate in the legislative and regional elections. Finally, many socially and economically prominent people will lend all of their weight: Francois Bachelot, delegate general of the Chambers of Liberal Professions in the Department of Seine-Saint-Denis, Pierre Descaves, vice president of the SNPMI in the Department of the Oise, Jacques Vaysse-Tempe, president of the Assembly of French Citizens Repatriated from North Africa and municipal councilor in the Department of Haute-Garonne, and Bruno Megret, president of the Committees of Republican Action in the Department of Isere.

This strategy of "attracting notable personalities" from all directions has led to a hostile reaction among some members of the party apparatus who split off and established the National Opposition Front on 23 November 1985. No doubt the National Front hopes that the loss of a few party members will be largely compensated for by new voters who are sure of the "power of attraction" of the Extreme Right.

[Question] Will the National Front attract enough voters to deprive the traditional Right of electoral victory?

[Answer] With 8 to 9 percent of the votes and about 30 deputies in the National Assembly, according to projections on the breakdown of seats, ¹⁰ the National Front seems to be unable to deprive the parliamentary opposition of a victory in March 1986. With about 50 percent of the voters intending to vote for it, the traditional Right should control more than 300 seats in the National Assembly (an absolute majority consists of 289 seats). However, in case of weakness or divisions in the government majority, the National Front could well play the role of "trouble maker." Let's not forget that in 1956 Pierre Poujade, with about 50 deputies, deprived the Center-Right coalition of victory. It should be said that the Center-Right at that time was much weaker than the Right and the Center of today. Although the National Front has

little chance of becoming a government party at the national level, this is not the case at the regional level.

[Question] Can the National Front become a party with regional power?

[Answer] The influence of the Extreme Right which, in 1984, had gone beyond the barrier of 10 percent of the votes in 11 of the 22 French regions, can realistically aim at opening the doors of several regional executive authorities. Everything will then depend on the attitude of the traditional Right. If the traditional Right wants to keep or win certain regions, it will have to choose between an alliance with the Extreme Right and the third force. Which will win out, between the firmness of its statements refusing to collaborate with the Extreme Right or its hostility toward the socialists? Such a question could come up on the evening of 16 March 1986 in the regions of Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon, Ile-de-France, or Picardie. Whether or not they are given ministerial portfolios, the representatives of the National Front will be solidly installed in most of the regional assemblies.

[Question] How will the National Front stand up under the test of parliamentary representation?

[Answer] Proportional representation is going to permit the entry in force of deputies of the Extreme Right in the National Assembly and in the regional assemblies. This parliamentary recognition can provide new legitimacy to the National Front which, at the moment, suffers from a certain lack of credibility regarding its capacities as a party in power. The history of the parliamentary fortunes of the Extreme Right indicates that the power of the National Front will tend to trickle away into the parliamentary sands. This was the case with the Poujadist group in the National Assembly after 1956. However, as we have seen, the National Front has a sociological dynamism, a political structure, and personnel who were not available to the Poujade movement. The National Front is decidedly not a thing of the past.

5170

CSO: 3519/174

KYP LEADERSHIP SAID TO BE FULLY POLITICIZED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun 86 p 1

[Text] The position of deputy chief of the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] will be assumed by former secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order K. Tsimas as soon as the new law on the KYP is approved. This conclusion can be clearly drawn from the statements made yesterday by the government spokesman, who had remained silent when this information had appeared in an opposition newspaper 2 weeks ago, but who hastened yesterday to confirm an article in the well-known publication that is so dear to the government.

In answer to a question on the subject, Mr Papaicannou specified that under the present legal status of the KYP no civilian can be appointed to the position of deputy chief of the organization. However, this will be made possible with the approval of the new law. He added that "he is not committing himself" for the period immediately following the passage of the new law on the KYP.

It should be noted that Mr Tsimas, together with Mr Tsouras and also the replaced leadership of the Greek Police, had repeatedly been criticized by the opposition as unfit for his position at the Ministry of Public Order.

When the Ministry of Public Order came under Mr Drosogiannis, both Mr Tsouras and Mr Tsimas (who "resigned" in order to facilitate the new minister), as well as the leadership of the police were dismissed from this sensitive sector. This had been interpreted as proof of a change in government policy on issues pertaining to the Ministry of Public Order at a moment that was so critical for the government's credibility in confronting terrorism. The impression had also been created that the new minister, Mr Drosogiannis, would be the principal figure in carrying out the new attitude. Of course, the government had stated right from the beginning that another important government position would be given to Mr Tsimas after his "resignation." However, his appointment to the KYP position when this organization is being restructured minimizes the meaning of his dismissal from the Ministry of Public Order.

It is also emphasized that meanwhile, another person has been appointed to the leadership of the KYP who has been publicly criticized by the opposition (Mr Makedos, well-known after the offending report he had written on Greek Americans when he was serving at the Greek Embassy in Washington).

Political observers believe that Mr Makedos' and Mr Tsimas' appointment to the KYP should be interpreted as characteristic of the government's choice of a climate of confrontation vis-a-vis the opposition. While filling the positions of head and deputy chief of the KYP is the exclusive competence of the government, the latter cannot choose individuals who have repeatedly--and not without justification--been criticized by the opposition, especially when the government calls on it to form a "national responsibility front."

/12232

CSO: 3521/161

BRIEFS

EANES FAVORING LEFTIST FRONT--During a recent meeting with a group of Pintasilgo supporters, Eanes expressed interest in the convocation of a convention of the left, and declared that he favors a strategy involving a front that would bring together forces from the PRD, the PS, the PCP and independents, a coalition that would be able to claim power from the right and govern the country. [Text]
[Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 May 86 p 64] /12232

CSO: 3542/115

REPORTAGE ON TCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE SIXTH PLENUM

Central Committee Statement

TA271808 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
1700 GMT 26 May 86

[Turkish Communist Party Central Committee statement on its Sixth Plenum,
dated 26 May]

[Text] The Sixth Plenum of the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] Central Committee has convened. The plenum discussed the Political Bureau report read by Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Haydar Kutlu. It analyzed the situation in the country and the world at large and determined the party's duties. It also reviewed the preparations for a national conference. It discussed and approved the 1986 TCP national conference (?notebook) and decided that it will be opened to discussion within the party and by the public following the necessary [word indistinct]. The plenum also discussed the steps to be taken for the national conference to succeed.

One cannot talk about a qualitative change in the regime despite a new series of [word indistinct] as a result of the determined struggle by the democratic forces. Claiming that Turkey is on the path of democracy, the Evren-Ozal dictatorship and its supporters within the imperialist camp are, through various maneuvers, trying to prevent the people and the democratic forces from forming a determined opposition. They are also trying to confuse, divide, and destroy the people and democratic forces, and to isolate the leftist forces. While U.S. imperialism is quickly taking steps to further commit Turkey to its war plans and to cause tension in Turkey's relations with its neighbors, the last vestiges of the nation's economy are being destroyed, dependence on imperialism increased, and workers and syndical rights curbed and further through bills adopted by the parliament.

The TCP appeals for a mobilization to halt the United States and the dictatorship is gaining a new dimension under the current conditions. The Sixth Plenum has determined that currently there are more possibilities to realize such a mobilization and to create a united democratic mass movement for peace and democracy. The Izmir rally of the Turkish Confederation of Labor [Turk-Is], which was the first powerful mass political protest against the dictatorship and which was realized through the joint effort of the broad

democratic forces, together with the participation of the communists, as well as this year's May Day celebrations, which had the same characteristics, are clear evidence of these possibilities. The fact that the Turk-Is Leaders Council has decided on new rallies and a general strike, and that the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] administration had noted the necessity for demanding rights by taking to the streets with the people, shows that it is possible for the large masses to walk together with the comrades who participated in the Izmir rally.

The Sixth Plenum has once again stressed that the major problem in halting a deterioration of the situation in all areas, in halting the fascist dictatorship, and in realizing a general amelioration of the situation, is one of securing the unity of all forces in favor of peace and democracy. Such unity can be realized only through the belief that it is possible for Turkey to be saved from the current situation, and through a convergence around a strong conviction in the path to liberation. The TCP has presented in detail its national democracy program regarding Turkey's liberation through the documents entitled "The TCP National Democracy Alternative," and "The TCP Reform Program for the Turkish Armed Forces," adopted by the Sixth Plenum, and through the previously adopted document, "The TCP Peace, National Security, and National Sovereignty Alternative."

The TCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum has given all communists the duty of discussing the TCP alternative proposals with all the democratic forces, and of developing a dialogue and cooperation with these forces in preparing for the national conference. Furthermore, it has also given them the duty of familiarizing the masses, including those in factories, workplaces, districts, villages, schools, and universities, with the party views. The TCP has taken the necessary measures to achieve these goals. The TCP plenum has declared its unconditional support for the determined inclination [as heard] among the ranks of the democratic opposition and has drawn attention to the wrong inclinations among these ranks. The TCP will increase its effort to draw the masses into a political struggle and to strengthen the mass movement. To this end, the TCP will continue its political campaigns for the abolition of the defense cooperation agreement, a general political amnesty, syndical rights, and the economic and political rights of the toilers, as well as its campaigns against the U.S. bases, tortures, arrests, oppression of the Kurdish people, unemployment, layoffs, and low wages.

The Sixth Plenum discussed the proposal submitted by various leftist circles to form a legal leftist or socialist party, and it decided that given the current conditions such a move would not help the leftist forces fulfill their duties in the struggle for democracy or help strengthen leftist unity and socialist ideals. The plenum called on all citizens and democratic forces to exert every possible effort to halt the government project to sell the public economic enterprises to the private sector, and to prevent the United States from using the bases in Turkey against our neighbors. The plenum also stressed that the ever increasing slander campaign against our neighbor Bulgaria facilitates the U.S. Administration's moves to use Turkey for its own aggressive plans, and it called on all democratic forces to take a sound and responsible stand and to more actively oppose this campaign.

The plenum also assessed the 27th CPSU Congress and adopted a special resolution drawing attention to the historic significance of the congress and its enlightening effect on the struggle for peace and social progress. It called on all of the nation's democratic forces to respond positively to the constructive and responsible stand taken by the Soviet Union regarding world and regional peace, and friendship and cooperation among people. The plenum also called on all communists and all the other revolutionaries to take as an example the Leninist path of the Soviet communists in their daily activities.

The TCP is preparing for its national conference in a revolutionary and struggle-oriented spirit, bearing in mind its grave responsibilities. We have all the preconditions to enable our national conference to be the springboard toward reaching the goal of a stronger TCP. The party organizations and all communists should prepare themselves for the national conference in the spirit of the communist struggle and should achieve their goals by fulfilling all their duties. Everything should be directed toward the success of the national conference.

[signed] TCP Central Committee, 26 May 1986

First Installment of Kutlu Address

TA281420 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
0400 GMT 28 May 86

[First installment of opening speech by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] Dear comrades. I am opening the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] Central Committee Sixth Plenum. The entire party is aware of the significance of this plenum. The reports from our party organizations, the numerous letters sent to the party organs, and the meetings we held following the announcement of our decision to hold a national conference indicate that our party members are enthusiastic about this decision. Our party organizations' work on this matter began with the Political Bureau's proposal concerning preliminary work on the conference. Currently, all our organizations are conducting this work and expecting a new direction from the Central Committee Sixth Plenum. In this plenum we will discuss the theses of our national conference and conduct intensive work regarding many topics.

What will be the major emphasis of this work and the TCP national conference? What is the essence of the work the TCP wants to carry out and the goals it wishes to attain? We must again point out a topic which we always stress. In its history, Turkey has never faced such severe deterioration. However, this situation also constitutes the basis for the emergence of very wide-ranging and dynamic forces for the salvation of our country. Deep-rooted and democratic transformations in the economic, social, and all other fields are becoming apparent. This creates an extraordinary opportunity for us.

Unprecedentedly large democratic forces can now unite and pave the way for a positive change in the country's destiny for the next 100 years. What should be done to this end? First we must ensure that everyone realizes this fact, which we have expressed in simple language. In other words, we must explain repeatedly that Turkey is facing a historic opportunity. To be able to realize and exploit this fact, one must first carry out a consistent and determined policy and struggle within the highly unstable atmosphere in our country. This point is crucial for the democratic forces. Why? The unstable atmosphere is creating new situations. We must of course observe all the circumstances. However, this must not cause us to waver or hesitate in our basic policy.

Second, the dictatorship's tactics should not be allowed to deceive the democratic forces, especially the leftist forces. Through its known tactic of a return to democracy, which it was obliged to resort to, the dictatorship made certain concessions. However, it also created significant opportunities for itself. It is, on the one hand, holding on to the fascist state mechanism to be used in one way and degree or another when necessary, and even strengthening this mechanism; on the other hand, through the civilian government and parliament it is exerting an ideological and political influence on the masses that would not be possible through a naked dictatorship. It is able to deceive the democratic forces and even the leftist forces and the masses. Its chief goal consists of preventing the unity of the democratic forces and dividing them, and of obstructing rapprochement between the leftist forces and other democratic forces. It is necessary not to be deceived by these tactics and to separate the leftists from other democratic forces by wrongly assuming that a gradual transition to democracy is underway.

This is the message we want to relay to our people and all democratic forces. Our people should choose their own regime, their own future, and their own path of development. U.S. imperialism, the Evren-Ozal dictatorship, and the owners of big capital who support the dictatorship are the arch-enemies trying to prevent these goals from being achieved. An end should be put to U.S. interference in our domestic affairs and to the U.S. military and political presence in our country. Our people should be freed from the U.S. yoke. The Evren-Ozal dictatorship should be overthrown and it should be made to account for its deeds in order to prevent future 12 September coups. These goals can be attained only through the unity of all forces against U.S. imperialism and the dictatorship, the establishment of a united mass democratic movement [words indistinct]. These views constitute the fundamental principles of our national conference theses. In these theses, we are presenting in detail the national democracy alternative which is the most realistic alternative to the current regime.

The party program approved by our Fifth Congress serves as a sound guide. Developments in the country have proved that our program is right. Our policy, which responds to concrete development, is not derived from the simple and logical principles of our program but from the concrete situation and an empirical struggle, under the guidance of our program. Political developments have not only proved our policy correct but have also proved our

program correct. In the beginning, some of our comrades and friends who could not see the dialectic ties between our program and policy thought that these two were contradictory. There were even those who attempted to confront the program against the policy. The empirical class struggle was the best reply to this confrontation. Such anomalies have become rare. The reason we refer to it is that such views have caused us to think more profoundly about our activities.

The creative implementation of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with our national characteristics is now becoming a lively theoretical and empirical experiment. The national conference will transform this experiment into practical lessons. What are we trying to realize with our theses? The TCP is showing the realistic and revolutionary path to put an end to the fascist dictatorship and to establish a national democracy in order to prevent the deterioration of the situation in the country and to achieve an amelioration. A turn for the better may not be [passage indistinct].

Securing a turn for the better is a major issue not only in our country but on the international level as well. The aspiration to peace is the most basic and natural aspiration of humanity. What can be more natural than the right to exist? However, this most basic and natural right [words indistinct]. The threat against peace is not [words indistinct] because the source of the nuclear war threat is the aggressive policy pursued by the U.S. Administration. It has now become clear that this policy is not a passing [word indistinct] policy. The U.S. Administration is now in the hands of the military industry, the arms manufacturers and their men, the politicians. In other words, the most aggressive, reactionary, and chauvinistic forces of imperialism are the source of the war threat.

The United States has not given a single positive reply to the numerous peace proposals of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. decision to continue its nuclear experiments, the Star Wars project, the barbaric attack on Libya--without the knowledge of its allies--and the threats against our neighbors, Iran and Syria, show that the United States is determined to pursue this inauspicious policy.

Everyone in our country and the world at large can clearly see the source of the threat to peace and human development. The peace process, as you will see in detail in our Political Bureau report, is being strengthened in our country. The possibilities for a strong anti-imperialist movement to be born are increasing. There are other positive factors as well. The program to free the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000 that was announced by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Gorbachev on 15 January 1986; the idea of an international security system put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress; the proposal to significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons in Europe made by Comrade Gorbachev at the 11th SED Congress; the Soviet proposals on banning chemical weapons; the withdrawal of foreign fleets from the Mediterranean; the solution of the Palestinian and Cyprus problems; and other peace initiatives have stirred a significant reaction in our country as well.

Our Central Committee will dwell on the 27th CPSU Congress, and we believe we are not exaggerating in calling it a historic event. We should immediately add that even those in our country who are opposed to the Soviet Union have not been able to ignore this congress. However, we should add that the Turkish radio and television and the yellow press, which are the mouthpieces of imperialism and the dictatorship in our country, consider it their duty to conceal from our people the responsible and constructive stand of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries regarding the future of humanity and the peace movement gaining strength in the world. We cannot say that we are taking every step to inform our people on the peace proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. We should not assume that our people know everything that we know. We should not refrain from repeatedly explaining to our people these peace proposals and responsible stands.

The current world situation is such that even those who do not embrace socialism can see that it is in their interest to be friends with the Soviet Union. Current domestic and foreign conditions facilitate the explanation of this reality to these circles. Making these forces, which are not ready to embrace socialism, see these realities will also serve to turn back blatant anti-communism and anti-sovietism, which is the primary goal of our current ideological struggle.

Comrades, at this time communists must completely adhere to the reliable principles of Marxism-Leninism and follow with a lively interest new developments in the world. The 27th CPSU Congress has been a guide in our search in this direction and has encouraged our efforts. Political reaction continues to be the invariable and deepening characteristic of present-day capitalism. Capitalism incessantly nurtures reaction. On the other hand, through its ideological campaigns and its sometimes-overt, sometimes-covert brutal interventions in people's political lives, imperialism is further strengthening reaction and providing thus for a forceful shift to the right.

The deepening economic and social disintegration in our country, along with cultural deterioration and decadence, make a serious ideological struggle imperative. This negative situation is influencing the leftist movement in an ideological sense. Any movement which does not examine the concrete and active problems created by socialist developments is doomed to be ideologically corrupt. No movement can continue to exist under such circumstances. As a result, aimless discussions lead to neglecting the main enemy and indulging in mere internal struggles, and the movement becomes prey to internal dissensions and divisions.

In the wake of the Fifth Congress of our party, we have dealt specifically with the main issues. Currently, our party is not neglecting any issue by saying it does not concern us. This stand increases interest in theoretical and practical fields. From now on this interest will be intensified. It must not be forgotten that in our time, the basis for ideological struggles is the fight being waged between the reactionary and progressive forces.

When considered from this point of view, it can be observed that a healthy movement which is seeking a way to liberate our country, which is close to Marxism-Leninism, and which is composed of a broadening force of revolutionary and democratic forces, is coming alive. We, the communists, want to unite our search for a solution with theirs. This is possible only if we are not bound by ideological conformity.

Capitalism's internationalization is currently being intensified. This development increases by many times the importance of proletarian internationalism compared with the past and provides it with a broader area of influence, increasing the importance of international solidarity.

The general crisis of capitalism is deepening. The domestic instability of capitalist economies is widening through minor structural crises. Mass unemployment and inflation are becoming permanent problems of those economies. We can clearly see the destructive results of these problems in our own country. In the same way, western democracies, which are praised in a bid to minimize the superiority of socialist democracies, are suffering from deep crises.

All these developments accelerate the heightening of the working class struggle and encourage the struggle being waged against the monopolies by the non-proletarian sections of the people and the broad-scale middle classes. As a result of these developments and under the influence of socialism, the mass democratic movements are gaining extraordinary strength. This development, along with the mass peace movements, represent one of the most characteristic traits of our time.

Another new characteristic of our present-day capitalist world is the blatant interference of the United States in the internal affairs of not only developing but also of developed countries, in order to forcibly impose its policies on them, and the appearance of a national conscience in view of the increasing nuclear destructive threat.

The contrast between the people who are most clearly in favor of the preservation of world peace, and imperialism's most reactionary, aggressive, chauvinistic, and war-mongering forces, is gaining both a national and international understanding. This contrast has become an integral part of the fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism in our time.

Currently, this reality can be observed to a greater degree in our country. The working class in our country, which is the fundamental revolutionary class of our time, today faces such challenges as struggling in the front lines for the preservation of world peace, fighting against foreign capitalistic and domestic exploiters, and trying to overcome the fascist dictatorship. Our working class is obliged to save the entire nation by liberating itself. It must become the saving class of our country. The TCP is convinced that the moment it is equipped with true and appropriate policies, our working class will be able to accomplish this task. Our party is working toward this end. Views expressed in our arguments are based on these general considerations.

Second Installment of Kutlu Address

TA281353 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
0400 GMT 29 May 86

[Second and last installment of opening speech by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] Dear Comrades. One may ask if such a detailed alternative program is necessary. It is not difficult to see that a change for the better, both in international relations and in the domestic field, is not easy to achieve. Undoubtedly, the chief task now is to eliminate the Evren-Ozal dictatorship, and achieve democracy. However, we claim that it is not possible to be satisfied with structural political freedoms that remain wholly superficial. Of course, we do not minimize these freedoms, but the fascist dictatorship cannot be uprooted unless fundamental moves are undertaken to effect deep-rooted democratic changes in the social, economic, cultural, and all other fields.

As demonstrated in detail in our theses, the change that accompanied 12 September was not a simple one. The dictatorship implemented significant and deep-rooted changes in the state and economic structure. The social implications of these changes will emerge more clearly in time. The Evren-Ozal dictatorship crushed all the positive aspects of our social development since our national liberation war and the Ataturk period, and strengthened and built in all the negative aspects. In short, Turkey is once again faced with the task of construction. Naturally, this is not yet the task of socialist construction; it is the task of constructing an independent, sovereign, democratic, and progressive Turkey. It is to this end that we are proposing the program of democratic reforms.

Another question that comes to mind is whether this is the TCP's own government program or whether it is the program of a government in which the TCP's participation is a precondition. Of course, we are not entertaining the illusion that the TCP will be able to establish a government immediately--tomorrow. However, we are saying that if it were possible and we could assume power under existing conditions, this program could be implemented. We are stating the duties and issues a democratic government is obliged to resolve, whether or not we are a part of it. Even if we do not participate in it, we will support a government that undertakes to resolve these tasks. However, there is no doubt that such a comprehensive program cannot be fully and substantially implemented unless such a government relies on the weight on the working class.

Comrades, the task before us remains unchanged. Despite new factors in developments, the regime is still in power. Our task consists of waging a struggle against the dictatorship for democracy, together with everyone. The phase of dialogue and cooperation between the democratic and leftist forces is yet to be achieved or concluded. The duty to create a united democratic movement is before us. This is why, as we stated in our report,

we cannot justify the legal Socialist Party proposal. The most important reason for this is the ideological one. A Socialist Party established within the legal framework outlined by the dictatorship is bound to lag behind its own social legitimacy. Despite the good intentions of those who proposed such a party, it would not be able to properly defend the socialist ideals. If today there is a vacuum, a social necessity in the legal field, it is absence of a communist party.

Moreover, an attempt to establish a new party without first struggling to reopen the Turkish Labor Party and the Turkish Socialist Workers Party, which were established legally and which gained both social and legal legitimacy--in other words, without first waging a struggle for extracting this democratic right from the dictatorship--would also undermine the spirit of resistance for democracy. The current task is to secure the solid unity of all democratic, leftist, and other forces in factories, workplaces, and neighborhoods based on the masses.

Comrades, we see that people outside are beginning to understand the attitude of the TCP toward the bourgeois opposition. All the same, we must note that while it is impossible to hear the breath, let alone the voice, of the illegal leftists in the bourgeois press, the following messages reach millions of people through their parties: There is no democracy in Turkey; there is torture; the United States is interfering in our internal affairs; MIT [National Intelligence Organization--FBIS] is fulfilling a negative function; militarism is continuously undermining democracy; this government is oppressing the religious; Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the Penal Code must be abolished; the Constitution must be amended; this government must be toppled; this government, this parliament, and this president are not based on the will of the people; Turkey is a country of prohibitions; May Day is the workers' holiday; and others.

Only those who cannot think with a cool head can deny the importance of disseminating these thoughts to millions of people. The TCP will not hesitate to openly support every view or move against the dictatorship on the road to democracy, regardless of its source. Naturally, we criticize the opposing attitude of these circles and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, we have always stated and we will always state that none of the branches of the bourgeois opposition is powerful enough to solve any of the people's real problems and that they do not constitute a source of hope.

In summary, it is currently up to us to show our people the road to real salvation. The duty to better acquaint the masses and the other democratic forces with our party's views on this matter and to transform these views into concrete strengths falls on our national conference. We do not claim that with our theses we are supplying the most correct answer to everything or that we foresee everything. On the contrary, we are creating a discussion platform with the widest-ranging forces.

Especially now, the creation of joint opinions and the exerting of joint efforts both inside and outside the party are of great importance. Therefore, all the comrades who discuss our policy with anyone outside the party must

advocate and discuss this policy with a flexible and tolerant, but at the same time determined, attitude. They must also be receptive to all correct views. The success of our conference undoubtedly depends on this.

On the other hand, it is vital for our national conference to obtain concrete and tangible results on all the fundamental issues we have raised. Among these issues are: securing the unity of broad-ranging democratic forces and the leftist forces; strengthening the masses' economic and political action; creating an anti-imperialist peace movement and a united mass democratic movement; and expanding and enhancing our party's circle of sympathizers. We also must take into account that the masses we must currently embrace are much larger than during the pre-12 September period. Our concepts of mass movement and mass organization must therefore change. In other words, we must develop the kind of work that embraces every progressive goal and that is devoid of any sectarianism. This point is particularly important for the youth, union, women, and intellectual movements. We must take our relations with our allies seriously and shoulder the responsibility of these relations. We must learn and teach how to work together. Our arguments must be convincing rather than [words indistinct] and crushing our opponent. We must have a patient and [word indistinct] policy of persuasion.

What is the current situation of our party? Is it strong enough to shoulder all the duties we have named? I do not hesitate to say yes. Our friends as well as our enemies are well aware that we exaggerate neither our strengths nor our capabilities. We are following the path of truth. While saying yes, I am bearing in mind all our weaknesses and shortcomings. One should, no doubt, thoroughly interpret our positive reply. What is the focus of our strength, which we shall increase during our conference? In other words, what kind of a stand shall we adopt, given the strength we possess?

We are trying to show the following points to the leftist forces outside our party: Democracy cannot be attained only through the strength of the working class and the left. No results can be achieved in this way. It is evident that the TCP cannot expect to achieve results only through its own strength. However, we can be very influential in securing the unity of the forces that can obtain results. We exert an influence on the conditions that will give way to a positive result.

There are three conditions for attaining this goal:

The first condition is that the TCP increase and strengthen the confidence of the masses and the democratic circles.

The second condition is that the TCP should be able to show to the masses and the other democratic forces that the country can be saved, that development can be achieved. The TCP at least should be able to show that the people's living conditions can be remarkably improved. It should be able to show that such goals are not illusions. The TCP should be able to instill optimism in these forces in order to stimulate them into action. We should thus instill a strong desire and determination for struggle. This is the revolutionary essence of our alternative program.

The third condition is to first create an organized movement--even if it is not widespread in the beginning--in all the dynamic sectors of the masses, namely the factories, the unions, and among the youth and the intellectuals, and to make use of all the legal possibilities in the most effective manner.

We now have the strength to meet all these three important conditions. I would like to recall that we do not claim to have attained our goal of a stronger TCP. We are currently in the initial stage. We will assess what our party has and has not achieved in the aftermath of its Fifth Congress. We can say the following at this time: The TCP has been part of all the actions taken since the 12 September coup. The TCP was not only part of these actions, but it also directed them. It not only gave advice but it actually initiated them. The Izmir rally and the 1986 May Day celebrations are significant examples. The same thing can be said about the actions taken outside Turkey. The reports sent by our organizations and, what is more important, the numerous letters we have received from our followers that show our party's influence prove this point. It is not a coincidence that after every important action the police and propaganda machines of the regime have chosen our party as the major target of their attacks.

I would also like to state that no force can disrupt the unity of our party. We have achieved our unity without resorting to a liquidation of opposition within the party, in the name of purification. Instead we have achieved it through patient dialogue and persuasion of comrades with different views. This demonstrates both to those inside and outside the TCP the true meaning of a party.

This is perhaps the first time I have stressed the achievements of our party. However, our party has continued on its struggle path without a day of interruption. This is the achievement of all our comrades and especially our comrades in [words indistinct]. I am now referring to your achievements, because during the conference I shall mercilessly criticize your shortcomings. At our national conference we will not stand before our working class and our people only with our views concerning the liberation of our country and the alternative program. We shall expose the achievements as well as the failures of our party. We want our people to have confidence in the TCP. However, we shall seek their trust and confidence not through demagoguery but through concrete views and actions.

We shall give our last reply to those who are never content with the achievements of our party, the staunch TCP enemies and police efforts to portray our party as an organization seething with secret intrigues. We shall give our last reply to this shameless smear campaign against our party. This will be our last and final reply. Our party, which for years has been the target of the most barbaric and unimaginable assaults and smear campaigns, is the most democratic and open party in our country. We have confidence in our party and our party has confidence in its comrades. Our party members are proud of being under the roof of a reliable [word indistinct]. Our party's followers are increasing. Is the fascist dictatorship referring daily to our party in vain?

As a last word, we shall gain a policy [words indistinct] at our national conference. We have self-confidence because [words indistinct]. The democratic alternative which we have put forward strengthens our belief that our country can today enter the path of national and social liberation. We want to spread this belief to the masses. I believe tht our Central Committee, which will convene after the conference, will include on its agenda new and concrete revolutionary duties, that a new and clearer path will open before us, and that a considerable [words indistinct] in the goal of a democratic Turkey and a strong TCP. We wish all our comrades success in this [words indistinct] which has created a new revolutionary spirit.

First Installment of TCP Activity Report

TA2011145 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
0400 GMT 30 May 86

[First installment of Political Bureau activity report read by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] Dear comrades. Nearly 6 months have elapsed since the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] Central Committee last met. This is not a long period. Nevertheless, it has been long enough to prove, through developments that have occurred, the complete justification of our party's evaluation, policies, and concrete stand. Moreover, the pace of developments during this period has accelerated. It appears that developments will accelerate even further.

Our party's determined policies are of a nature that can cope with such rapid change and can contend with new situations and events that emerge in every field of its political struggle. This fact is now clear. Currently the problem is to widely and actively disseminate our party's policies of democratic unity and determined struggle among the masses. Our prominent task today is to increase our efficiency in every field, to expand our party's activities among larger masses, and to make new achievements in our struggle to accomplish the unity of the broadest possible democratic forces.

It is in this spirit that our party is preparing for its national conference to be held in 1986. We have all the necessary conditions to transform our national conference into a very important springboard to attain our goal of a stronger TCP. The Sixth Plenum's task is to take the measures necessary to realize this potential.

International Situation

The dangerous tension in the international situation still prevails. There are signs of new intransigence in this situation. The reply of the U.S. military-industrial complex to the relatively successful Geneva summit between the U.S. and Soviet leaders, which has given all mankind hope for better times, has been to intensify its efforts to reach military supremacy over the socialist countries and to engage in extraordinarily aggressive acts

against the countries which refuse to bow to the U.S. impositions and want to preserve their independence.

The international situation has reached the point where the Reagan Administration can no longer conceal its aggressive aims behind its so-called peace-loving statements. U.S. imperialism is now pursuing the policy of proving its military might through the use of military force, trying in this way to impose its interests on the world's nations. U.S. imperialism is dreaming of regaining the positions it lost and is losing through its use of force. These dreams will lead nowhere, yet they represent great dangers for the fate of all mankind.

The United States is insisting on implementing its plans to militarize space. It has already received the agreement of the British and FRG imperialists for this initiative. The United States and NATO insist on not considering the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. administration is persistently continuing its nuclear tests. NATO is getting ready to store the new two-stage chemical weapons developed by the United States in Western Europe and Turkey.

In addition to increasing its pressures on Nicaragua, the United States has attacked Libya, bombing this country before the eyes of the entire world and completely exposing its true face. This brutal act carried out by the United States against the Libyan people without consideration for women or children has caused a strong reaction both internationally and among our country's people.

More and more people are now beginning to understand the reply to the questions of which side really wants peace, which side prefers war, and where the source of the war threat lies.

The program announced by Comrade Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 to free the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the Soviet proposal to hold a summit meeting with the United States to discuss a ban on nuclear experiments, the proposal put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress on an international security system, the proposal made by Gorbachev in Berlin to significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons within the region stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains--namely the entire European continent--and the Soviet proposals on a ban on chemical weapons, on the withdrawal of all foreign fleets from the Mediterranean, and on the solution of the Cyprus problem are indisputable proofs that the Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of peace.

This fundamental and reliable policy creates great opportunities for a peaceful future of our country, a close neighbor of the Soviet Union. A positive Turkish reply to the peaceful Soviet proposals and initiatives will greatly contribute to regional and world peace. The 27th Congress of the brotherly CPSU, this historic forum of the Soviet communists, is a strong indicator of the responsibility felt by the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the international communist and workers movement and the whole of humanity, as well as of its capacity to fulfill the duties stemming from this

responsibility. Our party has time and again stressed the importance of the 27th CPSU Congress. The TCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum, through a resolution informing our people of the significance of the 27th CPSU Congress and formulating the duties that befall us, will help us benefit from the opportunities the CPSU Congress has created for us.

The Foreign Political Situation and the Peace Struggle

U.S. imperialism, which is faced with world and U.S. reaction against the moves to escalate the arms race and its attacks on Libya, is preparing for new and more dangerous attacks. The United States is ready to launch new air raids on Nicaragua, Iran, Syria, and Libya. President Reagan has not hesitated to make these threats personally. The hawks of Washington have termed this policy "new globalism". They claim that this policy of "new globalism" aims at securing world peace and tranquility. However, in actuality this policy is tantamount to creating trouble for all peoples of the world and transforming our planet into a battlefield. The lesson to be learned is that the struggle for peace should be strengthened throughout the world.

This fact carries more importance for our country. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has clearly stated that Turkey is the focal point of many U.S. regional strategies. In U.S. plans, Turkey constitutes a bridge to war. [as heard] Dangerous developments confirming these facts, which we have been stressing from the very beginning, have occurred in recent months. Two U.S. battleships have crossed the straits on their way to the Black Sea and have violated Soviet territorial waters. What would the consequences be had the Soviet Union been as irresponsible as the United States? What would have happened to our country, which has 60 U.S. war bases with nuclear warheads? Every patriot should dwell on this issue at length.

Those who shamelessly exploit the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident, claiming that Turkey is covered with radioactive clouds, in order to serve their anti-Soviet campaign, are continually concealing from our people the danger posed by the U.S. bases. The United States insists on building 11 transmitters for its radio stations carrying anti-Soviet propaganda, and on deploying new chemical and nuclear weapons on our soil. The same determination is being shown with regard to obtaining logistic and deployment rights outside the NATO framework for the Rapid Deployment Force.

In addition to extending the Turkish-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement, secret negotiations are underway to sign an agreement entitled "Wartime Host Country Support". With this agreement, the United States wants to use our soil for the Rapid Deployment Force [RDF] and to secure the support of the Turkish armed forces for RDF attacks. The Evren-Ozal administration is ready to sign this agreement. The same willingness applies to the Defense Cooperation Agreement. The administration is waiting for the public reaction to subside.

Soon after the Libyan attack, President Reagan announced that the United States might attack our neighbors Iran and Syria as well. Speaking in

Bahrain, Vice President Bush said: In the event that we sense a danger in the region, we will immediately intervene militarily even if we are not requested to do so. The Evren-Ozal administration is indifferent to this stand which directly concerns our country. The same indifference was exhibited regarding the Libyan attack. The administration even extended aid to the United States. All these facts clearly show us that U.S. pressure on Turkey will increase and that Turkey may, at any moment, be dragged into a war because of the United States even if the Evren-Ozal administration is opposed to it.

The United Nations has declared 1986 the Year of Peace. It is currently more necessary and possible to strengthen the struggle for peace in our country. Every measure of oppression implemented by the dictatorship against the peace struggle will be a clear violation of the UN resolution. Every voice raised in favor of peace will, at the same time, strengthen the struggle for democracy.

These developments have proved, in a concrete manner, the reliability of our alternative program of foreign policy to meet our national interests. We have fulfilled a duty in proper time. Now we should spread our views and proposals further. The forces that may respond to us positively are increasing. Statements made by many circles show that their foreign policy concerns are similar to ours. A crushing majority of our community and all the opposition forces sided with Libya at the time of the U.S. attack. This shows that our views on the existence of forces in our country that can stop U.S. imperialism were not based on illusions, and that our people's anti-imperialist traditions are vivid. We should increase our effort to unite all these forces.

A narrow and limited approach to foreign policy problems by the opposition forces outside our party prevents them from becoming more active against the great danger on our doorstep. Nationalist [words indistinct] are tying the hands of many circles when it comes to taking a stand on the Cyprus problem, the Turkish-Greek conflict in the Aegean, the Syrian and Bulgarian issues, and the constructive and peaceful Soviet proposals. However, national interests can be secured only if national approaches can be transcended and security interests can be taken into consideration by all parties concerned.

The U.S. policy of "new globalism" can be countered through a collective security concept and through an unselfish approach, taking into consideration our security interests as well as those of all our neighbors. Only in this way can we prevent U.S. interference in Turkey's relations with its neighbors and the creation of new conflicts. Many circles adopted the correct stand regarding the Libyan issue. We believe that this stand should serve as an example for the other pending issues. However, one should not wait until the danger is at our doorstep, as was the case in the Libyan issue.

If the necessary pressure is applied on the Evren-Ozal administration, it can be prevented from extending the requested service to the United States. Therefore, all the democratic forces [words indistinct] in order to abolish the Defense Cooperation Agreement, to take control of the U.S. bases in our country, and not to sign any new agreement with the United States. The campaign against the U.S. bases should be stepped up.

Second Installment of TCP Activity Report

TA310955 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
1400 GMT 31 May 86

[Second installment of Political Bureau activity report read by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] The Internal Political Situation

Dear comrades, although there has been a series of developments in the political life of our country, developments that should not be underestimated, there have been no qualitative changes in the regime. After the DISK officials, the officials of the Peace Association were released; the suspects in the intellectuals' case were acquitted; a large number of political prisoners were released as a result of the new law on the execution of sentences; the public speaking ban on former politicians was lifted; some policemen were sentenced for torturing prisoners; the Turkish Confederation of Labor was allowed to stage a rally; and legal press organs that defend progressive views are being allowed to expand their activities. These are important new developments and there are more that can be added to the list.

However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret these developments one-sidedly. These developments naturally show that the democratic forces have achieved important gains in issues about which they have waged a persistent struggle for a long time. These achievements increase the possibilities of the democratic forces. However, if you look carefully, you will see that none of these gains are guaranteed, that they can be taken back any minute, or at least neutralized.

Even though the possibilities of the democratic forces have increased, the maneuver [by the authorities--FBIS] to which we pointed a long time ago has supplied and is continuing to supply possibilities to the dictatorship as well. The dictatorship resorted to the maneuver of allowing the establishment of new parties and holding elections with a view to preventing serious opposition by the democratic forces. It assumed a civilian appearance on the one hand and regained, even if it is to a limited extent, the mass support it had lost by using the Motherland Party to confuse the masses, on the other. Thanks to this maneuver, the dictatorship prepared the ground for obtaining the support of Western European imperialism. In this way, the dictatorship is confusing the masses and ideologically influencing and guiding them through the civilian government, while retaining the 12 September mechanism of oppression and the possibilities of using it more harshly any time it wants. That is the situation today.

During the analysis of the political situation in our Fifth Plenum, we had determined that very broad opposition forces were united in opposing all the basic institutions of the existing regime and that the masses had reached a point where they were open to the idea of action. During the subsequent months, the Correct Way Party, the Democratic Left Party, the TCP, other

leftist forces, and the Prosperity Party posited the view of a national conciliation for a new constitution, the movement for an amnesty gained momentum, and important worker actions were carried out.

Evren, who is [words indistinct] the political isolation of the fascist dictatorship regime from the masses and from the democratic forces, has been forced to admit that he is the only one defending the dictatorship constitution today. However, because of the reason we mentioned earlier, the dictatorship has not become incapable of controlling developments, nor has it taken a permanent step back, even though it has suffered a political isolation. Therefore, it would be a mistake to ignore the danger that the dictatorship might toughen. The democratic struggle is developing, but this danger will increase unless the democratic forces unite and assume more determined positions.

The dictatorship, by using the means made possible by the maneuver, is trying to divide the democratic opposition, to prevent the masses from joining the political struggle and the mass movement from growing. When necessary, it is making the necessary obligatory compromises.

The aim of imperialism and of the collaborationist oligarchy is to protect the government positions they have gained, to ensure that Turkey plays the role assigned to it in U.S. military and political plans, and to maintain the 24 January economic policy so that the Turkish economy can be closely tied to the world capitalist centers in all aspects. They can make various other compromises in order to prevent a united democratic opposition, but it should be well understood that they will do all they can to prevent any developments that might create obstacles to their aims.

Obviously, democracy is an obstacle to them. The democracy yearned for by the people was not, is not, and never will be compatible with the military and political role assigned to Turkey by the U.S. military-and-industrial structure, with the approval of the British and West German imperialists, with the desire of the multinational monopolies to exploit Turkey to the end and maintain it as a backward and dependent country, with the habit of the Turkish monopolist bourgeoisie, which is always after gains without production and without investments, of exploiting the state resources, and making a profit of 1,000 to 1.

The democratic struggle cannot be successfully waged in Turkey, where imperialism is an internal factor, unless we can fully grasp the changes of the past years in the international situation, in the structure and attitude of the imperialist capital, and in the Turkish economy.

We would like to underline the fact that imperialism and the collaborationist bourgeoisie are as afraid of a wide bourgeois democracy in Turkey as they are of a revolution. Therefore, in order to stop the real processes toward democracy, they both resort to all kinds of tricks, and they retain all the possibilities to brutally crush these processes when necessary. Furthermore, they take sly steps in order to increase these possibilities and to reinforce the fascist institutionalization. The examples are not few. In recent

months, armed security units have been assigned to large private and state enterprises. When the efforts to arm certain persons against the people under the guise of village protectors in eastern Turkey did not yield the desired results, the authorities began to organize new official armed units for that purpose. Meanwhile, preparations are underway to allow the free sale of arms to supporters of the regime. Recently, the interior minister instructed the entire police force to take measures especially against the student and worker movements. Who can talk of democracy in a country where the police force is trained against the worker and student movements?

The latest examples are: the plainclothesmen during the Turkish Confederation of Labor rally in Izmir, the extraordinary police measures taken during that rally and on May Day with a view to frighten the people, and the inability of the Turkish Parliament to bear the name of May Day as "Workers Day".

Here, we must also point to the new election law. This law envisages a two-party regime. We believe that even those who fail to see how the state structure is being turned fascist, those who forget that the militarist generals have not abandoned their government positions, and those who think that because elections were held Turkey has moved toward democracy, even those people will realize, by merely looking at this law, that Turkey is not moving toward democracy, that one cannot move toward democracy in this way.

In response to the many-sized tactics undertaken by the imperialists and the collaborationist oligarchy to accord the dictatorship a democratic appearance by making certain concessions, one can witness two erroneous tendencies in addition to a correct tendency in the ranks of the democratic opposition. The correct tendency consists of insistently concentrating on the fundamental tasks of the struggle for democracy without being deceived by these tactics, enhancing the determination of the opposition, and supporting the struggle of the masses. As opposed to this, one of the wrong tendencies is leaving the door open to conciliation with the regime and the forces behind it, remaining indifferent to the basic tasks, and believing and expecting that a step-by-step transition to democracy is possible. The other wrong tendency consists of overlooking the new opportunities created by the dictatorship's tactics and not taking advantage of them.

All three tendencies, in our opinion, are present in all the ranks of the [word indistinct] of the democratic opposition. How did the correct trend present itself in the past period? We saw it in the following phenomena: the strengthening of the movement to stop torture, expose it, and bring the torturers to justice; the determined attitude adopted by many deputies of the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] and CUMHURİYET, and the efforts these circles exerted in a bid to stop the pressures on the Kurdish people; the defense of May Day at the Assembly; the Izmir rally organized by Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor], the decision by its organization to hold new marches and meetings, and the announcement that a general strike will be held unless the government changes its stand; the strengthening of the idea of democratic unity with Turk-Is; the united stand of the Correct Way Party [CWP] and the Democratic Leftist Party [DLP] for new elections, a new constitution,

and a new president, and their open cooperation with other opposition forces for a new constitution; the Prosperity Party's support for this move; the SDPP proposal to hold early elections at several provincial and district congresses, and this party's consistent defense of democracy; the intensified anti-militarist moves by Suleyman Demirel and the CWP against the top-level Army administration; the recent overt expressions of concern regarding the MIT [National Intelligence Organization]; the argument by the Prosperity Party that in addition to Article 163, Articles 141 and 142 of the Penal Code must also be abolished; the expansion of the circles which react against our country's slave-like dependence on the United States; the intensification of the demands for peace; the support displayed by all the legal opposition parties for Libya in the face of the U.S. attack against that country, and their more sensitive attitude concerning the protection of our national interests against the United States; the joining of leftist forces broader than the forces comprising the Leftist Unity in an active campaign to secure a general political amnesty and to stop the tortures and the oppression of the Kurdish people; the recent petition submitted by lawyers; the signatures collected by artists against censorship; the intellectuals' determination to fulfill their tasks in the struggle for democracy in an organized and unified manner; the moves undertaken by the SDPP together with leftist intellectuals to defend democratic rights; the courageous moves by various organizations of intellectuals on the subject of democracy; the determination of democratic youths to use the right they obtained through unity to establish a student association for the purpose of resolving all students' common problems; and the emergence of an initiative by democratic women to protect women's rights.

The wrong tendencies, on the other hand, became apparent from the fact that the SDPP administration regards the existing constitution, parliament, and government as problems of an ordinary regime and acts accordingly; that the SDPP claims that it will be sufficient for it to come to power to solve the problems and it shuns early elections; that it does not join in the CWP and DLP initiative to amend the Constitution; that it leaves the door open to conciliation with militarist generals; that it attempts to cooperate with foreign capitalists and TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association], and issues statements to this effect; that it asked the Social Democrats in the Council of Europe not to pressure the regime in Turkey; that, in practice, the DLP chooses the leftists and intellectuals that do not sympathize with it rather than the regime as a target of opposition; that the DLP remains indifferent in the face of basic issues such as the urgent problems raised by the masses in various actions and the struggle against tortures; that the DLP does not demonstrate an attitude consistent with its pronouncements regarding a wide-ranging democracy and freedom toward the TCP; that the CWP turns a blind eye to the oppression of the Kurdish people; that the CWP does not hesitate to make anti-communist statements against the TCP; that the Turk-Is administration expects the government to change its anti-worker attitude; that it is extremely slow and lax in implementing the decisions on action; that it does not adopt the problems of other toilers; that the legal socialist party forces [words indistinct] in the illegal leftist movement; that the tasks of intensifying the actions of the masses, spurring the mass organizations, and expanding the leftist influence in these

areas are not sufficiently fulfilled; that the legal socialist parties are satisfied with a policy that merely interprets events rather than insistently pursuing a political right to achieve democracy; that the majority of Turkish and Kurdish democratic forces continue to emphasize the points that separate them from other democratic forces more than those that unite them with these forces; and that certain leftist circles with legal publications adopt an attitude which minimizes the working class and its role in the democratic movement, which claims that we must wait for the progress of capitalism, which supports the idea of a leftist movement detached from the worker's movement, and which encourages anti-Sovietism.

The basic reason for the influence of these wrong trends on the democratic opposition is the fact that the current policy of the U.S. imperialists and the collaborationist oligarchy has not been fully understood and the belief that it is possible to attain democracy without struggling against this. There is a conviction that the image engendered by their tactics is the reality--that the regime has softened and that we will attain democracy gradually and easily. There are those who talk on the task of securing themselves a position rather than attaining democracy. They cannot see that it is impossible to secure a lasting position to serve the people without uniting in the struggle for democracy.

Third Installment of TCP Activity Report

TA021535 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
1700 GMT 1 Jun 86

[Third installment of Political Bureau activity report read by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] In this past period, the TCP supported without preconditions and with all its means the healthy strengthening of the ranks of the democratic opposition. It tried to strengthen this movement by its own activities, and voiced the necessary criticism against all signs of wrong tendencies without compromising its constructive and unifying policy. It showed how these tendencies enable imperialism and the collaborationist oligarchy to maneuver and help them achieve their aim of dividing the democratic forces.

The Central Committee Fifth Plenum determined that the only way to strengthen the right movement in the democratic opposition and increase its determination is through enhancing the mass movement, and the plenum placed this duty before us. It also decided to carry out political campaigns to this end. That this policy was correct was specifically proven in this past period. This did not happen naturally; it happened as a result of the party organizations' activities in line with the policy determined by the Central Committee.

The Izmir rally is both educational and encouraging in many aspects. It revealed the great power that can emerge from labor unity, when it is achieved. The rally also reflected the developing consciousness of the working class. The tendency to restrict the rally within an economic

framework was eliminated, and the rally turned into a powerful political protest where the political as well as economic demands of the working class were voiced.

Even if there were a few mistakes, the TCP played a very active role, in line with the Fifth Plenum decisions, in uniting the differing political tendencies during the preparation and organization of the rally. If we look at the Izmir rally, we see very clearly that when the working class becomes active and carries out action with its own struggle methods, when the communists and their supporters, who pursue a policy that defends the unity of all the democratic forces and the interests of all the other toilers, increase their efforts, the dictatorship is pushed against the wall and is unable to hide its true face, and the tendency to wage a determined struggle gains strength in the ranks of the other democratic forces.

The strike of 3,500 state monopoly workers in Samsun, the workers' and their families' protest in Sungurlar, the strike of the train engineers in Ankara and Istanbul, and the march organized by unions in Balikesir were important acts of protest.

We can say that if we are able to fulfill the necessary requirements, this year's May Day will be the beginning of a new phase in the struggle for democracy, in that it was marked by phenomena, which are not related in practice, but which are actually closely interrelated through the numerous ties of the social position and role of the working class and the objective dialectic of the democratic struggle; by the May Day actions of the progressive sectors of the proletariat and its friends; by the Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] decision to hold a series of strikes and a general strike; by the pronouncement of a leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] at the National Assembly, under attacks by Motherland Party [ANAP] and National Democracy Party [NDP] deputies, in favor of May Day as the international holiday of the workers; and by the increasing demands for a Turkey without prohibitions.

If we do fulfill the necessary requirements, if we, the other leftist forces, the consistent supporters of democracy, and the activists of mass organizations do fulfill the requirements, then it will be possible to achieve positive changes in the situation at a faster pace than one may think. Everyone now can better see that we are not talking nonsense when we say that hope lies with the working class. However, how should one interpret this statement and what should one do in line with it? In our opinion, the direction of our Fifth Plenum provides the answer to this question: To activate the progressive sectors of the working class and assist them in uniting all the toilers, regardless of their political views, in general democratic demands; to heighten the toilers' actions using all possible means; to support every democratic initiative without preconditions or dilemmas; to increase the influence of the working class and its organizations throughout the entire society in this manner; to secure and develop the cooperation of the democratic forces; and thus establish the democratic front step by step.

Our party organizations must carry out their campaigns within this framework. The efficiency of this path has already been proved. We determined this policy beginning with our Fifth Congress and developed and improved it in accordance with concrete developments. At that time, though there was nothing tangible on the matter, we expressed our conviction that the working class would play a constructive role in the struggle for democracy, that in addition to it, other forces would emerge in a bid to actively participate in that struggle, and that the policy of uniting all democratic forces should be given paramount importance. Various circles in the left claimed that we were dreaming.

As a result, we were subjected to much criticism and gross accusations. However, currently anybody who has the ability to analyze the situation without being sentimental can be convinced that our policies were justified. The political realities that only we declared in the past are now being voiced by much broader forces. While in the past we were struggling alone in line with the four chief goals determined at the Central Committee First Plenum, now we are working together with very wide-ranging forces.

However, here we must make a point. The ranks of those who accused us of not being revolutionary when in the past we pointed out that very broad-ranging forces can be activated in favor of democracy are now wrongly interpreting the fact that the forces we indicated are becoming active, and jumping to the conclusion that the nature of the regime has changed. This is the most dangerous error for the leftist forces. We would like to emphasize strongly that the fascist nature of the regime has not changed. It is impossible to speak of a change in the regime unless a process begins to develop whereby the deep-rooted changes introduced by the fascist dictatorship into the state structure are eliminated, the doctrine of becoming the satellite of the most aggressive imperialist forces is reversed, and this government, this constitution, and the existing fascist apparatus of oppression is replaced.

We are only at the beginning of the struggle to achieve democracy, and not at the end. Whoever believes that democracy or sound democratic positions can be attained without first securing the unity of the democratic forces, which are becoming increasingly active, enhancing the role of the working movement, that is now showing signs of activity, leading mass actions into an ever-increasing trend, creating a united, massive, and democratic movement, or closely uniting the Marxist left and enhancing its influence; in short without realizing a national resistance, is bound to receive again a severe blow in the future.

The TCP documents "The National Democratic Alternative" and "The National Democracy and the Armed Forces" programs which we submitted to the plenum for approval and which will be submitted to the party for discussion during the national conference process, formulate the TCP's fundamental views regarding the democratization of the state. We believe that these documents will greatly assist in increasing our political influence in the democratic struggle.

The Economic Situation

The real economic situation is sufficiently grave to cause anyone who loves his country and who feels even the slightest responsibility for the country's future to rebel. Exposing Ozal's lies on the basis of figures relating to inflation, rate of growth, paper money, balance of payments, unemployment, real wages, and profiteering by monopolies are no longer adequate to demonstrate the real importance of the situation.

Currently, the important thing is not only the terrible impoverishment and regression revealed by these figures. The real important issue consists of the future awaiting Turkey, the fact that industry and agriculture are being driven down the road to ruin. We are not exaggerating. Turkey is currently a country whose industry and agriculture are collapsing. Imperialist agents, who have infiltrated us and seized all the key positions in the economy and the state, are slyly but rapidly progressing on this road. They are destroying all the objective foundations of our national entity and national sovereignty piece by piece.

We advise those who claim that we are exaggerating to take a close look at the facts and the documents. The plan called the "Rehabilitation and Privatization of the Public Economic Enterprises" [KIT] prepared by one of the prominent U.S. monopolies--namely, the Morgan Guarantee Trust Company--has recently been announced. If this plan is adopted and implemented by the government the following will happen: Strategically important mines such as borax, industrial installations relating to telecommunications and to the production and transport of energy, industrial branches of a dynamic character, and the airlines will immediately be transferred to monopolies outside the country. The remaining mining installations, and the textile, fertilizer, and cement installations will be further developed by the state for a while longer and will then be transferred to foreign monopolies. The iron, steel, aluminum, and copper installations, the railways, the shipping industry, agricultural machinery factories, coal mines, and the sugar and tea factories will be left to disintegrate. The state will continue to administer services such as the posts, the ports, and the airports.

The picture is very clear. Heavy and machine tool industries will be destroyed. Turkey will become a country whose only means of transportation will be the highways, thus creating a dependency on oil alone, and whose air and maritime transport, energy, telecommunications, mines, and dynamic sectors will be in the hands of imperialism. Can such a country exist? Can an independent state exist within this framework? Can national development be achieved under these conditions? If we remain silent, imperialism will have no difficulty making the Evren-Ozal administration adopt these plans. Past experiences confirm this.

Now let us look at agriculture. Even the spokesmen of the Turkish Union of Chamber of Agriculture [TZOB], which is under the control of rich farmers and the agricultural capitalists, have, in recent months, repeatedly stated that Turkish agriculture is in danger. However, no one is paying any attention to these cries. On the contrary, the Ozal government is keeping the subsidies

low, decreasing the number of subsidized items, and gradually reducing state monopoly purchases. Agricultural loans are being reduced and the interest rates on these loans are being increased. Irrigation expenses are also being increased. The government has recently decided not to subsidize fertilizers and to be selective in its support of agricultural producers.

All these steps are not being initiated by the government. All these steps are IMF demands which appear in the World Bank protocol signed on 4 April 1984. The implementation of these imperialist demands began in 1985 and has since caused a continuous drop in agricultural production, which has become chronic since 1982. [as heard] The growth in agricultural production lags behind the population growth. This has resulted in the import of agricultural goods. We have become wheat importers.

Livestock breeding is on the decline. Small- and medium-sized breeders and even the rich ones are in a disastrous state. If this trend is not stopped our dependence on the outside world will spread to the agricultural sector as well. The picture is becoming complete. National industry is being destroyed. The mines and similar installations are being handed over to imperialism. Agricultural production is on the decline and, as a result, agriculture is actually being destroyed. This is the future of our country.

We should recall that our foreign debts are constantly increasing. The rate of this increase accelerated in 1984 and 1985. We should also recall that the share of short-term loans within our overall debts has considerably increased during the last 2 years. Given these conditions, it becomes clear that imperialism has every possibility to easily and speedily implement its dictates. Given the current picture, we cannot refrain from asking what the unions, the opposition parties, our intellectuals, and the various chambers and industrialists who do not stand to benefit from these developments are waiting for in order to adopt a decisive stand.

We believe that the economic and social policy alternative prepared by the TCP in light of all the above-mentioned facts constitutes a sound foundation that all the national [word indistinct], the patriotic forces, and all the forces which favor putting a stop to the current economic trends can agree upon. This foundation is a democratic statist policy. This policy, in accordance with the interests of the working class and the other toilers, is the socially enriched version of the statist policy which functioned positively in the past. We believe that this is the only realistic and applicable alternative in order to put a stop to the destruction of the country through the implementation of the 24 January decisions made by the IMF and TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association--FBIS], to prevent the deterioration of the people's living conditions, and to realize a turn for the better. We believe that every individual who can grasp the meaning of the picture we have drawn will agree with us.

The Fundamental Guidelines to Further Activate the Mass Movement and the Mass Organizations and to Form a United Mass Democratic Movement

The campaigns adopted to strengthen the mass movement by the TCP Fifth Plenum should be conducted in an orderly manner. This, above all, is closely related to the further activation of our work within the mass organizations and the various branches of the mass movement in line with the party policies. The basic guidelines of these activities, the labor movement, the Izmir rally, and the subsequent Turk-Is chairmanship council decision on a series of strikes, as well as a general strike show that it is possible to activate Turk-Is in accordance with the interests and demands of the grassroots. Now everyone, including those who bluntly criticized us without even proposing a plausible alternative, can clearly see that our decision toward a unity with Turk-Is in chaotic 1981 was correct as well as productive.

The government has launched an assault against the workers and their unions. The bill on the abolition of indemnity payments, the abolition of the minimum wage, the employment of workers through public tenders by KIT, the extension of the practice to employ workers on contract, the setback in labor laws, the introduction of new wage systems to exploit and divide the workers, and the freezing of wage increases at 25 percent, which is below the inflation rate, are on the government agenda. Layoffs are continuing. The Turk-Is decision on a series of strikes and a general strike is directed against the government. The current duty of the democratic unionists, who defend the interests and rights of the grassroots, is to create the conditions for the implementation of this decision. To this end government interference in unions should be prevented. On the other hand, it is necessary to spread the idea of strikes and a general strike and to begin organizing the factories. One can establish general strike committees extending from worksites to unions.

The will for a series of strikes and a general strike is directly connected with the democratic struggle. Therefore, this decision should not only be supported by the workers but by the democrats as well and should be transformed into the will of the nation. We should also point out that we are referring to careful, meticulous, but determined preparations. The empirical process shows that despite its subjective intentions, the Turk-Is administration, when caught between the government attacks and the reaction of the grassroots to the regime, cannot prevent the activation of the confederation.

The policy to be pursued under the circumstances is not to let the criticisms against the conciliatory stand of Turk-Is in its relationship with the existing regime take priority, thus minimizing the importance of heightening the grassroots' reaction against the regime and to transform this reaction into a political rally for which the masses are ready.

The year 1986 is the year of collective wage agreements. It is obvious that in our country, where the average daily wage, which was \$5.30 in 1985, has currently dropped to \$2.00, a very tough struggle must be waged by the workers to improve this situation. Currently, the government, in the face of this increasing pressure from the working class, is not able to feel at ease. The extent to which the smallest demand by toilers in the workplace will be

defended will be important in the determination of the results of the approaching collective wage agreement talks.

This year is also the year when Turk-Is will hold its general congress. The outcome of this congress will determine the confederation's stand on various issues. This congress has all the chances of becoming the most important one in its annals. That is why it must be approached with extreme seriousness by all responsible trade unionists.

Developments in the last 6 years have clearly proved that Turk-Is policies, which have prevailed in that confederation since the day it was first founded, such as preserving labor peace, considering all trade union activities above political party considerations, caring for community calm and conciliation, and other similar views, have served the interests of only the bosses and not the workers themselves.

However, today the confederation will find a stronger opposition by worker masses to its policies of conducting a policy of conciliation with the government and the bosses. Currently, defending all trade union liberties is imperative. Choosing the option of the middle-way or conciliation will lead to concessions. The time is ripe for a new policy to reign in Turk-Is. This policy must be based on the principle of "rights not being granted but being taken"; and must be determined by a process in which the grassroots are the decisionmaking and implementing organ, providing unity for all workers and trade unions which pursue a constructive policy of unity of action. Such a policy must care for the demands of all other toilers as well and must serve to transform Turk-Is into an important institution in the struggle being waged for democracy and a future democratic Turkey.

No single political force can impose on Turk-Is today such a policy based on democratic trade unionism, before overcoming the obstacle presented by the fascist and pro-government trade unionists. Until the close cooperation of communist, leftist, and social democratic trade unionists is secured, and until constructive work aimed at the unity within the Turk-Is administration of the trade unionists who are not fascists or pro-government is implemented, the federation cannot be brought to the point where it can implement its current preeminent tasks.

The belief that all that is at stake is bringing trade unionists of a certain political view to power in the federation without the contribution of all trade unionists who are in favor of democracy will only undermine the unity of Turk-Is. Should such an objective be achieved, then this will greatly strengthen the general workers movement, will induce the Social Democratic People's Party [SDPP] to give up its dreams of communal conciliation and peace, and will prevent the SDPP from taking advantage of worker discontent and reaction only for its own interests.

The unity of trade unions is the backbone of the struggle in favor of democracy. That is why the unity of Turk-Is must be supported by all democratic forces. General issues like eliminating government attacks against workers and trade unions, the bringing to power of a government that will

solve the workers' and trade unions' democratic demands, and the drafting of a new constitution that will include these demands, are fundamental principles that will provide the unity of various broad forces within the trade union movement.

Congresses in the branches or headquarters of trade unions as well as in the Turk-Is federation must be the forums in which demands are determined, a new economic and social view is inculcated among the grassroots, and ways of realizing these demands and the policies to be pursued to this end are sought. Each congress must be transformed into a platform where preparations for a strike or general strike [passage indistinct].

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NEW OFFICERS SCHOOL CURRICULUM AIMS AT CREATING 'GENERALISTS'

Elective Technical Curriculum Available

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 8 May 86 p 16

[Article by Peter Bergen: "They Believe in God, King and Country"]

[Text] At one of Denmark's higher educational institutions all the students still believe in God, King and Country. Yes, they hold these ideals so high that they determined their choice of an education.

During the wage negotiations the officers organizations claim that young people today do not consider the job of an officer as a vocation. But among the students with which AKTUELT spoke at The Army Officers School, wages were definitely not foremost.

"Money is not everything," explained newly fledged First Lieutenant D. F. Severinsen, 28, who is father of a family and as such has at least a need for a reasonable wage.

"God, King and Country count more than wages." These words came unprovoked and naturally from one of the cadets, which is the correct title for the prospective officers. And the others agreed that these ideals had great importance for them.

Animals

Otherwise the cadets have the same background, appearance and manner as young people at other educational institutions. OK, they are all well-built and in fine physical condition. Otherwise they would not be in the school.

"Out in society" they encounter prejudice. When they are in uniform they "get the finger," and there are shouts of "animal" and "murderer" after them on the streets. But more often they encounter positive curiosity, and they do not take the negative reactions seriously. One said:

"I often find that people become rather amazed when, after a couple of hours conversation I tell them that I am a cadet. They say, 'You don't look

like it,' or 'I can't believe it.' There is a lot of ignorance about what we do, and also a lot of curiosity."

Blinkers

"I often hear comments about the uniform. But if you yourself are normal, people accept your work like any other. It depends entirely on how you yourself behave.

"Leftwing oriented people look at us as people who want war. But we actually work eight hours per day to prevent war. We try to explain that.

"I am willing to enter discussions. But it is not always possible to discuss. Some people have blinkers and are intolerant.

"It is important that we understand that the fear of war and nuclear weapons is real. And that it is not us they are criticizing, but the 'system.'

"It depends very much on the geography. In Jylland you do not encounter such a hard and bombastic tone as you do in Copenhagen."

A Challenge

The social background of the students largely corresponds to the national average. With one single but noteworthy exception: some, but still an absolute minority, are sons of officers or others involved in the military.

Most often they are among the youngest cadets. Such as E. Reese-Petersen, who has just finished the school and is a first lieutenant at only 22. They went into the military directly from junior college, and then into cadet candidate school. The great majority first felt the desire to be officers while they were serving as enlisted privates, or frequently as conscript sergeants. Or after being sent home.

"I studied to be a doctor, but I saw the health system as being too bureaucratic. The military is not, so I decided to become an officer," said T. Rosenquist.

The instructors at the school are pleased by such a background. They consider it an advantage if a student has tried something besides schools and barracks.

"A challenge" and the opportunity to come rapidly into a position of leadership are the usual reasons given by the cadets for having chosen the career of an officer. And also to participate in defending the country and democracy.

Leadership Training

"Ours is the only education which is aimed at training people to lead. And there are not many occupations in which people get such great responsibility so early," said the school's superintendent, Colonel Soren Haslund-Christensen.

The salary, about 13,000 kroner for a newly fledged first lieutenant, is not enough to induce anyone to become an officer. But perhaps that counts in considering that an officer does not have an educational debt to pay off. During the two and one-half years as a cadet their salary is 11,000 kroner per month.

Sports Officer

"Most of them are drawn to the soldier's life, the free life in nature and all that. But they discover that being an officer involves much more than that," said one of the instructors, Major Jan Ewald.

Many also come in hoping that they will be able to turn their great interest in sports into a profession. They must realize that there is no need for so many sports officers. And that in any case they must serve three or four years in the ranks before they can become sports officers.

Even though a so-called "unit officers" course has been introduced, the instructors instinctively classify some students as "troop officers" or "administrative officers." Some have the ability to lead people but are not much as administrators. Others are best behind a desk.

Generalists

The new training program, which has just produced the first group of first lieutenants, is intended to train "generalists," officers who can do anything. The principle is that all who pass the examination at Frederiksberg Castle have a chance to become generals. Privately the instructors evaluate which ones "will go far." Their evaluations of a man's possibilities of advancement usually are correct, they say.

Officers take specialist training later, according to their desires and abilities. And then the chances to become a general decline if, for example, one chooses to become a computer expert. On the other hand a computer officer can pick and choose among well-paying jobs outside the defense.

Colonel Haslund-Christensen said, "It is important for one to decide what he is good at, and then be trained accordingly. The system is much more flexible than before. To a greater extent, one can shape his own success."

Officer Career Attracting Youths

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 8 May 86 p 17

[Article by Peter Bergen: "More Youths Want To Be Officers--Only a Few Will Succeed"]

[Text] The troubles of the generations of '68 with the authorities have not left much of a mark on the attitude of the '80s toward the military. Willingness to defend the country is growing, and the Army Officers School can

pick and choose among applicants, of which there are more. This year there were 179, compared with 170 last year.

So before a young man or woman can call him- or herself a first lieutenant he or she must go through a lot of hardship.

As a rule only three percent of the cadets resign or are sorted out at the Army Officers School. Usually it is because they cannot meet the physical requirements. Before admission, however, two-thirds of the applicants are rejected.

Women have the most difficulty getting in, because they must meet the same physical requirements as the men. Of the 66 cadets who just completed the school, only 2 were women.

The entrance examination takes two days. Many fail the physical tests, but most fail because of the military-psychological evaluation consisting of interviews and tests. The school superintendent, Colonel Soren Haslund-Christensen calls the psychologists' test "the eye of the needle."

"The psychologists can determine whether the one with the high marks from his high school final examination has worn himself out getting them, and is burned out and without imagination: there may be nothing left in him. While one with poor marks may have since had different jobs, participated in sports, travelled abroad, and is now mature and goal oriented."

To enter officer school one must have been a sergeant. The reports on how that turned out are of course very important. Some sergeants are found to be so well qualified that they are invited to apply for officers school.

"We look for talent in the ranks, that is where the best officers come from. They are often people who have not thought about becoming officers," said Haslund-Christensen.

He summed up: "One should be among the top third of the sergeants. He should have a good physique, be able to study, meaning he should be able to understand theory and put it into practice, and be able to analyze and reach decisions. And he should have leadership potential--a natural ability to get others to carry out his wishes. Among the 178 applicants, perhaps 60-75 are good enough."

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DEFENSE COMMISSION ENVISIONS PARTIAL RENEWAL OF MATERIEL

Personnel Problems Also Addressed

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 26 Apr 86 p 13

[Article by j-ae: "'Compensate For the Lag' Considerable Budget Increase Suggested for Defense"]

[Text] In its report on the armed forces' action and economics plans for 1987-91, the Parliamentary Defense Commission talks about a return to a strict application of the recommendations made by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee. This means not only a continued, comparatively high budget growth but also compensation for the shortfall which occurred during the current five-year period.

The Commission states, in its report, that the appropriation for the procurement of materiel was less than suggested by the defense Committee during 1982-86. Therefore, it was not possible to make procurements to the intended extent. At the same time, a great part of the procurement budget must be used to compensate for the increased cost of technology.

According to studies made by the General Staff, prices of defense materiel have increased on an average 5 percent faster than the general cost index. The Third Parliamentary Defense Committee estimated this increase at only 2 percent and it suggested that the defense budget should have a real increase of 3.8 percent annually.

Consequently, all shortages could not be corrected in the manner suggested by the Defense Committee. Important projects have not been realized or have been delayed. For instance, the development of the so-called protective forces has not occurred as planned.

The recommendations of the Defense Committee have only been met as far as salary, management, and maintenance budgets are concerned, and those have even been exceeded.

The Parliamentary Defense Commission now wants to continue to apply the recommendations of the Defense Committee, which means special emphasis on the landforces and the protective forces during 1987-91.

On the basis of existing studies, the Commission has established that a real annual budget increase of 3.8 percent is not sufficient to reach the goals approved by the Defense Committee, during 1987-91. This is due, among other things, to the shortfall and the increased technological cost of materiel.

The conclusion then is that the defense budget during 1987-91 should not only continue to be increased by 3.8 percent per annum, but it should also compensate for the shortfall during 1982-86.

Among other things, the Commission suggests further that the benefits for enlisted men should be improved in accordance with earlier objectives. The daily rate of pay must be increased and the system of free trips enlarged.

The Parliamentary Defense Commission also finds fault with the lack of personnel in defense, which affects instruction in as well as utilization of the materiel.

The Commission emphasizes the fact that procurement in the future should be tied to personnel reserves as far as operation and maintenance are concerned.

At the present time, the Defense Department is preparing a change in the regulations concerning military service age, so that a force of 31,000 men can be maintained annually despite the reduction of the age groups.

The Defense Commission considers it important to increase the number of men being recalled for reserve exercises by 3,000 annually. The report also mentions that the reserve exercises ought to be extended by two days.

No Cost Calculations

The Parliamentary Defense Commission does not give any estimate of how much money will be gobbled up by its recommendations if they are followed to the letter. Its chairman, former under-Secretary of State, Matti Tuovinen, says, "That was not the task of the Commission." In any event, it is obvious that there would be a considerable budget increase.

In reality it was mainly the representatives for the Social Democrats who expressly opposed exact figures and calculations. They did not want to tie the government's hands in any way.

Colonel Antero Karvinen, who acted as secretary on the Commission, said yesterday that, according to the calculations of the General staff, the shortfall in materiel amounts to over 700 million markkas. Overall it may be a question of several billion markkas. There are two alternatives in the suggested action and economics plan for 1987-91 reported on by the Commission, a basic plan and a development plan. The basic plan, on the whole, follows the 3.8 percent recommendation, the development plan would mean a real increase in the defense budget of 6.2 percent per annum.

The general feeling yesterday was that the Commission's recommendation indicate that the development plan level is being reached.

The basic plan would make possible a partial renewal of materiel and a slow expansion of the protective forces. The development plan would facilitate improvements in the materiel situation and an earlier realization of the plans for the protective forces.

One Reservation

The Commission was unanimous in its recommendations. There was no voting, but Jorma Hentila, member of the People's Democratic League (SKOL) added a reservation to the report. Hentila is of the opinion that a solution ought to have been found that would prevent defense expenses from increasing more than the average budget expenses. The Finance Ministry estimates that the expenses of the State can have an average annual increase of only 1.5 percent during 1987-91.

In his reservation, Hentila maintains that the Commission based its recommendations on obviously unrealistic economic and political judgments. "Among other things, the Commission paints a positively "rosy" picture of the eventual use of nuclear weapons," says Hentila. According to him, the risk for the future use of nuclear weapons has increased.

He maintains further that Finland, on the whole, cannot afford to build up a system that can defend effectively against the threat of cruise missiles. Political, not military, actions are needed for that.

The Parliamentary Defense Commission is headed by the former under-Secretary of State, Matti Tuovinen (Center Party). Vice-chairman was Pekka Myllyniemi (Social Democrat), member of parliament, and members were Antti Kalliomake (Social Democrat), member of parliament, Vice-Chairman Tapani Morttinen (Conservative Party), Editor-in Chief Jorma Hentila (SKOL) and Party Secretary Peter Stenlund (Swedish People's Party).

Consensus, Authoritativeness Elude Commission

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET In Swedish 27 Apr 86 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Cautiously but Unanimously"]

Jan-Magnus Jansson writes that the report from the Defense Commission is cautious in its wording about the outlook for defense during the next five-year period, but unanimous except for the representative of the SKOL. The fact that the Commission has not defined the figures exactly is a weakness, but it is due to their wish for the largest possible consensus.

[Text] As mentioned in the HUFVUDSTADSBLADET yesterday, the Defense Commission convened Parliament, has rendered an opinion about the trends

of defense during 1987-91. The basis for the opinion is the action and economics plan that applies to the administrative sector of the Defense Department for the same period.

The opinion is unanimous except for the member of the SKOL, Jorma Hentila, who added a reservation. The Commission has aimed for the same broad consensus that characterized the Parliamentary Defense Committees during 1970-81. Unfortunately, it has become more and more difficult to get the consensus to include the members of the SKOL. Remember that the SKOL had to leave the government in 1982 just because of a question about defense spending. It can be stated, however, that unity between the non-Socialist parties and the Social Democrats is necessary in order to give the recommendations sufficient political strength. Political unity in its turn takes its toll in the form of compromises.

The defense planning during the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's were based, to a great extent, on the work of the three Defense Committees. During the spring of 1985, when the government decided not to appoint a fourth Committee, but instead created a smaller Commission (which on the other hand has a mandate without time limit), there were fears that the Commission's assignment was too limited and that the broad-based planning done by the Defense Committees now was at an end. There can be no final judgment in the matter, until it can be seen what authority the now rendered opinion has. In its structure, the Defense Commission's statement is reminiscent of those of the earlier Defense Committees. It is, in many ways, a question of follow-up on the work done by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee (PFK III) at the beginning of the 1980's.

One point in particular indicates that the mandate of the Commission is fairly limited. The detailed overview of the international situation that used to introduce the reports of the Defense Committees are missing. This is obviously because the writing of such an overview was not part of its mandate.

The lack of an evaluation of the international situation would constitute a serious omission, if the international situation, since 1981, had undergone such changes that a radical defense-political re-evaluation would have been necessary. Properly speaking, it can be stated that the international situation shows many facets that did not exist five years ago, but it is reasonable, at the same time, to agree with the Commission's comment that the situation, in the case of Finland's security policy, "does not give rise to new conclusions." On the contrary, Finland's situation in the 1980's has been surprisingly stable and that should, of course, be reflected in our security policy.

Finland's stable situation, however, has not prevented a certain political turmoil from arising even in our immediate surroundings. This is also remarked upon in the Commission's report. It notes--almost in a reporting manner--the idea that the military-political significance of Northern Europe is increasing. The references to Sweden have been modified to a certain degree. Like all earlier defense reports, the present report maintains

that Sweden's freedom from alliances and neutrality, "combined with a strong and credible defense ability" have a stabilizing significance for Finland and all of the North. At the same time, however, the report makes references to views in Swedish discussions indicating that future military interest will touch on Sweden more than before, and notice was also made of a new report about the sensitive position of Southern Sweden between the military blocks. This brings to mind the notable speech made by Vice-Admiral Klenberg, chief of the General staff, about the situation in the Baltic in 1984.

Otherwise the news is scanty. It may be due to the limited mandate of the Commission that it does not add to the report of PFK III in the controversial question of Finland and a nuclear war. The report is also reticent in the case of cruise missiles, but it does state that if cruise missiles are also provided with conventional warheads for tactical purposes, the demands on air defense will be made more stringent.

A noticeable new feature is the references to terrorism and sabotage, concepts that did not figure in earlier defense reports.

A broader question is whether our defense doctrine has been visibly influenced by the thoughts about a so-called crisis management put forth by the commander of the defensive forces, Jaakko Valtanen, in his speech to the Paasikivi Society at the beginning of 1984. One response could be that the thought of a crisis situation "under war level," being more probable than open warfare, has long been part of the defense planning and was clearly defined in the report by PFK II in 1976. This almost sacred text has since been repeated in various connections and is also a part of the present report. In any case, it would be important to specify more clearly how the "crisis management" affects our defense thinking.

Concerning the acquisition of materiel and other development on the part of the Defense Department, the Defense Commission bases its report, to a conclusive degree, on the recommendations of PFK and on the action and economics plan of the Defense Department. Here we will only note the recommendations that concern the total budget and materiel acquisitions and bypass the otherwise important questions regarding the administration of the defensive forces, the instruction and the servicemen's situation.

In regard to the implementing recommendations of PFK III for the period 1982-86, the report notes that a shortfall exists and that has led to the fact that the so-called protective troops within the ground forces have not been equipped according to plan. Since the Commission states that the defense budget during the period was higher than recommended by the Committee, as far as money is concerned, the lag is due to the fact that certain conditions for PFK's calculations have been altered. This applies, first of all, to the so-called technological cost increase in war materiel. The Committee calculated that it would increase 2 percent faster per year than the general cost of living, while it is now considered to be closer to 5 percent.

In regard to materiel acquisitions, PFK III, in its report, presented a longterm plan for the development of defense during a 15-year period. However, there were only figures for the years 1982-86. The task of the Defense Commission has now been to determine the concrete budget decisions for the years 1987-91.

It has been working with two alternatives, prepared by the Defense Department, the so-called basic plan and the so-called development plan. The latter, considered satisfactory by the military experts, is working with a real budget increase of 6.2 percent per year--undeniably a large figure from a budget standpoint. The basic plan, a kind of minimum plan, works with the growth figure of 3.8 percent per year, introduced by PFK III. Both plans stress the development of ground forces, referring to the renovation that will later become necessary within the aerial forces in the middle of the 1990's.

In contrast to the Parliamentary Defense Committees, the Defense Commission, in its report, has not tried to make its own policy, nor tried to put figures on its cost suggestions, which is mainly due to a wish for a consensus. The Social Democrats have opposed precise figures which would be controversial within the party.

The Commission, however, has laid down certain general rules. It includes the suggestions of PFK III, but urges that the lag in the previous period be compensated for, and that the increase in technological costs be covered "completely" beyond the 3.8 percent annual real increase that the Committee recommended in its time.

The caution with regard to actual figures leaves the deciding authorities, in the last instance the government, with a fairly free hand. This is balanced by the agreement about the report, provided that it measures up to practical politics. If the, so far, long-term defense planning is subverted, our whole defense policy could become a flop (see picture) and that would be intolerable. Our situation and our commitments are exactly the same as they have always been.

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STRIL 90 ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROVIDES NEW RADAR CHAINS

Stockholm VART FORSVAR in Swedish No 1, Feb 86 pp 5-6

[Article by Lt Col Mats Bjorling, chief of the Tactical and Air Defense Department of the Air Force Staff: "STRIL 90: Important to Entire Total Defense System"; first paragraph is VART FORSVAR introduction]

[Text] In the debate over the future shape of our defense, very considerable interest has been shown in the issue of antisubmarine defense and in the JAS system over the past few years. This is understandable, considering the submarine incidents and the importance of the JAS project to Swedish security policy. But there is some danger that other components will be pushed into the background. One such component, a very important link in total defense, is the Tactical and Air Defense Control (STRIL) System.

The STRIL System of the future is called STRIL 90. It is not an entirely new system, as STRIL 60 once was, but a further development of the old system with partly new centers and all-new radar chains.

The STRIL System's missions remain unchanged. They are the following:

1. Providing the early warning and control needed by the interceptor units.
2. Air surveillance.
3. Monitoring of other aviation systems.
4. Control of general alerts.
5. Command of antiaircraft defenses.
6. Air raid warning radio network (LUFOR).
7. Ordering base alerts.

In addition to those wartime missions, the STRIL System has extensive missions in peacetime as regards early warning and combat information in connection with incident preparedness.

Threat Picture

The threat environment in which the STRIL system will operate in the 1990's is decisive as far as the system's design is concerned. The views expressed by the Air Force commander in chief in OB-85 [1985 Report by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] can be taken as a basic description of that threat. Here is a quotation from page 175:

"In recent years, the big powers have sharply increased their capability for offensive aerial warfare and the transport of airborne troops and materiel. New aircraft and helicopters with considerably greater carrying capacity and range than older types are being introduced. Target acquisition systems, target analysis systems, and sighting systems are growing increasingly advanced with the growing use of modern electronics for signal processing, computing, visual displays, and so on. Airborne weapons against pinpoint targets are very accurate. Weapons against surface targets, including in some cases even hardened targets, are effective in covering large areas. Air operations are becoming less dependent on weather and visibility conditions as guidance systems, target acquisition systems, homing systems, and so on continue to be developed.

"The number of flight formations intended for offensive warfare has increased, especially in the East. For the most part, that increase has been brought about by assigning offensive missions to units formerly intended for defense.

"In the event of war, an aggressor's Air Force and airborne landing capability will constitute a very serious threat to us. Our population and civilian infrastructure will be in danger of serious injury and damage, our total defense system's fixed installations will become attractive targets, our mobilization efforts may be combated by air raids and attacks by troops dropped from the air, and our command organization will constitute an important target, as will our combat forces on land, at sea, and in the air."

Strong Air Defense

One conclusion which must be drawn from the threat picture described above is that it is more important than ever for Sweden to have a strong air defense.

Our ability to meet that threat requires active air defense components such as interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft defenses. In this connection, the interceptor units constitute the most important component because of their agility in the air, where they can muster strength quickly and use high firepower.

High quality in the fighter plane system is necessary to ensure success in air duels. But it is equally important that there be enough aircraft to cover the entire length of our long country and to ensure that they can hold out.

The STRIL System must also be so designed and balanced that it can carry out its missions all over the country both initially and after fighting has started. The system's qualities must include endurance and flexibility.

Technological developments have resulted in greatly increased possibilities for the early detection and monitoring of movements in the air. The early detection of surprise attacks that is made possible by radar technology is of great importance, not only because of the opportunity it provides to mobilize defense resources and meet the attack but also because the civil defense organization and the civilian population can be given earlier warning.

Construction of the STRIL 90 System has already begun. We have progressed farthest in connection with high-level radar. Construction of the chain using the PS-860 is almost complete. The radar station performs very well even in a jammed environment and has a range of 180 miles. It can also be protected from attack.

To ensure low-level coverage, a similar chain using the PS-870 low-level radar is being procured. This station can also resist jamming and withstand attacks. It has a range of 60 miles.

But the biggest future project is STRIL-C 90, which calls for converting the equipment in our STRIL centers. In STRIL-C 90, command will be exercised functionally through a command unit (LE) and a combat information unit (SE).

Overall Command

The LE will exercise overall command over the STRIL and interceptor units assigned to its sector. There will also be some degree of command over other flight formations and antiaircraft defense units. The sector's informational missions in the form of LUFOR transmissions, the transmission of orders to antiaircraft units, sector reporting, and activities in connection with alerts are handled by the LE.

The SE is responsible for combat information, target tracking, air traffic control, and optical aircraft reporting.

STRIL centers with varying tactical capabilities can be set up through various combinations of the LE and SE modules. The project includes all LE and SE equipment as well as activities in the centers for data processing, displays, and liaison.

Compared to STRID 60, STRID 90 will mean lower operating and maintenance costs, chiefly as a result of reorganized peacetime activity. The number of installations in simultaneous use for peacetime production and incident preparedness will be minimized. As one means of ensuring low lifetime operating costs, an effort is being made to procure uniform equipment of the modular type, preferably of a standard civilian type that requires little in the way of maintenance. Property in the form of fixed installations will be utilized to a very large extent.

The system of ground-based radar stations for low-level coverage has limited range and provides inadequate early warning times. The reason is that since radio waves travel in straight lines, radar's coverage of targets on the ground or of low-flying aircraft is generally limited to the horizon by the

curvature of the earth. To increase ranges, therefore, it is advantageous to place radar on aircraft for surveillance from high altitudes.

The FMV [Defense Materiel Administration] is working to develop an airborne radar that can be used for air and sea surveillance as well as some degree of ground surveillance. That radar, designated PS-890, will considerably improve our low-level coverage and endurance. Since the system will be airborne, it will be flexible and can quickly be put into use where most needed.

The system in question consists of a small turboprop plane with a rectangular top-mounted antenna. The antenna will be controlled electronically, meaning that a wide sector across the flight path can be scanned. The radar will act as a sensor for the regular STRIL System, to which the data will be sent for further processing and compilation along with other data.

The STRIL System will also be rounded out with passive measuring systems. The old optical aircraft warning system will be retained and modernized.

OB Level Necessary

The design of STRIL 90 as described above is included in current plans as part of the OB-85 program planning level and higher planning levels. It is necessary that at least that level be achieved if the STRIL System is to fulfill its missions satisfactorily.

For an aggressor, it would probably be necessary initially to limit the effect of our air defense. If the aggressor considers it necessary to attack the STRIL System to reduce the effect of our air defense, he will attempt to do so. Reducing the STRIL System's effect will mean poor surveillance and control in our airspace, with the result that the aggressor will lose fewer aircraft. If the effect of our air defense is reduced, the aggressor will also have greater opportunities for using his Air Force freely.

No Early Warning

Reducing the STRIL System's effect will also mean that the army's combat forces and the civilian population will not receive advance warning when they need it most. And the total defense organization will then have to operate under continuous pressure from the air and without advance warning. The consequences are obvious. We can mention the following as examples:

1. How will the army units plan and carry out their regroupings without the air raid warning radio network?
2. How will the civilian population be alerted if the situation in the air is not known? Will the population be forced to spend very long periods in the air raid shelters?
3. Will we dare continue important wartime production when we are in constant danger of an attack without warning?

The STRIL System is very important to total defense. The ability to command flight formations and antiaircraft units in an optimal manner may be crucial to the outcome of an attack on our country. A strong concentration on the STRIL System therefore appears very important, considering that in addition to its responsibility for controlling fighter aircraft and antiaircraft units, the need to protect the fighting forces and the population by providing early warning will continue unabated.

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CSO: 3650/216

HOME GUARD EXPANDS MISSION, IMPROVES EQUIPMENT

Stockholm HEMVARNET in Swedish No 2, Apr 86 pp 6-7

[Article by Lt Col Lars Wanrud, personnel chief of the National Home Guard Staff: "Innovations in the Home Guard Over the Past 2 Years"]

[Text] Before I describe a number of changes, I consider it very important to point out that the changes which have been made and those which may be made in the future are based on the long-standing truths concerning the Home Guard:

1. The organization makes defense everyone's business.
2. The will to resist is strengthened and made visible both here and abroad.
3. The credibility of our defense policy is strengthened.
4. The organization has a social function in society.

But the crucial element in the Home Guard and the one which must determine its dimensions is the fact that it is a wartime organization with wartime missions that must be carried out immediately and with the greatest possible effect.

Who Determines Requirements?

It is the opponent, not the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces], the CA [Army commander in chief], or the chief of the National Home Guard, who determines requirements.

It is the opponent's training, equipment, tactics, and objective which determine what the Home Guard must be able to do. When the Home Guard was established, its job was to stand behind a partially mobilized army. Today it must join in and take the first thrust. It will probably not be completely alone even at the start, but in most places it will still have to cope with sabotage units, diversionary units, and perhaps raiding operations. To ensure that its units are able to engage in armed action and so on, the Home Guard should not operate with units of less than half a platoon. That requirement has made it necessary to overhaul both the Home Guard's wartime organization and its missions.

The Home Guard's wartime missions must be given priority. The number of half platoons that a Home Guard district can raise determines how many wartime missions can be assigned to that district.

An overhaul of the Home Guard's wartime organization is underway in many parts of the country. One reason is that we have too many small Home Guard districts, meaning that a large number of people are used in noncombat posts.

Home Guard Must Be Able To Operate for Longer Period

After the Home Guard goes on alert, our staffs will probably have to operate for a longer period, at least to provide relief men. If the actual alarm follows, everyone will naturally be on duty immediately. Those in areas where acts of war occur will probably stay on duty until the war is over. And even in areas where acts of war are not taking place, the Home Guard will probably have to remain on duty for a long time to defend important targets or improve its own fieldworks. The idea that members of the Home Guard will complete their missions in 3 or 4 days and then be able to return to their civilian occupations no longer applies. They may be required for a week, 10 days, or a month—it is hard to say, since the situation will probably differ in different parts of the country.

One consequence of the above is that the Home Guard must have maintenance and staff organizations that can function for a longer time. It also means that the Home Guard's B personnel must be able to serve longer. One result may be that the difference between volunteer organizations of A and B personnel will no longer exist. The demands placed on Home Guard units and the opponents they may face in today's conditions may place B personnel in a more exposed situation than A personnel, most of whom will be in concrete shelters.

Unit Exercises

The Home Guard has been holding unit exercises for the past couple of years.

It follows from what I said above that a Home Guard unit must be trained as a unit, and the result has been unit exercises. They must continue long enough to ensure that the problems really do arise. An exercise lasting 6 or 8 hours places no demands on the maintenance crews, and an exercise that begins at 0800 hours and ends at 1400 hours places no demands on billeting. There are other aspects as well. A unit exercise ought to last 24 hours or longer. And it need not be concerned the entire time with the target the Home Guard is defending. A lot of other things can be included in a 24-hour exercise.

Special exercises within the main exercise must be organized for maintenance personnel and others.

People have wondered how that fits in with the stipulations in the contract. The answer is that a home guardsman's contract stipulates a minimum of 20 hours and a maximum of 50 hours.

The volunteer organizations have already taken that into account, and it is to be hoped that the rules for home guardsmen and volunteer personnel will become the same when the FRIVT is rewritten.

Home Guard NCO Quality Considerably Improved

Many Home Guard commanders and local Home Guard commanders have not received training appropriate to their positions. When I say appropriate training, I am referring to the relevant courses at the HVSS [Home Guard Combat School]. To improve the situation, the rule since 1 January 1986 has been that NCO's appointed after 10 October 1984 cannot receive a commission. The purpose is to encourage greater participation in courses. Perhaps we should stipulate in the future that the appropriate course must be completed before a person can be appointed to a post. Another measure aimed at raising the proficiency level among our local Home Guard commanders and equipping them better to work on the staffs of defense district groups was the introduction of advanced courses for local Home Guard commanders in the fall of 1984.

Seven students have completed the course, and another 18 are currently being trained. The Home Guard courses are necessary, but to a greater extent than before, we must also see to it that Home Guard NCO's have a foundation in military command training.

Home Guard's Equipment Being Improved

Besides illumination for nighttime combat, weapons for B personnel and AK-4's for all home guardsmen may represent the most important equipment needs at the moment. Concerning the first-named need--weapons for B personnel--I have nothing new to report. The question of training and weapons for B personnel is being handled by Defense Staff/SAMFRIV. Experimental courses will probably be organized this summer. Weapons are not available, and because of the prevailing economic climate, new production will probably be delayed.

The Home Guard will be supplied with AK-4's under a special plan. All permanent home guardsmen in the general Home Guard and the industrial civil defense corps will be equipped with AK-4's in 1992.

By their own choice, members of the general Home Guard are obliged to serve in the Home Guard to carry out the four following missions:

1. Guard duty in connection with activity covered by the IKFN Regulation.
2. Guard duty at military restricted installations.
3. Rescue missions.
4. Search missions.

To make it possible to quickly deploy a force for those missions, many defense districts are currently organizing such forces. At the same time, several districts have decided to organize a platoon force at the local district

level. Individuals joining that force sign a special contract and are given special training that includes testing them as guards.

Home Guard With Naval Duties

In defense districts on the coast, personnel are being recruited to form Home Guard sections with naval duties. Boat sections, radar sections, optical surveillance sections, mine sections, command sections, KA (Coast Artillery) sections, and others are being organized, with varying degrees of progress being made in the various defense districts. Some sort of activity is underway all along the Swedish coast.

Inspections by National Home Guard Commander

The former inspections of training and equipment have been replaced by what are now called inspections by the commander. Finances have made it necessary to limit inspection activity, with the result that the two former types of inspection have been combined into one.

The purpose of those inspections is to inspect the Home Guard's preparedness, wartime planning, training, materiel services, and personnel services. In practice, such an inspection may take the form of observation by the national Home Guard commander of a unit exercise—an exercise that would have been held in ~~the case~~—or of a visit to Home Guard districts when an exercise is not taking place. During those visits, the national Home Guard commander wants to meet with the local ~~commander~~, the deputy commander, the adjutant, and the leaders of the kitchen and ~~medical~~ sections. On all visits, the Home Guard stores are inspected, the combat ~~plans~~ are studied, and each leader reports briefly on his area of responsibility. The ~~desire~~ of the national Home Guard commander is to visit as many districts as possible, but because of time constraints, some areas must be content with visits by representatives from his staff.

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GNP GROWTH OF 3.8 PERCENT FOR 1985 SURPRISES ECONOMISTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 9-15 May 86 p 2

[Article by Frede Vestergaard: "Danish Economy Boomed in 1985--Happy 60's Again"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Text] There was much more boom in the Danish economy last year than was assumed before one week ago. Private consumption was greatly underestimated by Denmark's Statistics.

Last week Denmark's Statistics rather inconspicuously published some statistics which are worthy of attention.

They were figures for production, income, consumption and investment in 1985. One could call it the Danish nation's tax return.

What is noteworthy about the figures is that they show that 1985 was a much better year than the statisticians, and thereby also the civil servants who advise the government on economic policy, have thought so far.

The numerical growth of Denmark's GNP last year was 3.8 percent.

With "advance accounting," a couple of days before the new year, Denmark's Statistics estimated a growth of 2.5 percent, which was rather nice, but far from the factual figure. The GNP would prove to be 7.5 billion kroner greater than first calculated.

If one looks closer at the figures to see how the statisticians were deceived, there are immediately two elements which were underestimated.

One was the growth in public consumption, which did not grow by 1.0 percent as assumed in December, but by 1.7 percent. The other was growth in private consumption, which was 4.3 percent in 1985 (compared with 2.7 percent in 1984) and not 2.5 percent as estimated in December.

Both figures are noteworthy. Growth in public consumption of 1.7 percent, after a decline of 0.8 percent in 1983 and 0.7 percent in 1984, shows that the government and the Radicals were not able to maintain their goal of zero growth in public expenditures. It is possible that there were savings in

certain areas, but they were more than offset by the growth in other areas. According to what WEEKENDAVISEN has learned, the entire growth was in the municipalities, while the state maintained zero growth.

The growth in private consumption is noteworthy in the light of the detailed business index through 1985 showing much less growth. Actually only a growth of one percent from 1984 to 1985. It is rather certain that new cars (which are not included in the detailed business index) made up more than one-fourth of the growth of consumption of 9.3 billion kroner from 1984 to 1985, but there are indications that the detailed business index used by Denmark's Statistics is not good enough.

Investments grew 14.6 percent last year compared with 11.0 percent the year before, and they thereby lived up to the politicians wish for strong growth in investment.

It appears differently for private consumption, however, and in retrospect it raises the question of whether the government would have gone to reducing expenditures earlier if it had had a better understanding of how much consumption rose last year. The reports of the Ministries of Economy and Finance from last fall seem to show that the civil servants did not exactly trust the figures of Denmark's Statistics, but the public politico-economic discussion would have been different if it had been clear earlier that the increase in consumption was as great as 4.3 percent.

Happy 60's

Actually one must go back to the so-called happy 60's to find over a three-year period a greater increase in the GNP and private consumption than we have had from 1983-1985. No other country in Europe has had such great success over that period.

Behind the growth in private consumption there is partly a normalization of the consumption quota (that part of disposable incomes which are used for consumption), which was pushed below its traditional level during 1979-1981, and partly a strong increase in employment.

From the fourth quarter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 1985 the seasonal employment figure (corrected to full time) rose by 80,000 persons. Over a two-year period from the fourth quarter of 1983 the increase has been 134,000. If one looks at the latest monthly figure for unemployment, which is from February, the seasonally corrected unemployment was down to 215,000 compared with 263,000 in the same month of 1985. Thus a decline in unemployment of about 50,000 in one year.

(The new and higher production figures presumably mean that the poor productivity figures which were calculated for industry in 1985, and which have caused various pessimistic comments, will prove to be better than first assumed with renewed calculations.)

Therefore there was a boom in the Danish economy last year. The reverse of the coin was that the deficit in the balance of payments rose to 28 billion but the deficit became more understandable after the percentage growth of the gross national product was adjusted upward to 3.8 percent.

IMF WILL BE ELECTION PROBLEM FOR ANAP

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 3 Apr 86 pp 1, 8

[Article by En's Berberoglu]

[Text] Target: Basic prices will be increased if necessary, raises will be avoided, interest rates lowered, municipalities will be given new funds for investments, civil servants will be pacified by the law on additional indices and powers.

The IMF obstacle: Short-term loan plans cause worry, lowering interest rates will fan inflation, municipal investments are too numerous.

Result: The government has taken steps to stem fund sources, economic limits have been lowered, the municipalities' March payments were not sent.

Ankara - Preparations for the "elections' economy" the government planned to implement during the spring and summer months before primaries have stumbled on the IMF. The IMF has warned that, should the government resort to election economy measures, it will criticize them in its annual evaluation report. Although this has not been confirmed yet, the political investments projected by the government with a view to the primary elections expected to take place in the fall, which will affect various sectors, are as follows: 1. Basic prices: basic prices which were disclosed gradually this year will be increased "if necessary," in other words, if the targeted inflation rate cannot be reached. As was the case last year, the totality of payments will be effected in advance.

2. Inflation and Interest Rates: It is hoped that hikes which were avoided by taking into consideration the decrease in oil prices will lead to a clear drop in the rate of inflation. In connection with this, by resorting to lowering of interest rates, it is planned to kindle the market up to a point and reassure the business sector.

3. Investments: The resources that will collect in the Fuel Stabilization Fund because of the discrepancy in oil prices between world and domestic markets, and the other resources derived from other funds and the Property Tax will be channeled toward investments through municipalities.

4. The Situation of Civil Servants: With measures that will improve the situation of civil servants, raises will in particular be given to the higher echelons of bureaucracy.

IMF Criticisms

The IMF committee which was in touch with economic elements in the capital last month, issued the following warnings with regard to the economic situation, which it viewed on the whole as positive:

1. The Problem of Domestic and Foreign Financing: It expressed worry about the emphasis on short-term plans regarding the structure of Turkey's domestic and foreign debt.
2. Interest Rates: The Fund commission pointed out that pulling down interest rates would "heat up the economy," pave the way to resorting to savings, and kindle inflation.
3. Municipal Investments: If one also takes into account last year's local authority investments, the increase in public investments reached 12.3 percent.

It was learned last week that some steps were taken toward stemming the cash flow:

"At a meeting presided over by Kaya Erdem, the decision was reached to lower somewhat economic limits, which were set but were not disclosed.

At the same meeting, the tendency emerged to make cuts in the funds transferred to municipalities from the budget and fund resources. Within this framework, the municipalities' dues for the month of March were not forwarded."

12278

CSO: 3554/36

FLEXIBLE QUOTAS NEEDED IN TEXTILES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 3 Apr 86 p 7

[Text] Sukru Sankaya, chairman of the board of the Aksoylar Textile Industry and Trade Corporation, whose headquarters are in Bursa, said that they were in favor of more flexible quota limitations than those enforced on textile products.

The MFA (International Textile Trade Agreement), which lasted almost four years and which developed countries implemented by shelving the GATT agreement, is coming to an end in July.

While developed countries, wishing to protect their own manufacturers and fearing to lose their share in foreign markets, ask for another four-year extension of the MFA, developing countries which export wish to go back to the GATT which ensures international liberalism in trade.

The administrators of the Bursa textile firms, who unanimously agree in spite of quotas on the view that textile production must be increased and new markets be found, said the following in their evaluations of the matter:

Chairman of The Board of The Aksoylar Corporation Sukru Sankaya:

"Above all, we are in favor of maintaining more flexible quota limitations, however, just because there are quotas this does not mean we will not increase our production. As exporters, we are in the position of having to find new markets. Developed countries, in order not to lose their share in textile markets and the profits to which they were used in the past, are inclining toward quota regulations. Today, underdeveloped countries take the technology they use in their textile industry from developed countries which put quotas on their products .

Vice-Chairman of The Senis Textile Corporation Ismail Yavas:

"We believe that the MFA International trade agreement brings restrictive measures. Wider quota limits should be set. Because, just as we are ready sometimes to ship merchandise for which we have an export contract we are informed that quotas have been filled. That is why an extension of the MFA agreement for another four years would mean going through the same difficulties again.

Director General of the Sonmez ASF Spinning-Mill and Paint Industry
Corporation Mustafa Karaer:

"Since 25 September 1985 Turkey has been asking for a strict implementation of GATT regulations for the textile industry and has become a member of the "International Textile Clothing Bureau" to which 23 nations belong. This organization is working for developing nations toward liberalizing world trade. At the same time, Turkey has filed a suit with the GATT Textile Supervision Organ for the lifting of the quotas set by the MFA."

12278
CSO: 3554/36

END

JPRS-WER-86-063

30 JUNE 1986

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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30 JUNE 1986

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

LIBERAL PARTY THREATENS TO FORCE EARLY ELECTION

SDP Paper Perceives Frustration

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 11 May 86 p 8

[Editorial: "Liberals Threaten"]

[Text] The Liberal Party now feels itself so squeezed that it considers it necessary to threaten an election, which nobody in the party would dare undertake under any circumstances.

Many former Liberal Party voters have gone over to Poul Schluter, and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and company have for a long time fought a hard fight to capture votes from the Progressive Party. That is one of the reasons why the Liberal Party is today the government's most right-leaning party.

The Liberals are crying louder and louder to be heard. Exactly as Mogens Glistrup did, until nobody bothered to listen to him.

The chairman of the Folketing Market Committee, Svend Heiselberg (Liberal) called Anker Jorgensen and Lasse Budtz "useful idiots." And Bjorn Elmquist threatened an election. "We do not want to administer an alternative policy. If it gets just a little worse we will call for an election." And furthermore Elmquist threatened to make a tax on fertilizer a cabinet question.

One of the Liberal Party's political problems is that Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is not the only one of the party's top people who has difficulty understanding that a minority government cannot do whatever suits it.

Democracy can be clumsy to dance with. Apparently too clumsy for many Liberals.

Coalition Partners Reject Ideal

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 12 May 86 p 6

[Article by sib: "Liberals Stand Alone With Their Election Threats"]

[Text] Copenhagen--The Liberal Party stands entirely alone with its desire to call an election as a reaction to the Radical Liberal Party wanting to carry out an increase in the land tax and an environmental tax on fertilizer outside the government.

Not the Basis for an Election

"That's up to the Liberals," said the Conservative group chairman Knud Ostergaard, commenting on the election. "Land tax is a serious issue, but it can never be the basis for an election, as for example the NATO question can."

Flemming Kofod-Svendsen (Christian People's Party) confirmed that the government will permit the Radicals and the Liberals to debate the land tax and the tax on fertilizer alone. A fall election would be a pure "proportional strain" according to Kofod-Svendsen.

The Proposal Is Reasonable

"The proposal for a minimum limit of six mills on land tax, which we have advanced with the Social Democrats, is both reasonable and thoroughly prepared, and the Liberal Party has furthermore known our attitude toward the issue for a year," said Niels Helveg Petersen (Radical Liberal Party).

"It is foolish of the Liberals to threaten an election, because that would only cause trouble. I do not favor an election, and even if one should take place we will not change our attitude toward the land tax and the environmental tax on fertilizer," said Helveg Petersen.

9287

CSO:3613/140

POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER ANALYZES RESULTS FROM LATEST GALLUP POLL

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 22 May 86 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Green Winds Blowing Toward the Middle"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] The winds of public opinion are now blowing toward the political center and the question is to what extent the winds are green, writes Bjorn Mansson who has reviewed the public opinion situation in light of the latest Gallup figures.

With less than 10 months to go before the parliamentary election, the Finnish Gallup figures on party support provide a basis for analyzing the political opinion situation. The poll was conducted at the request of the four biggest parties in the period from 7 to 30 April. When evaluating the results one should bear in mind that this was too early for any "Chernobyl effect" to show up.

The civil servants' strike had begun then, but even the latest field interviews were conducted several weeks before the president intervened. And when the impact of the strike on political opinion is assessed, one should bear in mind that the effect is twofold: on the one hand there is the strikers' possible reappraisal of their own party sympathies and on the other there are the reactions of the general public to the strike. The first group is much smaller than the second, which turned increasingly against the strikers as the strike dragged on. The decision-makers who joined the president in taking a stand against the strikers' demands--most notably Finance Minister Pekka Vennamo and his Rural Party--should have scored more pluses than minuses if one looks at public opinion as a whole.

Keeping in mind these reservations and the critical attitude toward opinion polls that is always justified, some general trends can be noted:

Left-wing support is declining. However total support for leftist parties stands at 38 percent, according to the poll, somewhat more than might have been expected. It is only a little less than the 1984 municipal election results, although it is almost 3 percent below the results in the 1983 parliamentary election.

Support for the nonsocialist parties also seems to be a few percentage points lower than the latest election figures, but actually the Finnish Rural Party is solely responsible for the decline (plus a little more), while the Conservatives and the Swedish People's Party [SFP] were stable and Center support increased. The so-called traditional nonsocialist parties now have a support level of around 50 percent, which should be enough to ensure a parliamentary majority.

Aside from the Center Party the Greens are the big winners in the Gallup poll. However this depends a little on one's basis of comparison. Compared to the 1.5 percent in the parliamentary election, 5.2 percent is certainly an excellent result, but compared to the almost 5 percent in the municipal elections the gain is less spectacular. One can also say that the Rural Party's loss is the Green Party's gain--although the flow of voters does not go exclusively from one to the other.

If individual parties are examined in light of the latest Gallup figures, one can note the following:

The Conservative Party's rating of 22.7 percent is only a fraction higher than the party's 1983 election results and this tends to support the conclusion that the party's situation is stable. Chernobyl might have a negative effect while the civil servants' strike might have a somewhat positive effect. In other words, the pluses and minuses tend to cancel each other out.

SFP support is also stable at its normal level of just below 5 percent. It is hard to see that either Chernobyl or the strike will have any direct effect here. The support of Swedish-speaking Finns for their SFP, which has remained unshaken for 80 years, is not usually affected that easily--especially since the party has sympathized with general public opinion on nuclear power and has behaved in an evenhanded way throughout the strike.

The Center Party's gain in the polls now is noteworthy. If the Liberal share is removed from the election results, the progression is impressive: from 16.6 percent in 1982 to over 18.9 in 1984 to no less than 20.4 now. It should be observed here that Paavo Vayrynen's presidential candidacy did not really become apparent until the final phase of the polling period. But it seems likely that the sharpening of the Center profile had an effect. Whatever the reason, a gain of almost 4 percentage points (or an increase of almost 25 percent!) is extremely unusual under our circumstances as far as traditional parties are concerned.

If we include the Liberal rating of around 1 percent and the Christian support level of between 2 and 3 percent, the middle bloc is clearly larger than the Conservatives and the Social Democrats and comes close to a support level of 30 percent! Even the traditional middle parties (the Center Party, SFP and the Liberal People's Party [LFP]) alone now have more support than both the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. It is interesting to note that the Center organ SUOMENMAA stressed this to some extent in its editorial

space, which may be regarded as an indication of how the party ultimately feels about the Christian Party's participation in the middle-party co-operation.

The Rural Party's Gallup figure of 4.5 percent is half of the party's 9.7 percent rating in the parliamentary election and a good deal lower than the 5.3 percent the party won in the municipal elections. But before drawing any sweeping conclusions it should be noted that opinion polls in general tend to underestimate support for the Rural Party [FLP]. The party is also doing its best to achieve a positive Chernobyl effect, although its absolute opposition to nuclear power gives a somewhat hollow impression.

It is more interesting to indulge in speculations about FLP and the civil servants' strike. Pekka Vennamo's conduct, which was on the borderline of what is permitted in his official position, and the party's strong support--as the only party to offer any--for the president's threat of compulsory arbitration, undoubtedly cost the party the votes of some civil servants. But the party may have picked up considerable support among the "broad layers" of the population in compensation.

As noted above, the Green gains in the polls depend on what one compares them with. But a possible Chernobyl effect has not yet appeared. The question is how the Green line of absolute abolition is to be made credible, especially in view of the fact that they also demand (quite consistently, to be sure) a halt to the importation of electricity produced by nuclear power--as if electricity can be "earmarked."

How the Greens manage to mobilize their potential support in the election campaign also depends a great deal on whether the voters remain unorganized or not--and if they do organize, how this is done. Groups at the election district level would seem most appropriate, but there is still a lot of disagreement.

The Social Democrats' position as the largest party seems unchallenged, in spite of a decline to 25 percent of the vote compared to almost 27 percent in the 1983 parliamentary election. Thus the expectations of a large influx of frustrated People's Democrats have not materialized. The influx seems limited to people like Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund.

If we are to believe the Gallup figures, the decline of the People's Democratic League is not as great as was generally anticipated. The two People's Democratic/Communist groups now have the support of 13 percent of the voters, only 1 percent less than the last election result. Other opinion polls conducted recently have given much lower figures.

However the interesting thing about this poll is that the minority communists' "Democratic Alternative" has now had its voter support measured for the first time--and registered a modest 1.2 percent compared to 11.8 for the "mother" group, the People's Democratic League and the Finnish Communist Party. Although Finnish CP information chief Oiva Bjorkbacka is undoubtedly

right to warn his people in KANSAN UUTISET that the 1.2 percent figure "does not necessarily reflect the final reality" (the minority's election party has not yet had a chance to make its mark), the results show how hard it is for the minority to establish itself with the Finnish electorate. Taisto Sinisalo has no reason to rejoice.

Thus there is no polarization of voter opinion in sight at this time. The far left is losing ground and the Conservatives are not winning very much. The winds of public opinion are now blowing toward the political center. They are green winds--in the broadest sense of the word.

6578

CSO: 3650/222

POLITICAL

GREECE

INVESTMENTS REPORTEDLY PLANNED BY AL-FATAH

Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 25 May 86 p 11

[Article by Th. Lyrtsogiannis]

[Excerpt] The PLO will propose that Arab capital be invested in Greece and that economic relations with our country be upgraded. This will be done at this year's summit meeting of Arab heads of state.

This statement was made in an interview granted to our newspaper by Mr Abbas Zaki, member of the Al-Fatah Revolutionary Council, who is in charge of foreign relations and is also a member of the political office of the PLO. Mr Zaki was in Greece as a representative of his organization at the KKE (int) meetings.

"In spite of the fact that you Greeks helped us a great deal, Arabs unfortunately do not consider Greece the way they should. We believe that there should be a very specific stance by the Arabs vis-a-vis your country," Mr Zaki said at the beginning of the interview.

[Question] "What do you think this stance should be?"

[Answer] "Listen. We have very good relations with Greece. We believe that Arabs cannot have the same type of relations with, say, England, as with Greece. As the PLO, we shall present the issue of relations with European countries and we shall ask that these should be in conformance with their attitude. We shall ask that Arab funds not be left at the service of Israeli Zionism and of Americans, but that they be channeled to countries that support us."

/8309

CSO: 3521/163

POLITICAL

GREECE

REPORTED TENDENCY TOWARD PASOK SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WING

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 28 May 86 p 3

[Text] The recent article of former minister Ap. Lazaris in TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS certain initiatives by National Bank Governor St. Panagopoulos, and various moves of Deputy Minister of Culture Giorgos Papandreou make it clear that preparations are being made within PASOK to create a western-European type of social-democratic tendency which will attempt to attract to itself the liberal and centrist political public. Consequently, the estimations of MESIMVRINI Director Khr. Pasalaris, who in recent articles has noted that PASOK is preparing for a political turn to the right are judged to be sound.

"Seriously wounded by political erosion and corruptible as ever," writes Pasalaris, "PASOK is masquerading impetuously as an urban or even large-urban party--from the immature party it was in 1981 and the small-urban party it was in 1984--in order to perform its latest one-act play to...a rightist audience! And to seize the votes of conservatives, as it did in June with the votes of the...captains!

"Maybe, however, some more "accidents," like those of Kitsios and Manikas, will step in as the great performance. Maybe the scene will change suddenly. Maybe, maybe.... The pitcher cannot go in the spring many times without breaking...!"

What the MESIMVRINI journalist is ignoring, of course, is that PASOK's large-urban identity is favored by a large part of the dominant Greek large-urban strata which, being born and bred in national-political power, are working today with those political forces they think have a future. Even if something begins to stir in the opposition, it is too late, according to many observers. PASOK now has every facility to create leftist and center-rightist crutches which will support it politically through a process of distribution of power, which will surely be broken up in the future. As for the so-called liberal area, authoritative observers note that since it has never existed as a political reality in Greece, there is no future for it today. The Greek hour for liberalism, foreign circles estimate, will ring when the political generation which buried it has disappeared.

PASOK, moreover, knows very well the liberal area's inability to produce ideas and prospects and it is exploiting, irreproachably, an intellectual juncture it is creating and controlling itself. Thus, it is not accidental that PASOK will soon begin a new and wide-spread ideological campaign which will use ideas and messages belonging, in the main, to the liberal cultural heritage! Of course, in PASOK's case, the related sloganizing will contain abundant doses of anti-Americanism, but why not? I wonder if there are many Greeks who have read De Tocqueville and his words about democracy in America?

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND GAINS IN PROFESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun 86 p 3

[Text] The DKM [Democratic Movement of Engineers] --it is pro-ND--once again was shown to be the number one power in the day before yesterday's elections of the SPME [Association of Civil Engineers of Greece], obtaining 42.09 percent of the vote compared to 39.52 percent in 1984.

This victory is deemed important not only because DKM increased its percentage but because first of all abstentions were 50 percent and secondly because DIANA [Democratic Renewal] took part in the elections. The latter is in the same political sphere and it obtained 2.13 percent of the vote.

Also significant is the fact that PASOK lost 7.33 percent.

The KKE increased its strength by one seat, while the KKE (Int.) remained the same.

More specifically and according to the final results, the seven factions taking part in the elections came out as follows:

DKM (ND): 2,093 votes, 42.09 percent, six seats, compared to 39.52 percent and six seats in 1984.

PASK [as published] (PASOK): 1,068 votes, 21.47 percent, three seats, compared to 28.80 percent and four seats in 1984.

DPK [as published] (KKE): 917 votes, 18.44 percent, three seats, compared to 15.65 percent and two seats in 1984.

DASK [Democratic Autonomous Trade Union Movement] (KKE (Int.)): 542 votes, 10.9 percent, two seats, compared to 12.5 percent and two seats in 1984.

DEM [as published] (Independent): 216 votes, 4.34 percent, one seat, compared to 3.50 percent and one seat in 1984.

ADIK [as published] (DIANA): 106 votes, 2.13 percent, no seats.

AMP [as published] (Trotskyite): 31 votes, 0.62 percent.

It is to be noted that of the 10,300 engineers, there were 4,973 valid ballots. Mr S. Kouvelas, a civil engineer, ND deputy and a candidate for mayor of Salonica, in a telegram sent to the DKM, he congratulated it for its proud victory.

5671

CSO: 3521/162

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

KKE(INT) DEVELOPMENTS PLEASE PASOK--According to estimations and forecasts of a significant portion of PASOK cadres, developments in the KKE(Int) area are considered to be absolutely positive. This is because the creation in the Greek left area of a political force which will not have a communist stamp will help PASOK's political collaborations, particularly if a simple proportional system is instituted in the next elections. As factors from PASOK say, the creation of a non-communist leftist political vehicle in the next elections could turn out to be determinative for PASOK's remaining in power. Because it would be possible for such a vehicle to attract PASOK's dissatisfied adherents, weaken the KKE and eventually participate in a collaborative government with PASOK. In addition, PASOK factors say that, if Papandreu secures a viable possibility for collaboration to the left, then he will make new overtures to the traditional liberal area so as to maintain the anti-Mitsotakis centrist element housed in PASOK. From this viewpoint, certain recent initiatives by Deputy Minister Giorgos Papandreu, Minister of Commerce Giorgos Katsifaras, National Bank Governor Styl. Panagopoulos, and the prime minister himself, are not devoid of the developments being prescribed--developments which indicate that the governing of Greece by center-leftist governments, with strong populist elements, is tending to become a permanent situation. There has begun to be a deeper awareness of this fact, moreover, both in the country's productive classes and in many chancelleries of EEC member-countries. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 21 May 86 p 2] 9247

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP DEBATE--A dispute--but one without particular dimensions--has broken out between certain PASOK cadres; it concerns whether the movement should enter the Socialist International or not. Thus, Eurodeputy Khr. Papoutsis maintains that, for reasons of political expediency, PASOK must remain outside the Socialist International; this is in order to not create problems in its base, which has been reared with third-world slogans, and to not cut off the road which will allow it to attract political clientele from the communist left. On their side, however, other cadres maintain that PASOK must place itself in the Socialist International, first because Bulent Ecevit is moving comfortably to it, and gaining points, in a period in which Turkey is flirting strongly with the West at all levels. Second, they maintain that PASOK's separation from the socialists in the Socialist International has negative repercussions from both a diplomatic and economic viewpoint. And these repercussions, it is supported, will have, at some phase, a national cost which is far higher than the temporary electoral benefits seen by those opposed to entry in the Socialist International. At any rate, thus far Papoutsis' inclination seems to have the upper hand; this became clear with the young Eurodeputy's recent intervention at the Fourth KKE Interior Congress. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 21 May 86 p 2] 9247

THIRD-WORLD OFFICIALS' VISITS--According to the well-known policy of double-speak on both domestic and foreign issues and our country's international relations, the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs is going to come to Greece soon to brief the government on the efforts to transform his country's Marxist regime into a "People's Republic." A similar briefing was made previously by Ethiopian Ambassador in Athens [S. Tefferal] to KKE Secretary General Florakis. The Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs is a close acquaintance of Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias, who had made a suggestion to the prime minister and has received a "green light" for the official visits to Greece of representatives from third-world Marxist regimes to continue. All this, of course, in the frameworks of the effort the government is making to "sell" a "progressive" face to its base, without knowing, however, the negative impressions it is creating abroad--where impressions play a crucial diplomatic role. [Text] [Athens EMBIS-TEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 28 May 86 p 2] 9247

U.S. AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC IMAGE--U.S. Ambassador Bob Keeley is systematically attempting to improve his public image. After consultations, he is selecting the newspapers and the reporters with whom he talks in order that they publish whatever he thinks is favorable to him, following the negative impression left by some of his and his wife's observations on our country's internal affairs, which should not have been of any concern to him as an ambassador. It would undoubtedly have been better for him if what was said in Washington and later here had not been said at all. Unless it was said after a recommendation (from Washington). [Text] [Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 23-29 May 86 p 10] /8309

CSO: 3521/163

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN MAIN PARTIES' SUPPORTERS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 22 May 86 p 3

[Article by Editor Pieter Maessen: "Surprising Breakthrough of Victorious CDA among Non-Confessional Voters"]

[Text] The voter survey carried out by the Intomart Bureau yesterday makes it possible to represent graphically the composition of adherents to each of the political parties. The analysis is based on the work of Dr C. Van der Eijk and Dr B. Niemoller of the University of Amsterdam.

The Hague, 22 May: Yesterday's voting pattern differed radically on several important issues from the usual pattern in the Netherlands. The CDA seems to have tapped new sources. The PvdA was able to gain strength in CDA districts.

Data on these shifts were gathered with the help of the voter survey, in which 35,000 voters told something more about themselves than they do at the polls. It is also clear that this survey suffers certain limitations. Of course it is impossible to reduce to a graph which voters stayed home. It is also a well-known fact that voters change parties more often than they let on. Yesterday 16 percent of the people claimed to have changed parties. In reality, the figure lies probably well above 20 percent. The results, however, are not distorted because of this.

In all, 17 Lower House seats went over to other parties yesterday. There were more changes, but the gains and losses partly canceled each other out. Until 1967 no less than 10 party seats ever changed hands. After that year the number fluctuated at about 18. It does not seem that the stability that marked the years before 1967 will ever return.

The relationships of strength between left and right remained perfectly equal with respect to 1982. The left, including D66, got 61 seats. If one bears in mind that Scholten and Dijkman went over to the left from the CDA during the drive, the left has lost two more seats.

Disloyal Voters

The largest segment of party adherents was constituted by the loyal voters. D66 consists of only one-third loyal voters. Half of the 1982 followers of D66 bolted the camp. One seat went back to the PvdA and one to the CDA. But D66

also won seats back from both sides, just as many from the left (PvdA) as from the right (CDA and VVD), relatively speaking.

The VVD saw a goodly number of voters (4.5 seats' worth) leave its ranks in favor of the CDA and also lost two seats to the PvdA and D66. The new voters helped limit VVD losses. Fewer PvdA and D66 voters went over to the VVD, however.

The PvdA gobbled up the PSP and the CPN on the left, thereby compensating for the loss of two seats to D66. On the right the PvdA was ultimately able to take away nothing from the CDA and VVD: roughly speaking, gains and losses balanced out evenly there. The PvdA--just like the CDA--profited greatly from the new, young voters and from those who stayed home in 1982.

Lastly the CDA won in both wings also, but especially on the right: 4.5 seats from the VVD, a half-seat from the small rightist parties (probably the RPF) and three seats from young, new voters. The voters who stayed home in 1982 really helped Lubbers here as well.

VOTING PATTERNS OF NEW VOTERS IN:

	CDA	PvdA	VVD	D66
1986:	30.8	28.4	20.5	9.8
1982:	19.7	23.8	30.6	5.1
1981:	21.2	21.7	19.4	19.3

The CDA gains surprised nearly everyone. Up to and including 1982 this party got its votes almost exclusively from confessional voters. The number of people who traditionally belong to this group is becoming smaller and smaller, however. What happened?

From the (gradually diminishing) group of believers who adhere faithfully to the church, the CDA can hardly claim that it has scored any gains: this group already traditionally gives its support overwhelmingly to the CDA (some 80 percent) while the rest vote the small rightist parties or stay home.

Gains are indeed possible from among those faithful who attend church less often: in the last three elections the CDA gained on the average a scant 30 percent of the votes from that source. Although no data are known on that score yet, it is probably because Lubbers poiled more support from the CDA, especially from this group (constituting about 40 percent of the electorate).

Still more important, however, is the group of non-religiously affiliated (secular) voters (also about 40 percent of the electorate). Up to and including 1982 this group scarcely seemed to cast any votes whatever for confessional parties: only about 4 percent did that. In a recent Interview Bureau poll (conducted between 6 and 20 May among 6 500 participants), however, it was evident that no less than 11 percent of the non-confessionals listed the CDA as their party choice. If one remembers in this connection that the greatest gains for the CDA were probably realized in the last week before 21 May, he might give

serious thought to the fact that the percentage of non-confessionals who voted for the CDA is still higher. There is perhaps even a triplication of this percentage, from a practically insignificant number to a figure that gives the CDA at least a half-dozen seats from the secular voters. It seems rightly to be called a breakthrough, not one such as after the war, however, when the PvdA tried to break into the confessional camp. Thus it is a kind of reverse breakthrough. The PvdA sought that breakthrough consciously at that time, but did not succeed. The CDA did not in this instance consciously seek to overstep the "natural" boundaries, but must declare that it found followers without soliciting them, in another camp. Taking into consideration the strong connection between this breakthrough of the CDA and Lubbers the man, it is uncertain, however, whether the CDA has demonstrated lasting viability as a truly great party. Another possibility is that for a large group of non-confessional voters, the taboo against voting for a party that has a "C" in its name has now been broken, and in this way a new period in the relationships between political parties could begin.

Provinces

How are things going otherwise with the "old" breakthrough, that of the PvdA among religious voters, and therefore in religious districts? If the results by province are considered (see page 13 of this newspaper), a number of quite startling facts appear:

- 1) The CDA and the PvdA are both winning in all the provinces. Apparently the gains stand in the way of neither party.
- 2) The CDA gains were 5.2 percent nationally, those of the PvdA 2.9 percent. By province the recorded gains clearly differed, however. The PvdA (with its 7.7 percent) enjoyed much better than average gains in Limburg, Brabant (5.0) and Groningen (4.6). In the latter instance it had a great deal to do with the effect of the idling CPN party, which dropped back from 4.2 to 1.5 percent there.

In Limburg and Brabant, however, the PvdA recorded structural gains. The traditionally important Randstad (interurban zone of the west Netherlands) hardly contributed anything to these gains (and the chief cause of this seemingly favorable percentage of gains for Noord-Holland was the backsliding of the CPN, which was strong in Noord-Holland at an earlier date). In a word, when compared with the good results of the PvdA in Brabant and Limburg in 1977, there is now talk in those provinces of a structural breakthrough.



But the CDA also recorded gains everywhere, although not to the same extent everywhere. When compared with the national gains of 5.2 percent, the CDA did exceptionally well in Zuid-Holland (+6.5 percent), Utrecht (+6.4 percent) and Noord-Holland (+6.0 percent); that is, precisely in those districts where the PvdA made very little progress. Given the urbanization, lack of church attendance and secular character of the Randstad, the CDA gains here among non-confessional voters and those who seldom attend church seem to be the cause.

Table 1.






LOYAL CDA VOTERS

30.5



LOYAL PvdA VOTERS

40



Young Voters

For the first time since the beginning of the seventies, the Christian Democrats scored quite handsomely among the group of young voters. Since 1971 these voters always had a strong preference for new or non-confessional parties (PPR, D66, PvdA and PSP), but now for the first time in 1986, it seems that the CDA is the most popular party.

If we look at the figures for the new voters in the last three elections, it seems evident that this group increasingly reflects the broad shifts within the entire electorate in somewhat stronger measure:

- 1) In 1981 an almost equal following for each of the four largest parties;
- 2) In 1982 a very large following for that year's winner, the VVD;
- 3) In 1986 a very clear advance for the CDA and the VVD.

In any case it appears from the results of the poll among younger voters that the aging of the CDA, often considered as inevitable, need be anything but a foregone conclusion. It is still not clear whether this, too, was caused by the above-mentioned CDA breakthrough among weak or non-churchgoing voters. More comprehensive voter polls such as those organized by universities will necessarily provide answers to these questions in due time.

Yesterday's voting results point to the fact that the voter has further emancipated himself. He/She lets his/her behavior at the polls be determined less than formerly by (anti)religious motives, by social classes or by the areas where she/he lives. Conversely, they mean that the political and cultural differences between the regions have diminished.

8117

CSO: 3614/111

POLITICAL

NORWAY

PAPER EXAMINES REASONS FOR FALL OF WILLOCH GOVERNMENT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 May 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Hagen Is Right"]

[Text] We are not among those who needlessly support the evaluations of the leader of the Progressive Party, Carl I. Hagen. When it comes to his analysis of the causes of the government crisis, we may, however, only establish: Carl I. Hagen is right.

If anything, it is somewhat immoral of Kåre Willoch, the Conservative Party, AFTENPOSTEN and others to blame Hagen and the Progressive Party for the government crisis. As far as we are able to evaluate the situation, Hagen was and remains willing to do anything to secure a Conservative-dominated government, apart from raising the indirect tax on gasoline. On this basis, it is inconceivable that a politician such as Kåre Willoch would not find his way out of the crisis. The problem was not Hagen--the problem was that Willoch and the coalition parties did not want to continue in government. This was also shown in the process taking place before the King directed Gro Harlem Brundtland to form a government. All versions of a nonsocialist government were rejected by the nonsocialist coalition parties. Despite the nonsocialist majority in the Storting. It was not up to Carl I. Hagen.

7262
CSOÆ 3639-116

POLITICAL

NORWAY

LABOR PARTY PAPER ON NEW GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 May 86 p. 4

[Editorial: "In the Old Groove"]

[Text] Once the worst disappointment at the Willoch government's self-inflicted mortal wound has been overcome, the Conservative Party--and AFTENPOSTEN--may be expected to revert to their old grooves during their time in opposition. Their main occupation will then be the atrocity propaganda against the new government policy. We may safely expect the foreign and security policy to become one of the most central areas of the agitation of vulgarity. The first signs have already appeared.

AFTENPOSTEN yesterday gave us a sample of the level we may expect in the foreign policy debate in the future. It is a former personal secretary to Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm who has been given the opportunity to disseminate his personal opinions. And Hans Chr. Erlandsen is not without generosity. Norway will be facing the most dramatic change in its foreign policy course since 1948 if the Labor Party government chooses to put into practice its positions on central security policy issues, Erlandsen claims. The fate of the country will then be the same one as that of Denmark, and we shall be without security policy credibility in our defense and security policy.

We shall disregard the ugly disparagement inherent in such a characterization of one of our closest and friendliest neighboring countries. Everything will have to give way in the search of AFTENPOSTEN and the Conservative Party for arguments against the policy of the Labor Party, including the regard for our relations to a Nordic alliance partner. This is not surprising for those who have been following the various political campaigns of AFTENPOSTEN over the years.

When it comes to the description by Strøm's former close colleague of the credibility of Denmark's foreign and security policy, we believe that the fellow believers of Strøm in Denmark, as, for example, the Conservative government and Prime Minister Poul Schlüter, will feel called upon to protest. Denmark has in various contexts given expression to the positions taken by the majority of the Folketing. It is to be expected that there is great likelihood that the viewpoints are also supported by the majority of the Danish

electorate. If there has been any weakness in the line followed by the Danish government, it must be the fact that the government has brought itself into a situation where it has been in conflict with the majority of the Folketing.

The most important thing to a country's credibility in its security policy is to pursue a political line which is broadly supported by the people and which has strong political backing. The Willoch government has not had that in the nearly 5 years it has been in power. Foreign Minister Stray has on several occasions expressed himself in such ways in international fora as to make it necessary for him to change his political signals after contact with the Storting. In the most central issues of the disarmament policy, the government has constantly been on the point of being voted down in the Storting. Never before under other governments has it been necessary to have as many rounds of explanations and corrections in the foreign policy committee and in the Storting.

We, unfortunately, believe that this has damaged the Norwegian credibility internationally far more than the line followed by Denmark. It will now become the task of the Labor Party to correct this situation and anew stake out a foreign policy course which may unite both the Storting and the people.

7262

CSO: 3639/116

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS APPROVES BILL FOR SECURITY LAW

Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 9-15 May 86 p 3

[Text] At a Council of Ministers yesterday, Thursday, the government approved the draft-bill of a new internal security law that is going to be considered before summer by the Assembly of the Republic.

Taking as a basis the previous administration's security law, which the Parliament approved in general, the Cavaco Silva government drafted a text that considers many of the positions assumed during the parliamentary debate. The general duties of the citizens to collaborate with the security authorities contained in the PS's regulation were restricted, and the type of powers of the police as well as the processes of identification of persons before the police authorities were established more strictly.

Telephone tapping "of and for suspects" will be permitted "in case of overwhelming urgency," when acts of terrorism and terrorist suppression are involved but, at the same time, they have to be authorized by the minister of Internal Administration and a judge.

On the other hand, a Superior Internal Security Council, subordinated to the prime minister, and a Security Coordinating Office operating within the MAI will be created. These agencies are intended to coordinate all aspects of the area.

In the meantime, a new law for the services of foreigners is already being prepared.

8711/7051
CSO: 3542/103

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CUNHAL STATEMENT ON TIES ANGERS MDP/CDE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 9-15 May 86 p 12

[Text] The leaders of the MDP/CDE, the PCP's partner in the APU coalition, were very disturbed by Alvaro Cunhal's statements in an interview with the staff of O DIARIO, regarding this small party and its independence to make alliances with whomever it pleased (case of the PS or PRD).

Cunhal said: "One cannot believe that the MDP will decide to abandon the alliance with the PCP and exchange it for other alliances. It would be the road to the loss of its party identity and independence and to its own liquidation."

In other words, the MDP will be independent, have a party identity, and exist only as long as it depends, on the level of party alliances, on the dominance of the PCP.

The MDP/CDE, which is now going through an intense internal debate in which the question of alliances is a particularly pertinent point, did not like either the message or the disdain shown by the PCP leader. Consequently, the information department of the MDP/CDE issued a communique in which it rejected "the statement that the identity, independence, and existence of the MDP/CDE depend on the type of alliance that is entered into, which, furthermore, only it has the prerogative to decide."

The communique points out that, as a political party, the MDP/CDE "bases itself on its own values, demonstrated over the last 12 years--values that naturally and necessarily place it in the convergence for a democratic alternative."

This public rejection of vassalage to the PCP's designs by the MDP/CDE had already been manifested in the Assembly of the Republic during the 25 April commemorations in Jose Manuel Tengarrinha's speech, which was practically ignored but which was significant in terms of the political relationship with other parties and strategies, specifically that of the Communists.

In an open criticism of the PCP's rather triumphalist (and revivalist) position, the MDP president pointed out: "The deep spiritual bonds between those who rose up against fascism have not been, nor will they be very easily extinguished. On the other hand, to carry that attitude from the past to the present is to seek to take up again conceptual and political instruments that, by being inappropriate, are inoperative."

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ARTICLE VIEWS PSD'S POLICY OF ALLIANCES

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 6 May 86 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice: "Which Alliance for the PSD (IV)?"]

[Text] The fourth and last article devoted to the question of the PSD's policy of alliances seeks to answer the question left open by the earlier ones: How to achieve the objective sought (a bloc dominated by the PSD, an alternative to the Socialist one, with majority support in the Assembly of the Republic, and without any type of pre-election coalition with joint slates at the national level)?

To respond to the foregoing question, it is well to bear in mind that it is not likely that the PSD could obtain majority support in the Assembly in a four-party system. But that possibility ceases to have those limitations in a five-party system, even with the present election system, provided that a 40-percent vote is obtained and that significant voting differences are not established among the remaining parties.

It is also well to bear in mind that the experience of the government, without majority support in the Assembly of the Republic, makes it possible to conclude that it is not unfeasible for a given government to achieve the essence of its policies, provided that easy alternatives are not formed in the parliamentary framework, and provided that the opposition parties feel that they have more to lose than to gain from the opening of a general crisis. But it is also obvious that this type of solution inevitably has the stamp of being provisional and increasingly unstable.

Finally, it is well not to forget that, as I stressed last week, the CDS is a preferential ally, basically the only party with which it would be feasible to establish joint slates if that were an appropriate strategy, because there are no basic objections of a permanent nature to such a strategic solution. That being the case, the question that presents itself in the framework of the current election system is that, on the one hand, a dynamic of supraparty unity has been rewarded by the Portuguese electorate but, on the other hand, the choice of an ED-type solution must be discarded for the combination of reasons I have already mentioned. What this means is that, in the capacity of a dominant party and clearly set apart from the other parties at this juncture, the PSD is forced to organize a strategic solution that will enable it to govern with the awareness that it cannot do so in isolation and locked

in its navel, but also with the clear idea that it must propose a political-electoral program capable of attracting the electorate, and correctly responding to the existing challenges and the reading that a party with the ideology of the PSD has of the solutions for such challenges or problems.

What this means is that it does not make sense for the PSD to negotiate a common program at the general staff level with another or other party forces (the AD was like that), but that it should prepare a political platform of modernization and reform that will be capable of moving social and electoral strata situated beyond the specific areas of control of the PSD, and to which other political forces can possibly subscribe.

What this means, therefore, is that the PSD must establish a contract of political membership and open it to social, political, and economic forces, naturally being able to modify it to improve and intensify it but always respecting the original philosophy characteristic of the plan that the PSD has for Portuguese society.

What this means is that, while the PSD should not make any alliance of national and general scope, and for that reason the PSD cannot or should not assume any commitment to negotiate the distribution of ministerial positions in terms of election percentages, there is nothing to prevent social forces or political groups outside of political parties from reaching agreement to also assume that platform of modernization and reform, and to prevent finding within the framework of each election circle (which, as is known, today is the district) the most appropriate solutions for the objectives which I began by enunciating --on the contrary, there is everything to justify it. What I mean to say by this is that there may be districts in which it is justifiable for the PSD and the CDS to present themselves to the electorate on joint slates, others in which it is normal for them to compete with one another, and others in which the PSD slates should contain an appreciable percentage of prestigious independents capable of attracting popular support. Which means that the alliances of coalitions will be natural and not artificial, the product of realism and pragmatism and not of a geometric spirit that levels everything in the name of abstractions.

It will be said, however, that what we are asking for with this strategy is a colonization area to be formed around the PSD and for the other parties or political forces, especially the CDS, to agree to surrender to the desires (or even the whims) of the PSD. That is not the case, nor could it be so. The fact is that politics does not take pity on unrealistic dreams, especially when the PSD will have a politician such as Adriano Moreira as leader of the CDS. If the PSD demands or tries to impose something beyond the threshold of tolerance of the CDS or any other political force, or if the solutions do not appropriately respond to the interests in question, the failure of the strategy will be obvious. However, that is not the question. The general run of apparent overall agreements are only expressions of local agreements.

Obviously, those who believe that the PSD should not have a dominant position such as the one it occupies in Portuguese society will not agree with this. But things are what they are and it would be better for them to drown their political sorrows somewhere else and stop upsetting the normal play of the relationship of forces and the community of objectives with unsatisfied desires.

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL SHOWS OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR ENERGY, INDIFFERENCE TO POLICE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 May 86 p 2

[Text] The Portuguese in the Greater Lisbon area are overtly opposed to the installation of nuclear power plants in our country and divided regarding the 2-year period for solving the delayed wages problem (too long, reasonable, or impossible to fulfill are the opinions given on an equal basis); and the majority are indifferent toward the Public Security Police [PSP]. These are some of the conclusions from a poll taken by Pluriteste strictly exclusive to O JORNAL.

Among the persons queried in the Greater Lisbon area, those of the female sex were found to be the ones expressing the greatest concern over the installation of that type of power plant in Portugal. Of all those asked about the feeling evoked among them by the PSP, it is noteworthy that "respect" is cited by 16.5 percent, and "confidence" by 12 percent. "Fear" or "suspicion" was the sentiment selected by 8 percent of those interviewed.

Chernobyl

One of the issues posed by the pollsters which gave a reminder of Chernobyl was: "Do you think that it will be possible in the near future to make use of nuclear energy without the risk of personal accidents?"

A total of 29.5 percent responded positively, and 62.5 percent, negatively; while 8 percent of those polled did not know or had no answer. From an age standpoint (over or under age 35), the responses are very close. The same thing does not hold true with regard to the sex of those interviewed: males answered "yes" by 40.4 percent, and "no" by 54.5 percent; while 18.8 percent of the females answered "yes" and 70.3 percent, "no."

The disparity between positive and negative responses is far greater when the question is couched in the following terms: "Prof Cavaco Silva has announced the installation of a nuclear power plant in Portugal over the medium term. What is your opinion regarding this matter?" Of those interviewed, 71 percent were opposed and 21.8 percent, in favor; while 7.3 percent did not know, or had no answer.

Wages in Arrears

"Prof Cavaco Silva has stated that the problem of the delayed wages would be solved within approximately 2 years. Do you consider that too long, long, reasonable, or a period of time impossible to fulfill?"

The answer most often repeated was "too long," with 37.3 percent; followed by "reasonable," with 30.3 percent, and "impossible to fulfill," with 30.8 percent. The men and those over 35 years of age who were queried opted primarily for "too long."

Indifferent Toward PSP

A final question dealt with a heated issue: "Do the Public Security Police evoke in you respect (16.5 percent), confidence (12), security (13.8), suspicion or fear (8), disrespect (7.5 percent), other (9), and "don't know" (1.3 percent).

The percentage of those who cited "indifference" turned out to be uneven between men and women (28.8 as opposed to 40.1 percent).

Technical Record

Direct, personal interviews with 400 persons in the Greater Lisbon region, selected on the basis of sex, age, and housing areas.

The margin of confidence offered by this survey is 95 percent, and the margin of error, 5 percent.

O JORNAL is responsible for the interpretation of the results.

2909

CSO: 3542/110

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PAPER REPORTS ON STATISTICS OF WEEKLIES' POPULARITY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 16-22 May 86 p 4

[Excerpts] The most recent studies of media continue to rank O JORNAL in second place with regard to readers, among the leading general and political information weeklies.

According to the data gathered by Marktest for its "Bareme" (Regular Base for Media) during the 2-month interval of January-February, O JORNAL recorded 193,000 readers, as compared with 352,000 for EXPRESSO, 105,000 for SEMANARIO, and 101,000 for TEMPO; in a universe of 7.14 million individuals.

Norma's similar study, in turn, cited O JORNAL as having 211,000 regular readers (latest issue), in comparison with 459,000 for EXPRESSO, 103,000 for SEMANARIO, and 38,000 for TEMPO, with a universe of 7.987 million persons.

	Marktest *		Norma **	
EXPRESSO	352,000	4.9%	459,000	5.7%
O JORNAL	193,000	2.7%	211,000	2.6%
TAL & QUAL	118,000	1.7%	146,000	1.8%
SEMANARIO	105,000	1.5%	103,000	1.3%
TEMPO	101,000	1.4%	38,000	0.5%
O DIABO	98,000	1.4%	66,000	0.8%

* "Bareme" Jan-Feb 86, mean readership in a universe of 7.14 million individuals

** Media Study, Mar 86, readers of latest issue, in a universe of 7.987 million individuals

2909
CSO: 3542/110

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

EDITORIAL DEFENDS VERIFICATION ROLE OF POLL RESULTS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 May 86 p 6

[Editorial: "Predictions and Polls"]

[Excerpt] Opinion polls in the political realm always evoke two types of reaction: that of those who are benefited and that of those who emerge harmed. The former tend to overlook all the conditioning factors that could make the results relative; the latter, on the other hand, take shelter in their fallibility and cite past instances wherein they were challenged at the time that the votes cast at the polls were counted. Discounting the exaggerations, both may perhaps be somewhat correct. But the fact is that, in general, the polls are still the greatest barometer available to assess the approximate position of the electorate.

We already know that it is artificial to confront those queried, for example, with the hypothesis of there being elections now, at a time when most of the population would have a little more than vague notion of the motives that are currently prompting the politicians to operate seriously with such a hypothesis. However, it would be mistaken to imagine that the responses given under these circumstances mean nothing; because, as a general rule, those responses attest to suspicions which had been hovering in the air in one way or another. Moreover, if that were not the case, if the results were as absurd as some of those harmed claim, no one would even take the trouble to answer the queries or attach much value to them.

Like everything, the polls are what they are, and those published this weekend are no exception to the rule. If we view them carefully, there is nothing in their results which, at least tendentiously, has not already been empirically verified by many people. For example, it was already known that the popularity index of the government, and of the prime minister in particular, was high; that PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] was in worse circumstances than at the time of its scintillating entry into the political scene; that CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] could only reverse the downward curve on which it was embarking through a miracle; that PS [Socialist Party] was recovering; and that PC [Communist Party] has no reason to suspect that the same thing will happen to it. Polls, however, are intended to confirm: to confirm and to quantify.

2909

CSO: 3542/110

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CURRENT, PROJECTED ANTITANK WARFARE DOCTRINE ANALYZED

Preface

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 p 185

[Commentary by Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, Army Chief of Staff:
"Defending Against Offensive Attack Forces"]

[Text] The constitution and the basic security conditions of the FRG determine the defense mission of the army: successful forward defense with all of its might--shoulder to shoulder with our allies--so that in the event of a national defense emergency it can hold its own territory, limit damage and gain the preconditions for a political solution to reestablish peace. The threat is characterized by the offensive strategy of the Warsaw Pact as well as by the dominant role of armored offensive forces in the action of allied weapons with strong air support. To carry out the mission, then, it is necessary for the army to defeat the armored offensive forces in mobile defense. In combat, all operations and tactical measures must concentrate on this main task. Consequently, this task is also a guideline for the armament of the army. The objective of this series of articles is to make clear to the reader the connections between the threat, one's own operational principles, army concepts and technology and to present the contribution of armament in the fulfillment of the army's mission.

'Ground Forces System' Concept

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 186,187

[Article: "Defending Against Armored Offensive Forces Through the "Army System: System Thinking Displaces Duel Thinking"]

[Text] The concept "army system" and the statement "system thinking displaces duel thinking" have been permanent elements of the discussion of late, among other things on the interaction between technological development and the conduct of operations. The thinking of the military leaders is being influenced by this more and more. Just as individual weapon systems have become increasingly complex but all the more effective, the army is also in a process of change. Thus the introduction of up-to-date sensors, means of data

transmission and processing, and intelligent ammunition and the increase in penetration performance affect not only the combat effectiveness of individual weapon systems but also the combat effectiveness of the army as a whole.

One can represent the system mentality through the example of the defense against armored offensive forces. In this introductory article, there is to be no discussion of the details on the threat, our conduct of operations, or the concept of the army; this is reserved for the following articles. Rather, it is to be made clear how the different reconnaissance, command, and weapon systems can be utilized in a sequence of individual coordinated steps so as to be successful in warding off armored offensive forces.

We are also addressing the military hardware that will be introduced into the army in the near future, for its development was very substantially influenced by the overall system thinking. Naturally there should be no attempt here to give any firm instructions to the troop commanders. Every operation has its own dynamics.

The influence of air forces, missiles, airborne units, means of electronic warfare and possibly of the defense against chemical agents is present everywhere at all times and affects combat. It is ignored in the following to simplify the presentation but the elements that determine it are integrated into the army system.

If one views the introduction of a second echelon of armored offensive forces that is to continue the attack beyond the stopped first echelon, then one sees the following steps in defending against it.

Reconnaissance in the Depth

Armored offensive forces--essentially battle tanks, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzers--must be brought up from the depth before they can be put into action. In a first step, then, it must be determined which of these forces are brought up when and where. Precise reconnaissance of the enemy was always a precondition for success in combat but the possibilities for doing so were limited because attackers used the natural cover of the terrain in their advance and approach. With the utilization of the third dimension as well as up-to-date sensors and data transmission in real time, the situation has changed decisively. Reconnaissance drones--the first robots on the modern battlefield--make it possible for the defender to scout enemy offensive forces while they are still in the depth. They reduce what has been a substantial advantage of an attacker--surprise.

Situation Assessment

With the introduction of reconnaissance drones and modern electronic reconnaissance, there has been an abrupt increase in the amount of information available to the commanders and their staffs to assess the situation. If the acquired advantage is to be used effectively, then this flood of information

must be properly directed, processed and presented. This is possible only by utilizing the most up-to-date communications and data processing technology.

Heros, the army command information system for the computer-assisted conduct of operations in the staffs, therefore works closely with the reconnaissance and other command information systems. With its help, the tactical command can decide quickly which measures must be taken first to engage detected armored offensive forces. It is important to use the time that the attacker requires for his advance and approach. Of great importance, therefore, is not only the rapid formulation of decisions but also the immediate transmission of the resulting orders. Our communications systems make this possible. Their development will not only accelerate the flow of information but also make it more resistant against jamming measures and more secure cryptologically.

The situation assessment is repeated at the different command levels in the course of the enemy's advance and approach as the result or initiator of the next steps.

Electronic Warfare Against the Enemy Command

The bringing up and introduction of fresh forces is a procedure that requires high command performance. To interfere with it is an important early measure in defending against armored offensive forces. Through electronic warfare, it is possible to act rapidly, purposefully and in a concentrated manner and it can make it difficult for the enemy to gain attack momentum.

Inhibiting the Movement of the Enemy in the Depth

With the introduction of the MLRS multiple rocket launcher and the associated antitank mine launcher, it becomes possible to hinder and channel the movements of the enemy's forces while they are still in great depth. To be sure, the expended mine barriers cannot be monitored by direct-fire weapons but allowing the planned movement to come up and harassing it gains time, makes it difficult for the enemy to coordinate the operations of his forces, and facilitates their engagement through the long-range rocket artillery.

Target Acquisition

Combat reconnaissance, reconnaissance results of the drones, direction-finding bearings of electronic warfare, and inflight reports of the air force continually update the situation information on the enemy. This knowledge is completed through the precise results of target acquisition. Radar equipment as well as remotely piloted vehicles for target acquisition make possible the real-time engagement of point targets and reduce the expenditure of ammunition.

Attrition Through Indirectly Aimed Fire

Bomblet ammunition and, in the future, homing ammunition make possible the engagement of moving armored targets through indirectly aimed fire as well.

It is a matter of wearing down the enemy as early as possible with rocket and tube artillery during his approach and of slowing his movements. His attack momentum must not begin to develop and the cohesion of his conduct of operations must be disrupted even before entering combat.

Armored Combat Reconnaissance

Early, before the enemy reaches his own defense areas, he must be scouted through armored reconnaissance patrols--comprised of armored reconnaissance vehicles, battle tanks or armored personnel carriers--without or without a combat mission depending upon the situation. Their reports on the strength and organization of forces as well as on the focal point of the impending attack are the basis for last orders and measures by the troop commander to prepare the defense with directly aimed fire. Interference-proof and cryptologically protected radio contacts are essential preconditions for the effectiveness of the combat reconnaissance and the utilization of its results.

Neutralization of the Enemy Artillery

The attack of armored forces is preceded by the preparation fire of the enemy artillery. It is supposed to destroy or at least hold down special antitank forces. In this phase, it is a matter of reducing its effect as much as possible. That means that its gun emplacements must be reconnoitered quickly and precisely with our own artillery locating means and be worked immediately with our own fire. The time factor plays an especially important role in the engagement of the enemy artillery. With the introduction of an artillery command, information and fire control system, the results of the target acquisition means and other reconnaissance results are converted into fire immediately. In this way, the main fire support of the attacking armored units can be neutralized quickly.

Barriers Immediately in Front of the Defense Areas

The enemy tanks again stack up immediately in front of the defense areas. The movement of the enemy is again hindered by mine barriers laid in time manually or with mine launchers in combat as well as by the use of antitank directional mines. Here, in contrast to the barriers in the depth, however, direct-fire weapons as well as artillery monitor the barriers. This moment of the stacking up of enemy tank forces and of the new situation assessment by the attacker's commanders must be utilized immediately. The actual defensive combat begins in this phase. Here it is especially clear why the blocking capability is becoming an element equal in importance to fire and movement.

Containment Through Directly Aimed Fire

In the next step, it is imperative to contain the offensive forces through the concentrated fire of the directly-aimed weapons. Battle is engaged with the long-range antitank guided missiles of the tank destroyers and enters into its crucial phase with the fire of the battle tanks and armored personnel carriers. More than ever, it is important that

- the enemy tank be detected before it detects its target,
- our first round or missile hits its target before the enemy tank fires,
- the hit has such an effect on the target that the enemy is neutralized.

Rapid Formation of Antitank Focal Points

The attacker will use his advantage of being free to employ his forces as he chooses for a massed concentration. To prevent penetration or breakthrough situations, it must be possible to form antitank focal points quickly. In the operational framework, the most suitable weapon systems for this are the antitank helicopters. Their employment is an effective and highly valuable means of taking care of a critical situation. In the tactical area, however, it is still the battle tank through which an antitank force can be quickly concentrated at a crucial point even under enemy zone fire and through which one can act from a meeting engagement. Precisely under the frequently changing situations in modern defensive combat, therefore, the battle tank will remain indispensable in the future as well.

Destruction of Tank Forces

The final step in the defense of armored offensive forces is their destruction in front of and in the defense areas. Through forceful surprise counterattacks, the already wornout enemy must be repulsed through battle tank units. In this way, the defender regains the initiative at least locally and acts instead of reacts. This operation can be carried out quickly. Only through it is the defensive operation decided precisely relative to the enemy's main point of attack.

Control of the System

Only a part of the "army system" was addressed in the example "Defense Against Armored Offensive Forces." If one considers that only a small sector of an ongoing battle was illuminated and that additionally many other operations take place at the same time, for which forces, space and time must be utilized in the best possible manner, then one receives an impression of the complexity of the "army system." If one also considers that previously static elements--mine warfare, for example--become dynamic through the use of up-to-date technologies, that reaction times are being reduced drastically, and that

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mobility and ranges of weapon systems are continually increasing, then it becomes abundantly clear that every effort must be made to see that this system remains controllable especially in extraordinary situations. One must thereby consider system structures, interfaces, information availability, transmission and processing, time constants, combat effectiveness factors, logistical ranges and similar factors. Modern communications and information technology gives us the means for doing this. Only through its consistent utilization can one be sure that the military commanders can maintain control of their respective subsystems of the "army system" and ultimately be successful in doing their part, along with their units, in the main task of the army, defending against armored offensive forces.

Warsaw Pact Threat Analyzed

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 188-191

[Article: "The Threat: The Offensive As a Main Type of Combat"]

[Text] "The ground forces...possess the necessary combat characteristics for resolute battle against a powerful enemy in the land theaters of war. Their main task will be to exploit the results of the nuclear weapon strikes of the rocket troops and the air forces for the final destruction of the enemy groupings in the theaters of war, to capture (or to occupy) the territory of the countries of the enemy coalition quickly, and to end the war on the continent victoriously." (Footnote) ("Military Strategy," published by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, (third Russian edition, Moscow, 1968), German edition published in Cologne, 1969, p 383)

In accordance with the Soviet command and operational principles that are binding for all Warsaw Pact armed forces, the modern combat of ground forces is combat of combined arms. Participating in it are units and formations of all service branches of the ground forces, combat pilot and attack helicopter formations of the air forces and, in the case of engagements in areas near the coast, also surface naval combat formations of the naval forces.

Maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact armed forces show again and again that this principle is definitely being carried out in reality. The joint command of the ground and air forces is being applied consistently even down to the army level. The spatially and temporally coordinated utilization of munitions, among other things to exploit successes, to eliminate crises, or to shift the main effort quickly, can easily be practiced in this manner. Fire and movement as well as electronic warfare are basic contents of all operations.

The Offensive

The Soviet military doctrine designates the offensive as the main type of combat. When pushed with firm determination and at a rapid pace, it is supposed to guarantee the total destruction of the enemy in the combat of combined weapons.

The offensive shows the following characteristics: the offensive forces are organized in echelons and freely available reserves. This structure occurs at every level of command. The first echelon includes half to two-thirds of all combat and combat support troops of a unit. It is to force penetration into the enemy defense. The breakthrough and the thrust into the depth is taken over by the following forces of the second echelon. Freely available reserves are employed to clean up crises or to exploit situations what were not foreseen by the operations plan.

In addition, the capability of the armored formations for combat with combined weapons, supported by helicopters and fighter bombers, permits their purposeful employment independent of the main forces but coordinated with their offensive success to exploit unexpected situational developments for the engagement of reserves and installations in the depth.

In the offensive, after extensive preparation fire and with immediate support by artillery, fighter bombers and attack helicopters, armored formations are to penetrate the enemy defense areas. Generally organized narrowly in depth and protected by a dense antiaircraft shield, they are supposed to break through the defense areas quickly and destroy the reservists.

Nuclear delivery systems, command posts, antitank systems and artillery formations of the enemy are always engaged as a matter of priority.

Through airborne operations of forces in battalion to division strength, key terrain in the depth of the enemy territory is to be captured early, enemy reserves contained, and the command capability of the enemy reduced, thereby establishing the preconditions for the rapid advance of the main forces.

The military leaders of the Warsaw Pact states are trained so that they will no longer attempt to mount a rigid assault against the enemy defense. Instead, they are to look for the weaknesses of the enemy and outflank him or attack him in the rear. Movement and combat alternate. When necessary, the troops are regrouped quickly and flexibly. Through the alternation of deployment and contraction of forces, the NBC weapons of the enemy are to be underrun but, at the same time, adequately strong forces can always be organized for the decisive breakthrough.

Course of the Offensive

As a rule, the offensive from movement is waged over forces that have already reached the enemy. The preceding advance begins in a marshalling area that is about 40 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area and thus beyond the field of fire of the mass of the enemy artillery.

In advance of the main forces move the combat support forces such as artillery, engineers, air defense units, and possibly also tank destroyer units that monitor the offensive from favorable positions.

The preparation fire through artillery and air forces begins even during the advance of the main forces. The enemy defense and firing areas are subjected

to the greatest employment of ammunition for 30 to 40 minutes. With this uninterrupted fire, the intention is to affect the defender psychologically as well as materially.

As soon as the fire is shifted to the depth of the enemy combat zone, the offensive of the armored combat forces begins. The enemy should be given no time to overcome his shock and to put his defensive weapons into operation.

The "line of the initial assault position" is crossed without halting. Only at night is a short halt allowed for orientation.

The terrain sector up to the enemy positions is crossed with the greatest possible speed. The battle tanks roll ahead and the motorized riflemen follow dismounted. In this phase, tanks and armored personnel carriers keep the enemy down through direct fire with a high rate of fire.

Enemy mine barriers are cleared either with the resources of the combat forces or with the support of the engineers. Penetration occurs under the fire of all weapons. It is to be followed by the final destruction of the enemy in the forward positions. Subsequently tanks and the motorized riflemen, who have once again mounted their armored personnel carriers, attempt to push forward into the gaps in the defender's battle disposition so as to bring about a rapid widening of the penetration. Through a determined forward push, the cohesion of the defense is to be broken up and possibilities created for the offensive on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy. In this way, the forces mounting a frontal attack are to receive help in achieving success.

Finally, the second echelon introduced into combat is to break through the enemy defense system and push forward to the objective in the depth.

The attack forces must at all times be prepared to continue the combat under NBC conditions. After the enemy has "unleashed" a nuclear war--so the official Soviet statement--the use of its own nuclear weapons and the timely and effective exploitation of their effect becomes a "task of paramount importance" for all commanders. A similar assessment is probably in force for the existing chemical agents.

Uniformity of Training and Equipment

Uniform training and equipment are the basis for the realization of this offensive concept. The armed forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have organizational forms that are largely adapted to the Soviet model. Their weapons and equipment come primarily from Soviet production or are reproduced under license, whereby it frequently happens that essential parts are delivered from the Soviet Union. That strengthens the Soviet position of leadership and supremacy and guarantees a highly developed technology. In addition, uniform equipment makes possible rational warehousing and reciprocal material support in operations.

Military principles and norms are being standardized continuously to make it possible to work with generally valid values at all command levels in the rapidly developing combat.

The high military commanders of all Warsaw Pact countries complete a course of study at the academy of the Soviet general staff and qualified officers of the middle command echelon attend academies of the service branches of the Soviet armed forces. This common training is supposed to ensure a uniform intellectual foundation that includes both the military tools as well as the political orientation. The fact that they know one another simplifies the command of the major formations even across national borders. Otherwise, the training and advanced training of the officers of the Warsaw Pact armed forces carried out within a national framework and likewise oriented toward the Soviet model is very practical.

Three-fourths of the rank and file and noncommissioned officers of the Warsaw Pact ground forces are draftees. Along with the most up-to-date equipment, they are decisive in determining the combat capability of the formations. They are brought up from kindergarten on with the idea that their fatherland and its "socialist achievements" are continuously threatened by the imperialist powers in the West. In this way, the will to defend and hatred for the Western nations are awakened early. Neither individual expressions of discontent about the existing political system and domestic crises nor problems with nationalities in the multinational country Soviet Union ought to obscure the fact that as soldiers they would risk their lives with conviction in the event of war.

The military training of the young people begins in school, where military themes permeate all subjects. At the age of 15 to 17, they go through a premilitary training. The boys are thereby prepared specifically for their later application in the armed forces and the girls are prepared for service in civil defense.

The field training in the Warsaw Pact armed forces is hard and realistic. It is carried out under general conditions that by Western standards are unbelievably restrictive and psychologically stressful on the individual. Still, the oppression of the individual in the armed forces is merely a more intense form of the regimentation to which all people are subjected throughout their lives under communist rule.

The view that Soviet soldiers in particular would not be able to react flexibly to surprise situations in combat because of this patronizing is contradicted by their solid practical military training, various tactical modes of behavior that have been drilled into them, and their ability to improvise.

Relative Force Capabilities for Central Europe

For use in Central Europe, that is directed against the FRG and the NATO armed foes stationed in there, the Warsaw Pact has a total of 92 combat divisions.

Of these, 56 divisions stand ready in the GDR, CSSR and Poland as the first echelon. They include national and Soviet forces.

As the second echelon or reserve, another 36 divisions are counted in the three western military districts of the Soviet Union. Added to these are artillery divisions and other independent major formations.

The equipment of the rapidly available forces of the Warsaw Pact in Europe includes almost 27,000 battle tanks, 19,000 guns, 18,400 antitank guided missile systems, and 53,000 armored combat vehicles.

If one relates this potential to the NATO resources, namely to the approximately 13,470 battle tanks, 11,000 guns, 12,300 antitank guided missile systems, and 33,000 armored combat vehicles, then NATO's numerical inferiority in all areas becomes clear. Naturally, one could say that the Warsaw Pact would not risk an attack with a superiority of 2:1. If one considers, however, that the attacker, depending upon his intentions, has the possibility of greatly concentrating his forces whereas the defender must be present along the entire front, then it is evident that a superiority can easily be achieved at points of main effort that by no means excludes the possibility of an offensive.

NATO's disadvantage in central Europe is increased through the lack of spatial depth. This circumstance forbids allowing large losses of territory, because large parts of the population and of the economic potential of the FRG would thereby fall into the hands of the enemy.

But the NATO formations on the battlefield are opposed not only by the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. These forces receive substantial support from the air. Attack and transport helicopter formations, which are already assigned to the armies in peacetime, intervene directly in the combat. They are destined for antitank operations and for the transport of motorized riflemen. Operational aircraft of the Warsaw Pact air forces are likewise temporarily attached directly to the fronts and armies for certain missions.

Technical Developments for the Combat Forces

The tactical concept of highly mobile combat by day or night and the threat from weapons of the NATO armed forces, as seen by the Soviet Union, is also reflected in the technical development of the vehicles of the armored offensive forces.

The following trends are seen in the development of the modern battletanks:

--Transition to a three-man crew and introduction of an automatic loader. In connection with ergonomic restrictions and the carrying of part of the fuel outside of the armor protection, this measure allows the Soviets to construct vehicles that have an enclosed volume about 3 square meters smaller than Western developments. On the one hand, the clearly smaller silhouette makes detection and engagement of the tanks more difficult and, on the other hand, it permits a substantial armor protection with overall weights of under 45

tons. The automatic loader relieves the crew in handling the relatively heavy ammunition, permits the stowing of the ammunition protected on the hull floor in the middle of the tank, and ensures a high rate of fire. The disadvantage of the smaller negative range of elevation of the main gun connected with the flat construction is thereby accepted.

--The 125-mm smooth-bore gun is standard armament of all modern Soviet battletanks. The large caliber, the high initial velocity, and the continuous improvement of the high-explosive, shaped-charge and kinetic-energy projectiles are now ensuring the Soviets superiority in the effect of the ammunition on the target.

--The hit probability was decisively increased through the installation of laser rangefinders, improvements in the weapon stabilization and the fire control systems, and the extremely flat trajectory of the high-velocity ammunition.

--Mobility was improved through the gradual raising of the engine output to over 15 kilowatts per ton and the change from a wheeled track and suspension to track support rollers. The capability to drive under water has been standard up to now. It can not yet be judged whether this capability has been retained for the T-80 as well.

--The protection of the crew was improved through design engineering, quality of the armor steel, and the structure of the armor itself with the objective of protecting the crews to the range at which their own armament can destroy Western battle tanks. The introduction of laminated armor thereby contributed to a substantial improvement in the protection. An additional layer to improve the protection against neutron radiation is an integral part of all modern tanks. It is to be expected that the Soviets are carefully evaluating the Israeli experiences with reactive additional armor.

In the case of the armored personnel carriers, the transition from the BMP-1 to the BMP-2 shows how technology reacts to tactical changes. The new 30-mm rapid-fire gun permits more accurate fire at greater ranges than the previous 73-mm low-pressure gun. In addition, a caliber was chosen here as well that is superior to that of comparable NATO vehicles. Through the installation of special optics, the engagement of air targets is possible and thus consideration is given to the increase in attack helicopters in the West.

Tendencies toward more effective mounted action from the vehicle are seen, among other places, in the possibility of installing a fourth machine gun as well as in reducing the dismounted strength by two soldiers. The Soviets are equipping their armored personnel carriers with up-to-date antitank guided missile systems with engagement possibilities of up to 4,000 meters for use against battle tanks.

It can be stated that the combat forces of the Warsaw Pact armed forces are increasingly being equipped with vehicles whose technical capabilities fulfill the prerequisites for the realization of the tactical concepts.

Despite the requirement for firepower that is clearly in the foreground, Soviet vehicles represent a good compromise between the in part conflicting requirements for firepower, protection, mobility and a command capability. Besides some noteworthy work of their own, as in the construction of guns, the Soviets react rapidly to developments in the West. Detailed publications of the Western press and the possibility of buying the needed technology will make it easier for them to make the changeover from their heretofore mainly actively operating night vision equipment to thermal imagers in the near future and also to improve the fire control computers.

For the end of the 1990's, one can expect the introduction of a new generation of battle tanks. In addition to the adaptation of firepower, protection and mobility to the latest technology, special measures can be expected that make more difficult the detection of the tank through infrared and radar sensors and increase the protection against self-guiding ammunition aimed from above. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will thereby retain the existing turret tank concept or will turn to such revolutionary solutions as crown mounts or turretless tanks.

Overall Evaluation

Along with the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies, the Soviet ground and air forces in Europe have a tremendous firepower that by Western concepts far exceeds defense requirements. One must thereby acknowledge that Soviet equipment is up-to-date and of good quality. It is continuously being adapted to the development of Soviet operational principles and to the threat by enemy weapon systems. The high share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union allows the planners and procurers to coordinate their activities in several areas at the same time. This is verified by the improvements in the battle tanks and armored personnel carriers and the simultaneous increase in the artillery and helicopter forces in the last 15 years.

The purposeful concentration of forces and the uniformity of training, equipment and command are doubtless among the advantages of the Eastern doctrine. The dominance of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact facilitates the achievement of agreement. Nevertheless, national ways of thinking are not stifled but are frequently taken into consideration in policy decisions.

In the evaluation of the maneuvers and publications of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, a trend is becoming evident that--made possible, among other things, through the extensive provisioning with materials--indicates a greater capability of regiments and battalions for independent and self-responsible action. Support through the respective higher command echelon with resources required by the assigned mission facilitates the tasks of the commanders concerned.

For all that, an overlapping command structure equipped with redundant command resources ensures that the cohesive conduct of operations can be maintained in the event of surprise attacks.

Combined Arms Antitank Mission

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 192-195

[Article: "Antitank Defense in the Combat of Combined Weapons"]

[Text] "Modern combat is primarily a fight against armored forces." Thus begins the regulation ZDv 3/50 under the heading: "Antitank Defense--Joint Task of all Troops." This call for action is indeed the key to success against the superiority in armored forces of the Warsaw Pact that was presented in the preceding article, "The Threat." The current antitank defense concept is to be presented through a few brief selected considerations.

The Conditions

In the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact, the military mission of the army requires the defense of our country within the scope of the alliance. The army, along with the other military services and the alliance partners, must thereby

--contain the attacker near the border and destroy his strike forces,

--prevent him from proceeding with the offensive according to plan and nourishing it with fresh forces from the depth, and

--recover our own captured terrain from him.

Besides the defense in the combat sectors assigned to it by the NATO commanding generals, the army faces a second large task: ensuring the freedom to maneuver in the rear areas for their own and all other NATO armed forces on the soil of the FRG.

It follows from this double task--forward defense and the maintenance of the freedom to maneuver in the rear areas--that in a state of defense the German Army must have at its disposal two large components with different structures and equipment: a field army and a territorial army. It also follows that the operational principles must be optimized to the different tasks. This article is restricted to the field army, which is especially structured and equipped for engaging tanks.

The area influences the conduct of operations in many ways. The military strategic concept of forward defense, the will to limit damage, and the small depth of the area affect the possibilities in operational planning as well as the place and type of terrain use by highly mobile formations and weapon systems. The increase in builtup terrain through further settlement channels movements and limits the possibilities for the full deployment of tanks for attacker and defender. Cover and camouflage, on the other hand, are favored and possibilities for barriers are improved. The narrowness of the area

creates more positions at shorter combat distances. The quality of the road network and agricultural measures open up possibilities for movement even where previously the ground trafficability kept mechanized forces away.

The result is that the mission of the field army requires as the essential performance the successful conduct and continuation of four battles that interlock and are occurring simultaneously or that succeed one another:

--The battle on a wide front and with great intensity from the beginning in the scope of sustained delaying operations.

--The battle around and in the defense areas of brigades and divisions as a battle of combined arms in a mobile conduct of operations, including the employment of division reserves, with the goal of stopping and defeating the first echelon of the enemy armies.

--The battle against looming penetrations or breakthroughs in the primarily offensive employment of assembled reserves and/or of operational reserves from the front in a free operation that cannot be planned in advance with the goal of defeating and repulsing forces of the first echelon here at the latest and of restoring the integrity of its own territory.

--During these three battles, it is a matter of carrying the fight into the depth with reconnaissance and fire from the beginning to delay and wear down the second echelon so that the first and second echelons can be defeated one after another and separately.

The field army must be able to resolve these tasks. The destruction of attacking tanks is thereby in the foreground of all considerations and measures. The operations plan is therefore an extremely dynamic antitank plan.

The enemy's capability of carrying on uninterrupted operations is countered through the technical and tactical combination. To that end, highly mobile elements of antitank defense are to be employed flexibly. Our own capabilities for the conducting of the combat of combined weapons are also transferred to levels that are felt on the battlefield quickly and without a lot of staff work. For this reason, units and formations are the supporters of the antitank battle.

Tactical operational principles consider in advance the factors of mission and area shown above. The "antitank defense mission" common to all service branches is converted into procedures that reveal the enemy's weaknesses in technology, tactics and command and lead to the destruction of his forces. The objective is to hinder the systematic cooperation of the enemy forces, to force the individual weapon systems to expose themselves at vulnerable points, and to neutralize them through the hit with the first shot.

The Combat of Combined Weapons

The Significance

"Through the cooperation of different service branches under unified command, it (the combat) becomes combat of combined weapons" (AnwFE [instruction for command and operations] 700/108 No 103). This means the systematic division of labor, planned overlapping and situation-appropriate replenishment of the different forces and resources as well as the orientation of all efforts toward the objectives of the respective operations.

This orientation is the destruction of armored offensive forces. Thus the combat of combined weapons should not be understood as a mere description or course of action but as a challenge to apply a concept consistently. The basic idea thereby is to hit and defeat the enemy again and again at an unexpected time, unexpected place and in an unexpected manner. That requires initiative, especially at the command levels brigade to division.

Combat Elements

The main elements of combat are fire and movement. In combination with barriers, they determine the success in antitank defense.

With the expected enemy fire density, movements are made more difficult even under armor protection. On the other hand, high fire concentration forces movements so as to be able to maintain and utilize the combat capability at the crucial point. This requires the planning of areas without barriers or the use of rapid barriers with limited effective times as well as the exploitation of all cover offered by the terrain for movements and fire protection.

It is not so much the high density of our own fire that determines success or failure in antitank defense but the hit scored with the corresponding effect on the most important target. The frequency of "the hit with the first shot" is decisive.

Seen in this light, command maneuverability is a decisive element in combat.

The Contribution of the Service Branches to Antitank Defense

The army possesses efficient forces for the engagement of armored offensive troops: service branches that--each seen individually--can fulfill subtasks of an operation under the principles just described with ever greater prospects of success. The following description dispenses with the enumeration of all service branches:

--The command forces establish the technical preconditions for a maneuverable command. They support the conduct of operations through the provision of reconnaissance results and can quickly determine the point of main effort as

well as the direction of movements of armored forces. Through electronic countermeasures, they can help to deceive the enemy, to paralyze his offensive power, and thus to hinder the orderly interaction of his forces.

--The combat forces are the main supporters of the combat of combined weapons:

Unarmored combat forces carry on the infantry fight against infantry reinforced with tanks in heavily covered terrain with many obstacles. Their primary task is to carry on combat in and around localities, in woods and around waters to free armored combat forces for other tasks or, as defensive pillars, to hold an area for later operations of armored combat forces. In field fortifications, they utilize terrain sectors to back up enemy armored forces or to channel them so as to create the preconditions for the mobile use of armored combat forces. Through the skillful emplacement of long-range antitank weapons in combination with the fortification of merging localities supplemented through the dominant effect there of the panzerfaust, they clear the way, hold territory and make it possible for the armored combat forces to conduct mobile operations at a promising location. Through infiltration or harassment, they are especially well suited to surprising enemy tanks in close combat and to hindering the orderly advance of battle tank formations in assembly areas or in passing through localities and defiles. They thus establish the preconditions for the use of other, including weaker, forces and resources.

The airmobile combat forces are an essential means to contain enemy tanks quickly with strong antitank forces, protect flanks, close gaps, and capture important localities, defiles or bridges in surprise raids or in rapid operations. For this purpose, they are to receive special support and they are to be given the opportunity through extra time or utilization in buildup terrain to protect themselves or to dig in. Precisely in the case of rapidly developing operations, the formation of insular positions, or the impending loss of the cohesion in their own conduct of operations, airborne formations are well suited to serve as supporting pillars in the fight against armored enemy forces and thus as an effective means for regaining the initiative.

As the core of the army, the armored combat forces have the task of engaging and defeating the mechanized enemy through fire and movement at close and medium distances. High firepower, mobility and adequate armor protection allow them to alternate immediately between dispersion and concentration and between offensive thrusts, firefights from emplacements, and the slow fighting retreat, to reach the enemy quickly, and to pull back from the effects of superior fire through rapid movement into more favorable operating areas. Through a mixture of antitank forces adapted to the situation and terrain, the armored enemy can be overpowered even in areas that are only conditionally suitable for the employment of armored forces.

Armored and armored infantry forces cooperate very closely to overpower the enemy. Surprise attacks with fire and thrusts, if possible in the flank and rear, lend force to the movements. It is important especially for them to plan the antitank defense so that they intervene in the combat at the decisive time and at the right place in the most expedient organization. This is all the more important when visibility is restricted, where they can utilize the

modern thermal-image observation and sighting devices as a highly effective means of engaging armored targets to their own advantage.

The armored reconnaissance force obtains reconnaissance results with technical means and through scouting so that, if need be through combat or "letting themselves be overrun," the direction and focal point of enemy armored attacks are determined and reported to make it possible to take antitank measures appropriate to the time and situation. Through their reconnaissance results, the course is set for a "battle formation" and they make possible the crafty use of the main forces at the focal point and predetermine the success in the antitank defense.

Tank destroyer units fight with great mobility, generally on a broad front, and utilize the superior range of their weapon systems for a hit lead. They are therefore especially dependent upon reconnaissance results and always have priority in the choice of positions among the combat forces. Accuracy of fire and long range give them special weight in antitank defense. All terrain possibilities must always be investigated with respect to the success of the employment of tank destroyer units. Especially in cooperation with long-range support weapons, they can establish the preconditions for flanking attacks by their own forces at the point of main effort. Combat forces achieve the greatest effect only in close interaction with each other and with the combat support forces.

--The combat support forces act against armored forces through fire, especially at long ranges, obtain reconnaissance and scouting results, set up barriers, give support in overcoming obstacles, and carry on the fight against the enemy aircraft.

The artillery force locates targets and, by monitoring the battlefield, it provides information on the battle disposition, movements and strength of the enemy. It contains enemy forces in the depth as well, breaks them up, especially where they are backed up, and helps to stop them. The artillery must take part early in the fight against tanks. Through smoke and high-explosive fire as well as temporary barriers, it can contribute to the defeat of the armored enemy. By engaging the artillery of the enemy and neutralizing his observation, it prevents our own combat forces from being "covered up" with fire. It thus helps to see that antitank guided missiles can be fired accurately. The artillery can temporally change the battlefield to a limited extent with mine missiles for the laying of barrier minefields. It is thus an effective means for the rapid shifting of focal points, especially for antitank defense. It has a decisive influence on the mobile combat tactics of the armored combat forces, especially when coordinated with the engineers.

Engineers do not only interdict, they frequently make possible movements for the engagement of tanks. Especially the capability of reacting quickly with antitank mortar mines during combat and--when necessary--with varying effective times helps to change the battlefield in accordance with our own concepts so that it is especially favorable to our own conduct of operations. It is not a matter of reacting to enemy operations with the available means but of forcing them to react as intended by our own side.

Armored air defense forces primarily protect the formations of the combat forces employed at the point of main effort or assembled as reserves. It is they who make at all possible the mobile conduct of operations by day.

The NBC defense force provides for rapid decontamination far forward and helps make possible combat against armored forces under NBC conditions as well.

The logistic troops establish the material preconditions for combat and for its successful outcome.

But it must also be said that these forces are scarce in terms of their number relative to the threat and their mission and that there are shortcomings that must be eliminated.

The Third Dimension

The great width, shortage of forces and small depth of the defense areas require the utilization of the third dimension against the enemy's main attack forces. Antitank helicopters therefore strengthen antitank defense in all types of combat. Their early employment will effectively support the operations of the combat forces through the full utilization of their antitank guided missiles. They are a crucial means for the strengthening of the antitank defense and for shifting the point of main effort of antitank operations over great distances and are thus "the operational means for clearing up a critical situation."

Air forces can act in the enemy's depth, to cordon off the battlefield, and to give immediate support against attacks by armored forces. They are especially needed where army forces cannot adequately perform the main task of tank engagement: preventing the timely intervention of the second echelon. The importance of the use of airborne forces was already described above.

Antitank Defense of All Forces

The panzerfaust is a frequently underestimated means of antitank defense. It is used on a broad front, to be sure, but as a "pawn" it does not play a large role. In the planned equipment and through its large numbers, it has a substantial part in the destruction of enemy tanks.

From the protection of buildings and field fortifications, all forces so equipped destroy attacking tanks in close combat and wear down such "bold thrusts" through "numerous hits."

The Brigades in Combat

The conduct of operations of the brigades is a decisive precondition for antitank defense. The brigade is already organically capable of conducting operations of combined arms. With reinforcements appropriate to the situation and flexible command and through expedient mixing of the combat forces, the

most suitable commitment of forces can in each case be found for the engagement of the enemy. It is the task of the commanders to plan, coordinate and lead the interaction of forces, whereby in the foreground of all considerations is the understanding of the fight against tanks as requiring initiative. In this connection, command ingenuity is seen in the use of the service branches in each case in accordance with their strength and without a model. In the following, some possible examples for:

--Systematic division of labor: Armored infantrymen hold territory in terrain with many obstacles and are reinforced for antitank defense through tanks and tank destroyer units. The artillery thereby blinds the respective secondary targets and neutralizes the observation of the offensive forces that can hinder its own forces in the effective use of their weapons.

--Overlapping according to plan: Artillery and engineers complement one another ideally with their barrier resources. Engagement areas of the combat forces overlap so that flanking fire is possible at all times, even in the neighboring combat sector. Reconnaissance units complement each other to the extent that a complete view of the situation emerges and fire can be planned very precisely to achieve the respective hit leads.

--Replenishment appropriate to the situation: In utilizing reserves, the area foreseen for an offensive is to be kept free of barriers but made especially secure. Thus, for example, engineers or artillery are to be kept in readiness so as to hold back offensive forces quickly or possibly temporarily with antitank mortar mines or mine missiles to destroy them with a powerful thrust in the flank and rear. If own attacks or barriers are planned, the clearing of lanes for the bringing forward of counteroffensive forces can be monitored through the mine launchers of the engineers, for example, so as to be able to close them again quickly in the event of a surprise enemy attack.

--The orientation of all efforts toward the objective of each combat operation: The courage for a clear massed concentration is required here. All forces are to be employed so that the decisive thrust against the armored forces of the enemy is aimed where the enemy is to be weakened the most. In so doing, the gaining of the initiative at all levels is of decisive importance.

All in all, it is a matter of forcing our own operational concept on the enemy. The brigades, reinforced in accordance with the situation, are very well suited for this.

Conclusions

Every change or modernization of the enemy forces must be examined to see what influence it has on our own capabilities for mission accomplishment. If necessary, countermeasures must be taken. The mission analyzed at the outset of these comments makes clear how numerous the tasks of the field army are in the state of defense. This requires a set of instruments that are well sharpened and fully available for the necessary operations. If some instrument or other has become dull or is missing entirely, then it must be

renewed or acquired. But if the exchange of the entire set of instruments is necessary because the overall conditions change, then even a proven concept must be rethought and possibly redefined.

Antitank Concept Projected

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 196,197

[Article: "Concept of the Fight Against Armored Offensive Forces in the 1990's"]

[Text] The pattern of war in the 1990's will be critically determined by technological progress, which primarily brings about a substantial increase in the effect of the fire of ground forces under all visibility conditions. Four important conclusions can be drawn from the development trends:

--The numerical inferiority of weapon systems can partially be compensated for through the increased effect of fire and barriers. Thus there are prospects of success against a superior massed offensive enemy.

--The possibility of being able to engage targets almost immediately in the depth as well expands the battlefield considerably. The attacker can be weakened while still approaching.

--Combat forces must have the necessary protection against up-to-date weapons technology so that they can move to or on the battlefield at any time. The capability for the mobile conduct of operations remains indispensable for the defender.

--The exploitation of the protective effect of builtup terrain becomes more important. This introduces a certain renaissance of the infantry.

A glance at the other side makes clear that our previous qualitative lead has largely been equalized. All findings indicate that besides additional structural improvements there is also a striving to overtake NATO technologically.

Conclusion: The main task of the army is the fight against a numerically superior, qualitatively equal, highly mobile armored attacker with substantial superiority of firepower. This requires:

--firepower primarily against armored targets,

--tactical and operational mobility for rapid and repeated massed concentration,

--capability for counterattacks to gain the initiative and to recapture lost territory,

--capability for the immediate engagement of enemy artillery at any time,

--capability for short-term and rapid interdicting of areas to reduce the possibilities for movement and to slow the pace of enemy forces,

--protection against conventional fire.

In addition,

--the capability for action is also indispensable in the use of nuclear and chemical weapons,

--the forward defense of the alliance as a whole requires close cooperation with the respective allied neighbors.

General Conditions

The army can proceed on the assumption that in the future as well the minimum peacetime personnel requirement will be covered and the defense level will be maintained in full. Even under changing overall conditions, however, it is necessary to maintain quality and quantity, eliminate remaining deficiencies, and orient the army toward a stronger conventional defense capability. In this connection, three points must be observed from the beginning:

--Despite the mentioned renaissance of the infantry, a "demechanization" of the army is out of the question; on the contrary: numerical inferiority requires the flexible utilization of mechanized forces in order to be strong enough at the crucial point at the right time.

Our own initiative can only be gained through the defeat of the enemy in operations; for this purpose, armored forces are and remain necessary.

--Operational thinking and operational command ingenuity, which in the past comprised the superiority of the German command, must regain their former status.

--The fight against the enemy in the depth of the area, now very much in the foreground, will not be at the expense of the fight against the first operational echelon. The engagement of enemy reserves is a wearing-down "replacement fight" that begins early in the depth.

Objective

The armored offensive forces of a potential aggressor have high firepower, protection and mobility; in addition, they have superior numbers and have the initiative at the beginning.

Merely to react against such an enemy just shifts the time of defeat. The objective of command ingenuity is to be stronger than the enemy "where and when necessary." For this, one needs freedom of action and this comes from initiative. But initiative is impossible without a minimum of freedom of action.

The objective, then, must be to ensure operational freedom of action. This occurs through armored combat forces who reinforced are available as reserves, because:

--a combination of command and reconnaissance systems facilitates "courage for the breach,"

--the fire and barrier effect of the operational elements is clearly increased and--temporally and locally limited--releases mechanized forces,

--light combat forces, employed in suitable terrain, help to avoid the unnecessary commitment of mechanized combat capability.

The armored combat forces thereby continue to be the core of the army in the defense. They are the ones who, fighting in all types of combat, are in a position

--to reduce the numerical superiority of an attacker from the beginning,

--to contain the enemy in his point of main effort as well,

--to seize control of the law of action.

These basic ideas are put into effect as follows:

Delaying actions achieve a greater attrition of the enemy armored offensive forces through the increased fire and barrier effect of artillery, engineers and antitank helicopters.

The defense is conducted in a mobile manner utilizing the protective effect of the buildup terrain with forces that receive massive support through barriers and fire. The battlefield is expanded in front through far-reaching fire. Attacking enemy forces are detected and worn down while still approaching. Enemy attempts to break through are foiled by the rapid shifting of points of main effort, the full utilization of the defense areas for a mobile conduct of operations, and a rapid concentration of fire.

Counterattacks are carried out quickly and forcefully with heavily armored reserves to destroy the enemy who has penetrated and to recapture lost territory. Armored forces must also be made available continually during combat to preserve the operational freedom of action.

Planning

A large number of support tasks must be fulfilled to ensure success on the battlefield: command, reconnaissance, combat support, logistics and medical services are a prerequisite in ensuring that the combat capability is effectively goal-oriented and that it remains effective as long as possible to destroy the armored offensive forces of the enemy before they have done substantial damage to our own forces.

The measures for carrying out the basic concepts cover all areas. The basis is still Army Structure 4, which is being further developed in an evolutionary manner.

Combat:

The defense of armored offensive forces occurs in the system "Armored Combat Forces 90." A close linking of mutually complementary weapon systems compensates for the weaknesses of one element through the strengths of another.

The weapon system battle tank brings together as no other the factors firepower, survivability and mobility in an optimum manner. The battle tank is therefore the core of the system. With the Leopard 2, the army has a sufficiently efficient weapon system but certainly not in satisfactory numbers.

Two weapon systems are foreseen instead of the existing armored personnel carrier: an infantry combat vehicle that transports armored infantrymen on the battlefield and that has a automatic gun for fire support.

An antitank combat vehicle ensures the antitank capability of the armored infantrymen in the defense.

A self-propelled mortar remains the high-angle fire element of armored combat forces.

The new and urgent task of helicopter defense will in the future be taken over by a combat vehicle that in the role of tank destroyer can also combat battle tanks at long range. The weapon system, whose development has priority, will have a platform that can be elevated and a rocket system that can engage both types of targets at long range (tank destroyer/helicopter defense combat vehicle).

Light combat forces complement the armored combat forces by taking over combat tasks in terrain favorable for infantry. Airborne forces equipped with the "Wiesel" weapons carrier will quickly bring an infantry combat capability and antitank weapons into focal points.

The Antitank Helicopter 2 will clearly increase the army's antitank capability further.

Combat Support

The development of ammunition makes it possible to engage armored targets effectively through indirectly aimed weapons systems as well. For this purpose, it is necessary to have target acquisition and fire control in almost real time.

The mixture of tube and rocket weapon systems remains important for conventional artillery. The Mars artillery rocket launcher with a range of up to 45 kilometers will not only be the precondition for artillery engagement but will also be able to take over that of the reserves and the following echelons. Self-propelled howitzers provide for the immediate and continuous fire support of their own combat forces. High ammunition stocks, including bomblet ammunition and ammunition with search fuzes, are necessary and provided for. Before the end of the 1990's, combat drones will make possible the early conventional effect against armored offensive forces in the depth.

The tasks of the engineers will shift even more clearly to combat with and around barriers. New minelaying and launching systems together with more effective antitank mines such as antitank directional mines that independently engage armored targets, for example, raise the effectiveness of barriers against armored offensive forces. The counteroffensive of our own forces is supported with innovative mineclearing equipment.

In the area of antiaircraft defense, with the weapon systems "Gepard" and "Roland," the army continues to be in a position to protect its own battlefield movements against the threat by enemy air forces. The extensive army air defense, reconnaissance and command system will also clearly improve the efficiency of the army air defense.

Command, Reconnaissance

The numerical inferiority of the defender and the possibilities of the attacker for surprise and massed concentration force the flexible employment of forces. Efficient reconnaissance forces with effective reconnaissance resources are a precondition for this. The drone system increases the reconnaissance capacity of corps and divisions through long ranges and real-time data transmission. Radar equipment for target acquisition and battlefield surveillance improve the reconnaissance capability of the brigades. Electronic reconnaissance increase their own freedom of action. In comparison with technical reconnaissance resources, armored and unarmored ground reconnaissance has proved its worth and will have a permanent place in the army of the 1990's.

New radio sets with automatic channel selection give the army the best equipment in the area of field radio. Favorable frequency utilization, high reliability and good protection against electronic warfare ensure the technical prerequisites for the required flexible utilization of forces.

The Heros command system reduces the time requirement for the command and control process and leads to an information system that makes possible the rapid access to needed reconnaissance results for all command echelons.

Operational Support:

Efficient logistics and a modernly equipped medical service are the bases for the successful fight of our own forces against the enemy's armored offensive forces.

The improved reconnaissance possibilities and the greater weapon effect even in the depth of our own territory as well as the support of uninterrupted operations require the mobility and flexibility of the logistical system. For this reason, independent companies or formations continue to require their own elements or units for supply, transport and maintenance able to carry out their mission even beyond surfaced roads. Repair must take place at the lowest possible level as near as possible to the place of the breakdown. The logistical independence of the battalions and brigades makes possible their operational mobility.

The field medical service must see to it that the wounded receive first aid as soon as possible; it receives "emergency physician" status. This as well as the rapid evacuation of the wounded with helicopters to medical facilities in the rear strengthens troop morale.

The concept of the fight against armored offensive forces is the "quintessence" of the army concept: armored enemy offensive forces are worn down through barriers and fire. In this way, our own armored combat forces are put into a position not only to ward off attacks but to destroy the forces of the attacker through counterattack.

Direct Antitank Fire

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 198-201

[Article: "Fight Against Armored Offensive Forces With Directly Aimed Fire"]

[Text] "The main task of the battle tank is the destruction of enemy tanks." With this assigned task and its main weapon, the main gun, the battle tank is the classical representative of directly aimed fire for antitank defense. Besides the battle tank, however, a number of other weapons and weapon systems are capable of destroying enemy tanks with directly aimed fire. The following explains the defense against armored offensive forces with these weapons and weapon systems and presents an outlook for the future.

In direct aiming, the gunner sees the target in his sight. "Visual contact" prevails between the direct-vision block of the sight and the enemy. That is the nature of direct aiming. It characterizes the antitank weapons and the weapon systems of the combat forces. This also indicates that the distance between the weapon and the target cannot be as great as one might desire, for with his eyes and possible with the help of the sight the gunner must detect, recognize and identify the enemy before he begins firing. Nature, however, puts definite limits on this procedure through human capabilities and physics, so that direct aiming with adequate prospects of success is possible only to about 4,000 meters.

Directly aimed weapons for antitank defense can be divided into two types, tube weapons and rockets. Both types function according to different principles and complement one another.

Tube weapons permit a high rate of fire, the firing of several types of ammunition, and fast reaction. They are not dependent upon a minimum distance to the target.

Rockets fly substantially more slowly than the projectiles of tube weapons. The rate of fire and the possibility for the rapid change of targets is therefore restricted. Their advantage is in the greater range and the possibility of transporting large effective masses. The shaped charge is thereby the preferred working principle of the rocket warheads for antitank defense. In its classical form, however, this principle is subjected to limits that will soon be reached.

The gun fires primarily kinetic energy rounds. The projectiles act through their kinetic energy (KE) and today are designed as subcaliber arrow projectiles. In addition, however, there is the possibility of firing high-explosive shells as well as chemical energy HEAT rounds from tube weapons for antitank defense.




Figure 1. Ranges in Antitank Defense

Key:

1. Battle tank BK 120 mm
2. Battle tank BK 105 mm
3. Missile-equipped tank destroyer HOT
4. Missile-equipped tank destroyer TOW
5. Antitank guided missile system MILAN
6. Panzerfaust
7. Armored personnel carrier BMK 20 mm
8. Lightly armored targets

Antitank Defense Today

The core of the antitank defense of the German Army today is the battle tank Leopard 2. With it the armored brigades have a weapon system that can engage all now-known battle tanks of a potential enemy. Its main features, the 120-mm smooth-bore gun, the thermal imager integrated into the electronic fire control system, its ballistic protection, and a maximum of mobility enable it to be used in all types of combat and under almost all weather and environmental conditions. Meanwhile, the 120-mm smooth-bore gun with its up-to-date technology and its growth potential has also been introduced into the U.S. Army for the M1 A1 Abrams battle tank. In the future, it will be the "measuring stick" by which tank guns will have to be measured.

But the armored infantry brigades of the field army also have the Leopard 1 battle tank. In addition, the territorial army is also equipped with the M 48 battle tank. Both vehicles are equipped with the well-proven 105-mm gun. Just as the 120-mm smooth-bore gun, the 105-mm gun likewise fires a KE and a chemical energy HEAT round. The third ammunition type HESH (High Explosive Squash Head) originally on hand is no longer being procured because of its slight effect on modern armor. The type ratio for the other two ammunition

types has also shifted in favor of the KE ammunition. Whereas previously the performance of the shaped-charge ammunition against conventional armor of homogeneous rolled steel was at least equal to the effect of the KE ammunition, today it can be stated that through the further development of the KE penetrators into arrow projectiles the penetration performance of the KE ammunition against modern multiple-plate targets has increased substantially. With this ammunition type, fired from the 105-mm gun, the Leopard 1 and M 48 battle tanks are also in a position to engage the T-72 battle tank effectively frontally in the turret and hull.

The 20-mm automatic gun of the Marder armored personnel carrier is not foreseen for the engagement of battle tanks but for the engagement of lightly armored and unarmored targets. Optionally it can also fire high-explosive shells and armor-piercing projectiles in a burst of fire or single fire. Thus it is possible for the Marder armored personnel carrier to destroy enemy armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance tanks without requiring the support of battle tanks.

Along with the battle tanks, the antitank guided missiles constitute the second element of the antitank weapons of the combat forces. The "Milan," a wire-guided missile of medium range (up to 2,000 meters) is the antitank weapon of the infantry. It can be employed either from the Marder armored personnel carrier or dropped from a tripod. The airborne force has mounted it on the KRAKA (motor cart), which can thus be airlifted and also dropped by parachute. With the "Milan," the infantry has a weapon that, mounted on a Marder armored personnel carrier or KRAKA, makes possible--on the one hand--rapid reaction in surprise situations or use in attack but that can also be used--on the other hand--in defense from prepared field fortifications. It is then effective from terrain favorable to the infantry into the tank terrain and is most effective in flanking movements. The night operations capability of this weapon is produced through its intended equipping with the passive MIRA thermal imager. Beginning in the mid-1990's, the PARS 3 will take over the tasks of the "Milan."

The antitank rocket systems TOW and HOT have ranges of 3,000 and 4,000 meters, respectively. They thus belong to the "long-range systems." The TOW, a U.S. development, represents the strong element of the paratroopers, since for airborne operations it, just as the "Milan," is mounted on the KRAKA and can be employed from this. The Jaguar 2 tank destroyer is also equipped with the TOW. The AN-TAS 4 thermal imager gives the TOW a night operations capability for the full range. The tank destroyer companies of the armored infantry brigades are equipped with the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer. Employed as a self-contained unit or in platoons with the battalions of the combat troops and dependent upon cooperation, the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer is a massed-fire weapon for antitank defense at the command echelon of the brigade. So is the Jaguar 1 tank destroyer, which is equipped with the HOT, a German-French development.

Through its range of 4,000 meters, the Jaguar 1 tank destroyer can open fire even before it is itself in the field of fire of the guns of the enemy battle tanks. The tank destroyer companies of the armored brigades, which have the

Jaguar 1 tank destroyer, thereby wear down the enemy even before the battle tanks can take up the firefight.

Beginning in 1989, the "Wiesel" weapons carrier with the TOW or with the 20-mm automatic gun will replace the KRAKA. With it, the airborne force will then have a vehicle with the performance in the areas of mobility, protection, firepower and air transportability that is important for the unrestricted fulfillment of the mission of the First Airborne Division.

Antitank hand weapons are the third element of antitank defense. The light Panzerfaust 44 is a typical representative of this type. It has been introduced not only into the combat forces but also into almost all army service branches as a means of antitank defense for ranges up to 300 meters. With a simple optical sight and a mechanical firing mechanism, it is robust and rugged. Because of its limited projectile weight, however, the effect of its shaped-charge warhead on up-to-date frontal armor is not always reliable. The gunner thereby seeks to attack the enemy battle tank from the side or from behind to be more effective.

Besides the combat troops, the artillery is also in a position to engage individual enemy armored vehicles. This occurs in direct aiming with the field howitzers or self-propelled howitzers. To be sure, this type of operations is not the rule but it is very possible to engage standing or approaching armored targets at ranges up to 1,000 meters with adequate hit prospects. A 155-mm high-explosive shell thereby has a substantial effect even when it does not pierce the armor of the target.

Antitank Defense Tomorrow

The constant increase in the threat through battle tanks and armored personnel carriers results from increased armor protection through special armor, more mobility because of more powerful motors and improved drives, greater firepower through improved ammunition and electronic fire control systems, and greater ranges through increasingly large calibers. Combat effectiveness upgrading is a possibility for meeting these threats and keeping introduced systems up to the threat.

At the present time, there are plans, beginning in 1986, to install a new EMES 18 fire control system with integrated thermal imager into 1,300 Leopard 1 A1 battle tanks. In this way, the first-round hit probability will be raised substantially and the complete night operations capability with passive night vision equipment ensured. The substantial design similarity of the EMES 18 and of the thermal imager with the fire control system of the Leopard 2 battle tank thereby brings additional logistical advantages and standardization in training. After the positive completion of the corresponding investigations, preliminary measures for a further upgrading of combat effectiveness can be included in this upgrading--measures that could include, for example, the installation of the 120-mm gun of the Leopard 2 battle tank, a new supplementary armor for the turret, and the installation of a fire suppression system.

The improvement of the ballistic protection is urgent for an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the Marder armored personnel carrier. An increase in the caliber of the guns of armored personnel carriers will be the subject of additional considerations in the future, as the development potential of the 20-mm automatic gun for the engagement of armored targets is thought to be largely exhausted.

The delivery of the Leopard 2 battle tank began in 1979. The fifth lot has been in delivery since November 1985. In 1987, 1,800 Leopard 2 battle tanks will be delivered. With the planned service life into the decade after the next, an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of this weapon system will need to be planned for the mid-1990's.

The limiting conditions for an upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the introduced Leopard 2 battle tank are then to be presented in a Tactical Requirement through the evaluation of the previous experiences and investigations already under way. But the time period for the upgrading of combat effectiveness will mainly depend upon an accurate analysis of the threat, the expected technical possibilities and the appropriation of funds. Possible contents of this upgrading of combat effectiveness could include: improvement of the ballistic protection in the front, roof and rear areas; installation of sensors for helicopter and radar warning, for example; independent thermal imager for the commander; and installation of an integrated command and information system.

Besides the planning for the upgrading of the combat effectiveness of the weapon systems, work is also being done on the improvement of the performance of the 105-mm gun as well as of the 105-mm and 120-mm ammunition. The lengthening of the barrel of the 105-mm gun results in an increase in velocity. In this way, there is an increase in penetration performance at a given range or in the distance at which a penetration can be achieved dependably in a given time. The utility of such a measure, which would have the advantage that one could fall back on existing ammunition stocks for a certain time, is to be compared with the associated costs and to be evaluated, however, before a decision is made on the installation of a lengthened 105-mm gun or on the retrofitting with the 120-mm gun of the Leopard 2 battle tank. For this gun, there are intentions to develop a new type of ammunition for the engagement of unarmored and lightly armored targets as well as helicopters. The KE ammunition will also be substantially improved in its performance capability once again. It is a very good example of what growth potential can mean and of how weapon systems can be used in an optimum manner over a long time through the timely provision of the possibilities for upgrading combat effectiveness.

But the upgrading of combat effectiveness no longer makes sense when the threat cannot be countered adequately successfully by incorporating all measures. For the armored combat forces of the 1990's, then, the German Army has planned the development and procurement of new weapon systems for antitank defense as well. This "tactical family" includes:

--battle tank/armored combat vehicle

--armored personnel carrier/infantry combat vehicle

--tank destroyer/helicopter defense combat vehicle

--antitank combat vehicle

In the development of new weapon systems, the greatest possible standardization is to be sought. In addition, the consideration of the life cycle costs will have great influence on the selection of a concept and on the further development of each particular weapon system.

The first new development to be realized will be the antitank combat vehicle. As expressed by the designation itself, this is a vehicle that is optimized for the main task of antitank defense, just as a battle tank. Beginning in the mid-1990's, the antitank combat vehicle will take over the previous task of the "Milan" in the armored infantry battalions, for it has become apparent that the Marder weapon system is overburdened with the functions of the transport of the infantry troops, engagement of lightly armored and unarmored targets with the automatic gun, and engagement of tanks with the "Milan." For the engagement of tanks, therefore, the antitank combat vehicle will be integrated into the armored infantry battalions. It will be armed with the 120-mm gun of the Leopard 2 battle tank. In the conceptual phase that ends in 1987, it will be necessary to decide whether the concepts casemate tank, crown mount or turret tank will be put into practice. It is considered certain, on account of the short conceptual phase and the planned early date of deployment, that proven component assemblies will be used in part.

The conceptual phase has started for the tank destroyer/helicopter. This weapon system will replace the Jaguar 1 and Jaguar 2 tank destroyers in the field army. The armament will be the "PARS antitank rocket system, third generation and long range." This is a "fire and forget" system and is being developed jointly with France and Great Britain. It will have a night operations capability and will be integrated into the tank destroyer/helicopter defense combat vehicle on a platform extendable to about 13 meters. This highly extendable platform makes it possible to find substantially more positions for the weapon system in broken terrain to utilize the maximum range of the rockets and simultaneously to have cover against enemy vision and weapons effect. As an additional task, this weapon system will take over the helicopter defense for the combat forces. At the end of the conceptual phase, a decision must be made on whether the weapons and observation platform will be manned or unmanned and which sensors must then be mounted on the platform.

The infantry combat vehicle is to replace the Marder armored personnel carrier in the field army. It takes over its task except for antitank defense, however, which is taken over by the antitank combat vehicle. An important question that will have to be resolved within the scope of the current conceptual phase is the caliber size of its future weapon. In this connection, a decision must be made on its target spectrum within the scope of the combat of combined arms. When it is confronted with the task of engaging

the BMP-2 armored personnel carrier, for example, a 25-mm or 35-mm automatic gun will no longer be adequate. For this purpose, guns of up to 60 mm should be considered.

The present Leopard 3 battle tank program will end in 1986 with a final report. The program results will lead in a cost effective manner to the measures to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 2 battle tank and to the preparation of the technical requirement for the Armored Combat Vehicle 2000. The Armored Combat Vehicle 2000 is to replace the Leopard 1 battle tank.

In the scope of the preparation of the technical requirement for a weapon system to replace the Leopard 1 battle tank, it will also be investigated whether a conventionally built and evolutionarily developed battle tank still represents the most favorable possibility for the fulfillment of the task in view of the changed quality of the threat through intelligent ammunition, responsive sensors and the substantial automation of operating sequences on the battlefield.

Modern technologies such as, for example, adaptable active armor (reactive armor), digitalization of all electronic functions/data bus, up-to-date camouflage procedures, and sensors to recognize threats are to be incorporated. For armament, the 120-mm smooth-bore gun would basically be available but its performance needs to be improved. There is certainly potential for improving performance here. If the threat analysis were to reveal, however, that even a 120-mm smooth-bore gun with improved performance is no longer adequate, then new technologies must be applied.

But there are plans not merely for the new development of complex weapon systems. The PARS antitank rocket system, third generation, medium range, is in the definition phase. This system will in part replace the "Milan." The FRG, France and Great Britain are participating in the project. The system has a range of 2,000 meters and, just as the "Milan," can be carried by two soldiers or adapted to light combat vehicles, for example. Guidance is through a LASER guide beam (beamrider). The double shaped charge of the warhead can penetrate even up-to-date armor reliably and with adequate residual power. The first systems will be delivered to the field forces in 1993.

The light Panzerfaust 44 will also find a replacement in the Panzerfaust 3. After its introduction beginning in 1988, this weapon will be distributed in the Bundeswehr just as the antitank hand weapons previously introduced or still being introduced and will serve in the further concentration of antitank defense in all three military services. The weapon is designed as a so-called bipartite solution and is composed of

--a reusable weapon part and

--an ammunition part as a bulk expendable item.

It will make possible accurate firing at 300 meters from emplacements and closed areas. The simple training of the gunner and a growth potential for

improved performance of the warhead will allow it to be a weapon equal to the threat in the 1990's so as to destroy all targets provided with up-to-date armor. At the same time, with the reusable weapon part and an ammunition part as a bulk expendable item, it is a very economical solution.

Effects of New Technologies on Tactics

New Technologies have always had some effect on tactics. It will be no different in the future. And although under the current state of knowledge there will not be any revolutionary changes, a change or a further development of tactics can be predicted for subareas.

The increased first round hit probability in almost all weapons and weapon systems brings about an increase in operating ranges. To utilize the full performance offered, therefore, it will be a matter even more than before of considering the range advantages of their own weapon systems in operational plans and in tactical grouping and of including them in terrain evaluation.

With the Leopard 2 battle tank, the degree of mobility was achieved that can be utilized on the battlefield. A further increase will no longer be sought when all of the army combat vehicles have reached this level. But the application of new technologies has produced substantial progress in the area of ballistic protection, so that it has again taken second place behind firepower in the sequence of priorities. Weapon systems with a maximum of ballistic protection will show a substantially greater staying power than in the case of those in which mobility, that is, the capability of a rapid change of position, was part of the protective concept. In the selection of the emplacement, then, it will be even more necessary than before to pay attention to the possible effect of our own weapons. The substantial automation of technical sequences (automatic loader, integrated fire control, automatic target allocation, etc.) accelerates the flow of combat. Combined with high hit probabilities and high kill probabilities, the decision on the outcome of a battle must be expected more and more rapidly. But that also determines more rapid operating sequences in the command process, especially at the lower command echelons. They can be achieved here as well only through automation. The tactical commanders would thereby be freed from time-consuming routine operations and could devote themselves more intensively to their command function.

The capability for combat at night and with limited visibility is being increased more and more. Weapon systems are designed for the conducting of "uninterrupted operations." That is an enormous burden for people and material. As long as it is not possible to work in multiple shifts (with alternating crews, for example), the military commander must include this in operational planning and in tactical grouping. Under this point of view, reserves and relief attain new importance.

Indirect Antitank Fire

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 202-206

[Article: "Action Against Armored Offensive Forces With Indirectly Aimed Fire"]

[Text] The artillery, the main supporter of the firefight, will gain even more importance in repulsing armored offensive forces in the future. It is not thereby supposed to take over the primary task of the battle tank but to engage hardened targets in the depth of the area in the combat of combined weapons. This has not heretofore been possible, since important preconditions for this were lacking. In a self-defense situation, to be sure, a gun could always knock out battle tanks in direct aiming at close range, that is "eye to eye" with the force of the large calibers but this was the exception.

Indirect aiming means that targets are not to be reached through a sighting device but with calculated commands and generally invisible for the crew at a great distance from the fire. But this assumes that targets are detected, located and radioed to the fire direction center of the batteries. This is how the classical information complex is portrayed. But without suitable ammunition, with which even armored moving targets can be engaged effectively, this mission was not heretofore achievable through the artillery.

The Artillery Complex

Besides the improved performance of artillery weapons through

- greater ranges,
- increase in the rate of fire,
- improvement of accuracy,
- introduction of ammunition types appropriate to the threat and
- increase in the transport capacity of subammunition,

the ammunition will in the future have an effective system linkage between reconnaissance/target acquisition means and weapon systems.

Real-time reconnaissance, jamming-resistant data links, and computer-assisted fire control then make it possible to engage armored targets in indirect aiming. The increase in the driving speed of the targets through improvement of the power-to-weight ratio of the armored combat vehicles of the Warsaw Pact armed forces as well as the increasing hardening through the application of up-to-date armor techniques are compensated through suitable countermeasures and considered in our long-range performance profile. This is indicated in the following:

The requirement for the introduction or development of long-range reconnaissance/target-acquisition means are considered with the systems "Drone CL 289" and "remotely piloted vehicle for target acquisition."

The computer-assisted data transmission is to be carried out under the system concept ArtFuelnFELSys (Artillery-Command-Information-Fire Control System) with the introduction of

- the Artillery-Data-Situation-Operation Computer-Complex (ADLER),
- the Integrated Fire Control Means Artillery Battery (IFAB) and
- the Artillery-Rocket-Operations-System (ARES).

In other words, the artillery has begun, through the realization of the combination of weapon systems and long-range sensors, to create an integrated artillery system that will be up to any threat in the foreseeable future.

Tube Artillery

The question of whether field artillery guns are still up-to-date in a conceivable theater of war has been under discussion for a long time. The obvious advantages of the field howitzer, such as

- low price,
- low technical complexity,
- high reliability and
- small silhouette and the associated slight vulnerability of the equipment are opposed by equally obvious disadvantages, such as
- low mobility (despite self-propulsion),
- no protection for the crew (ballistic and NBC protection) and
- high personnel and material expenditures for each gun.

The increasing threat above all from the enemy artillery and the continuously growing demands on its own artillery with respect to protection, effect on the target, mobility, rate of fire and autonomy have had the effect that in the final equipment planning for the artillery of the field army only armored artillery guns (self-propelled howitzers)--besides the rocket launchers--are now to be found. The field howitzers will find their end use in the artillery formations of the territorial army for some time to come.

The 155-mm Field Howitzer 155-1, also known under the designation Field Howitzer 70, was developed jointly by the three NATO countries Great Britain, Italy and the FRG and has been in use in the armies of these countries for

several years. The gun made such a good name for itself after only a short time that several nations of the Western world have procured it or are interested in it. Its range of fire is up to 24 kilometers, 30 kilometers with a booster.

The older 155-mm self-propelled howitzer M109G is now being retrofitted to the current U.S. A3 status and simultaneously thoroughly overhauled and upgraded in its combat effectiveness. With the resulting 155-mm self-propelled M109A3G, the artillery has a proven system in large numbers that will be main armament of the armored artillery until the 1990's when replaced by a more up-to-date self-propelled howitzer. Norway has joined this reequipment.

Just as in the case of the 155-mm field howitzer, the nations Great Britain, Italy and Germany have teamed up to develop an up-to-date 155-mm self-propelled howitzer--the Self-Propelled Howitzer 155-1. It is to replace the self-propelled howitzers in the armies of these three states as soon as possible. Only with the introduction of a more up-to-date self-propelled howitzer will the equipment of the armored artillery also correspond to the otherwise already modern inventory status of the artillery.

In the 203-mm caliber, the old guns 175-mm M107 SF and 203-mm M110A1 SF howitzers were converted into 203-mm M110A2 SF howitzers in the course of the caliber adjustment and upgrading of combat effectiveness. (Footnote) (See SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 6/85, p 350). In addition to the increase in the firing range to 23 kilometers thus accomplished for the 203-mm howitzer, these guns were also modernized and their "lifetime" lengthened. It will have to be decided in the foreseeable future whether the Bundeswehr artillery will also retain this caliber beyond the 1990's.

Ammunition of the Tube Artillery

In the case of the ammunition types foreseen for the artillery for repulsing armored offensive forces, one distinguishes between the ammunition for the engagement of primarily semihard targets such as armored personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzers, for example, and the ammunition for the engagement of hard targets, the tanks. Thus, for the engagement of semihard targets, the tube artillery also uses so-called bomblets that are placed in the 155-mm and 203-mm projectiles in different numbers depending upon the caliber. The effect of the shaped-charge bomblets is directed against the surface of the armored vehicles that is known to be less heavily armored. The hit probability is based upon the relatively high unit quantity and the cost-effectiveness on the low price of the bomblets as a mass product. All bomblets utilized or foreseen have a substantial fragmentation effect against personnel and unprotected material and a considerable effect against hard targets.

The so-called search-fuze ammunition for the tube artillery is an advanced stage of development. The principle of this ammunition is based upon the use of projectile-forming charges (P-charges) in combination with sensors on an infrared and millimetric wave basis. If the sensors find an armored target, then they initiate a P-charge in the subammunition falling on a (rotating)

parachute. The projectile then hitting the target with very great kinetic energy is able to penetrate all previously introduced roof armor. Great progress was made in recent years in the development and optimization of the P-charges.

Rocket Artillery

With the light artillery rocket system LARS, the Bundeswehr was the first NATO army to introduce an artillery weapon against area targets. In a very short time, even before the enemy achieves a certain "hardening" through the finding of cover, large quantities of ammunition are brought into the target. The range is 16 kilometers.

With the use of FERA (fire control equipment with trajectory measurement), it was possible to achieve an optimization of accuracy that permits the engagement of almost twice as many targets as before with the same expenditure of ammunition. The use of electronic fuzes not only increases the effect of the ammunition on the target but also shortens the preparation for firing and also increases the flexibility of operations.

With the introduction of the antitank mortar mines 1 and 2 (AT 1/AT 2), the artillery was given an antitank capability in indirect aiming for the first time. Mine fields can now be remotely delivered oriented to the target in a very short time. The AT 1 mine works against the track and the AT 2 over the entire length of the vehicle. A block against removal, resistance against the effects of explosions, and high penetration performance as well as programming of the effective time make the AT 2 the most up-to-date antitank mine for the coming years. In combination with the "intelligent ammunition," it can also be employed in the depth of enemy territory to prevent an early withdrawal of the enemy from the planned target area. This means the autonomous action against tanks as a new task of the artillery.

The most important step toward increasing conventional firepower was taken with the introduction of the Mean Artillery Rocket System (MARS). This weapon system developed in the United States is being procured and reproduced in Europe by other NATO partners. Complete autonomy and the possibility for deployment under NBC conditions with a crew of only three indicate the tremendous technological leap of the artillery. In addition, the system has the potential of also being adapted to future threats through the development of rockets different both in caliber as well as in range without changing the weapon system. The ammunition spectrum was oriented toward the hardened target scenario and, in addition to the bomblet ammunition and AT 2, will also include rockets with homing terminally-guided subammunition. For the first time, this "intelligent ammunition" will be able to distinguish "genuine" targets from so-called "false targets," that is, militarily unimportant targets. It is optimized for the identification of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled howitzers and is designed so as to take into consideration the increased driving speed of the targets as well as their increasing hardening.

The concept is characterized by a propulsionless missile that, along with several similar subbodies, is brought over the target area and discharged by the booster rocket. In the search phase, the search head "inspects" the target terrain. If an armored vehicle is detected, then the missile guides itself to the target. A built-in logic is supposed to exclude the engagement of a target element by several missiles. The impact angle will generally be between 45 and 90 degrees so that the lethal mechanism can find the shortest possible way through the armor. In approaching the target, this missile must be able to follow a rapidly-departing tank. This requires a great maneuverability in a limited area. The resulting effective area projected to the ground is designated as the "footprint." It must be achieved by each missile of a rocket; overlapping is thereby possible and necessary for small target groups. The "footprint" must have a minimum spread laterally and lengthwise to compensate for the following negative values:

--reconnaissance errors,

--rocket dispersion,

--target behavior in relation to the age of the target data and the flight time of the rocket.

The overall concept of the artillery in the engagement of so-called semihard and hard targets, that of wearing down the enemy forces early during the approach through long-range fire and limiting their freedom of operation, is now to be carried out with the rocket artillery.

In the next phases of the approach of the enemy until intervening in the combat, the rocket artillery gradually also "turns over" the task of engaging tanks to the tube artillery, which then acts in observed fire.

Evaluation

In conclusion, it can be stated:

--With the indirectly aimed weapons of the artillery, armored targets are engaged from above--that is, against the heretofore slightly armored surface--through "modern" and "intelligent" ammunition.

--The even weaker underside is engaged with antitank mortar mines.

--And the front and side surfaces are primarily engaged through the combat forces with their directly-aimed antitank weapons.

Because different sensors are utilized, a potential enemy will be able to protect his armored combat forces only with a large financial expenditure and a loss of mobility.

The night operations capability, rapid reaction times, and large area effect will require the use of new tactics by the enemy and will make more difficult the massing of armored forces for concentrations prior to the start of an offensive.

Nevertheless, the main task of the artillery must be seen in the engagement of the artillery of the enemy and must be in balance with the defense against armored offensive forces, for it must be assumed that in its offensive preparations the enemy artillery will seek to neutralize our own antitank systems. This must be prevented so as not to endanger the success of a conventional defense.

Antitank Mine Warfare Development

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 208,209

[Article: "Barriers With Mines--A Dynamic Operation"]

[Text] In the state of defense, the threat by the fully mechanized armored forces of the Warsaw Pact through the entire width of the territory of the FRG requires all-round barrier operations by the army within the scope of forward defense. Barriers are to check or at least complicate and slow down enemy movements. They are also set up with the intention of steering enemy forces into areas in which they can be destroyed through concentrated fire or through counterattacks. In this way, barriers make a major contribution to restricting the freedom of action of the attacker. Barriers give support to their own forces and help to hold terrain, gain time, and save forces.

Mines

The mine, especially the antitank mine, is the classical combat means of the defender; there is no doubt about its defensive nature. With mines, diverse barriers can be set up and they can be laid in almost any terrain. In addition, the obstacle value of other barriers can often be increased through mines. Beyond that, the destructive effect of mines cause losses to the attacker.

The Anglo-Saxons call the mine "the poor man's weapon" because in it the relationship between expenditure and effect is especially cost-effective. This statement is confirmed by an OR study that comes to the overall conclusion that the mine is in first place in a listing of the weapons based upon cost and effectiveness data. One should not fail to mention thereby that the mines available in the army can restrict and often even impede the mobile conduct of operations.

Min Warfare As a Static Action

The conventional mines can be laid only by hand, that is, they require much time and manpower. Their pressure-operated fuze works only against the track and this is why there is a requirement for a relatively dense laying. Once

laid, it is time-consuming to take them up again. All this means that the static element of the conventional mine sets clear limits to the introduction of mine warfare into the mobile conduct of operations: prepared mine barriers in preplanned barrier plans can hardly be adapted to unexpected developments. A lack of time keeps mines from being laid.

For this reason, years ago the army engineers called for new mines with a large triggering width, that is, effective against track and hull with adjustable effective times and mechanical delivery systems for rapid laying.

Beginning in 1986, many of these demands will be fulfilled with the delivery of various systems; their influence on the conduct of operations will confirm the great importance of the mine, especially the antitank mine, for the defender.

The Minelaying System

To begin with, we should mention the minelaying system (MiVS 85), which serves the more terrain-oriented and generally prepared use of barriers for the state of defense. It is composed of the minelaying trailer with plow, the 7-ton military truck as a means of towing and mine transport, and the antitank laid mine. This mine works against the track and hull, that is, against the entire width of the vehicle. It has a magneto and is secured against lifting; after a few weeks, the mine can neutralize itself and is then reusable. The minelaying trailer mechanically activates and lays 300 mines per hour covered or about 600 mines per hour exposed. A varying mine density is adjustable. The towing vehicle can carry more than 700 antitank mines on pallettes.

The network of mine barriers laid with the MiVS 85 in accordance with the barrier plan can then be made denser by the commander at short notice in the course of combat--situation-oriented through the immediate engineer support with the mine launching system.

The Mine Launching System (MiWS)

This is composed of the mine launching vehicle "Skorpion" (M 548 G from the M 113 family) with the mine launching installation and the AT 2 antitank mortar mine. With a combat load of 600 mines, it is possible to lay a 1,500-meter mine barrier of the density 0.4 in 10 minutes.

The antitank mortar mine AT 2 has already been produced in large numbers for the Light Artillery Rocket System (LARs) for the ballistic laying of mine barriers. The same mine can also be laid exposed with the "Skorpion" in different mine densities and with different operative times. Secured against lifting, it acts as the antitank laid mine against the entire width of the vehicle and destroys itself after the end of the operative time.

The antitank mine systems that thus complement one another have just one gap: mortar and laid mines can be used or are effective only within limits on hardened streets and roads. The clearing is less difficult here because they

are easily recognizable. For this reason, the Antitank Directional Mine 1 will soon be introduced into the field forces.

The Antitank Directional Mine 1

It acts horizontally with a shaped charge against the hull and turret, has a range of up to 40 meters, and neutralizes itself automatically in the event that it is not triggered; afterwards it is reusable. With the antitank directional mine, it is possible to block gap lanes and other lanes between mine barriers as well as departure and access routes of all types quickly and effectively.

Conclusions

What conclusions result, then, from the introduction of these rapid barrier systems for the command and operational principles as well as for army logistics? It was possible to show in a number of map maneuvers of the engineer school and army technical school for structural engineering that with the rapid and mechanical deployment capability, adjustable varying operative time, and reusability of modern mines, mine warfare is receiving a dynamic element to which the combat forces as well as the engineers supporting them must adapt for the first time. This dynamics represents a challenge and requires that the commander coordinate the planned movements and the fire of his own forces with the planned barrier operations substantially more precisely than heretofore. The engineer commander, in turn, must be in command of a barrier plan with constantly changing operative times for individual barriers; the rapid flow of events requires no less rapid and certain communications and even closer cooperation in the fire support center, among other places.

Mine Warfare As a Dynamic Action

It is becoming apparent that "the element barrier capability is joining the classical tactical elements fire and movement" and that "we are coming to a triad of the factors "fire," "barriers" and "movement." In the logistics area, it is necessary, in addition to the storage and maintenance of electronic sensors and fuzes, to assemble larger quantities of mines more quickly. This means, in turn, that new time concepts will be in effect beginning with the handling in ammunition depots with mechanical stackers to the loading of transport vehicles using the corresponding loading aids to the delivery to the deploying engineers.

All of this is due to a rethinking in the combat and combat support forces: the mine may no longer be seen as the primarily static explosive ordnance that--once laid and activated--also hinders the movements of our own forces. On the contrary, the up-to-date "intelligent" mine is more than ever the

explosive ordnance of the defender, who makes use of its newly acquired dynamics and employs this in the combat of the combined weapons in such a way that his own movements are not hindered but are even supported "in the triad fire, barriers and movement."

Antitank Helicopter Doctrine

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German April 86 pp 210-212

[Article: "The Antitank Helicopter in the Fight Against Armored Offensive Forces"]

[Text] A numerical equilibrium with the Warsaw Pact forces in armored weapon systems can be ruled out for the future as well. The quality of the weapon systems of the East and West is becoming more and more nearly equal. As early as the beginning of the 1970's, the analysis of the threat and its probable trend for the German Army showed that existing gaps in antitank defense can reasonably be closed only through a flexible weapon system with the capability of a rapid massed concentration and the strengthening of the antitank defense of the combat forces.

For the conduct of operations in the defense of fighting formations, it is a matter of bringing together sufficient antitank forces relative to the points of main effort of the attacker in the shortest time possible. For armed forces that have to defend broad combat zones with a limited number of troops, antitank helicopters are an effective and often the only means of clearing up a critical situation, a means that when organized practically is always quickly available for the commanders of all major and combat formations so as to be able to check the enemy swiftly and unexpectedly at the decisive point.

The helicopter is thus a system that is equal to the requirement that our own reserves be available for massed concentration more quickly and with greater mobility. Above all antitank helicopters are in a position to be quickly available by day and, in the future, by night as well to

--begin combat unexpectedly at great distance,

--be employed in rapid succession at changing focal points of the combat,

--strengthen or form new points of main effort.

In independent action, they are also suitable above all for the containment and engagement of the enemy armored forces that have already been successful in penetrating the defense area or even in breaking through into the depth.

Such fundamental considerations were the basis for the introduction of antitank helicopters of the first generation into the German Army. The antitank helicopter BO 105 P does not have a capability for night operations. With its small silhouette and great agility as a flying weapons platform, it

corresponds to the conclusions of the threat analysis of that time. With its limited loading potential and lack of self-protection armament, on the other hand, it represents only an interim solution until an antitank helicopter with a night operations capability is introduced.

Principles for the Utilization of Antitank Helicopters

Planning

Through their early employment in the retardation phase, antitank helicopters are to cause the numerically superior mechanized combat forces of the enemy severe losses of tanks and thereby make the balance of forces more favorable at the beginning of the defense. It is thereby important that the antitank helicopters not be employed too early, that is, not "instead of" combat forces, but that they be used with them in the "combat force combined arms." In this way:

- a high enemy attrition is achieved and

- their own combat forces are kept from rapid attrition through close engagement.

Antitank helicopters are most effective in interaction with combat forces. They are not suitable for replacing combat forces, for they

- cannot hold terrain,

- are suitable only for combat against armored vehicles,

- cannot act at close range.

Regulating the Cooperation

The corps assigns antitank helicopters to the divisions for a certain period of time or for an operation. As a rule, this occurs during the evening position of the corps, when the expected points of main effort of the enemy attack for the next day become clear. In the short term, that is, within 60 minutes prior to readiness for action, however, antitank helicopters can also be used to clear up crisis situations.

Combat Tactics

Antitank helicopters can be employed for encounters and simultaneously. The particular type of employment results from the requirements of the troop commander. The rapid change of the type of employment is possible and will often be expedient. The combat tactics of the antitank helicopter remains unchanged in all types of combat, independent of the type, structure and equipment of the large formation being supported.

In the delaying action, the antitank helicopters strengthen the antitank defense of the covering force, largely in encounters during the temporally limited defense, so as to wear down the enemy continuously.

In the defense, antitank helicopters strengthen the antitank defense of the combat forces and are especially suitable for the rapid formation or shifting of the main antitank effort.

In the offensive, antitank helicopters monitor the flanks of the offensive forces and engage enemy counterattacks.

A special feature is the temporally limited independent operation: if close integration in the combat of the combined weapons is not possible--in breakthrough situations, for example--then the antitank helicopters must independently lead the combat for a limited time. For this purpose, it is necessary for the antitank helicopter commander to lead and coordinate the remaining operational combat, reconnaissance and barrier forces as well as fire support. These forces are to be attached to him until the cohesion of the conduct of operations is restored or until ground combat forces carry on the defensive battle from their positions.

Command Organization

The army aviation regiment keeps the antitank helicopters in readiness in the regimental assembly area. The antitank helicopter squadrons/flights are kept in readiness there at helicopter readiness sites until they are instructed to work with a major formation. They are then transferred to the advanced assembly areas in the combat sector of the relevant division. Advanced assembly areas include an advanced command post, readiness sites, and logistical installations.

Command Resources

For combat, antitank helicopters are dependent upon radio links, especially to the battalions of the combat forces. Communications records, command lines as well as reference points and coordinates of the command posts are continually kept available through the antitank helicopter regiment. In the case of the establishment of oral-personal communication or arrangements, the liaison detachments to the divisions as well as each commander of the antitank helicopters will coordinate the communications records for the formation.

Cooperation With Tank Destroyers and Combat Support Forces

Tank destroyers: tank destroyers and antitank helicopters are equipped with long-range guided missile systems and thus have both the advantage of superior range and, in utilizing their great effective ranges, the disadvantage of the obstruction to vision through smoke, dust and fog.

A simultaneous firefight from the same direction is inexpedient, for a continuously coordinated fire control is not possible.

Artillery/Mortars: In all agreements, the commanders of the antitank helicopters are to be informed about planned artillery concentration areas and planned and already occupied gun emplacements. Accordingly, that is valid for the use of mortars.

Army Air Defense: The system of the "organization of air space" represents a possibility for coordinating the use of antitank helicopters with the fire of air defense, artillery and air force. The planning for this is at the level of the ATAF; the commanding generals or the division commander have responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the sections acting in their areas. In this connection, the will of the troop commander must be expressed

clearly, for the operational requirements of the weapon systems mean limitations in either fire control or the use of antitank helicopters.

Further Development of Antitank Defense From the Air

Uninterrupted Operation

It must be assumed that the armed forces of the potential enemy are capable of uninterrupted operations by day or by night. The factors that heretofore have limited the combat of the PAH-1 are answered through basic demands on the PAH-2. For example:

- longer period of operation,
- at least eight guided missiles,
- full night operations capability and
- defensive armament against attack helicopters.

"Antitank Helicopter" Concept

The PAH-2's will also operate exclusively over their own area or territory not occupied by the enemy and make extensive use of the weapon effect and reconnaissance results of ground forces for their own firefight. It follows that the antitank helicopters, as opposed to the attack helicopters,

- have a high survival probability,
- achieve a better effect through close liaison with the combat forces in battle,
- can be more rationally developed and maintained through specialization in antitank defense in size and weight.

Structure/Organization

The PAH-2's, just as the transport forces at the corps level, are concentrated as an army formation, for only in this way can they form operational focal points. Advanced assembly areas in the division area are not needed. The exclusive disposition of the assembly areas in the rear corps area offers the advantage of increased survivability on the ground and improvement of the structure and ground organization.

Ground System

The concentration of the PAH-2's at the corps level and the resulting operational mobility in antitank defense will effect the structure and number of PAH-2's in the flight and thus the existing command organization.

In the case of the disposition of the antitank helicopter formation in the rear corps area, the question is raised of the availability of current situation data for the flight crews. This problem can be solved through the integration of the formation into the "HEROS" army command system.

In addition, the command and control process for the use of antitank helicopters, especially at night, requires the early results of an "air-supported" combat reconnaissance.

This refines the picture of the situation, in combination with the simultaneously acquired intelligence of terrain reconnaissance saves unnecessary losses, and shortens the time to the beginning of the firefight substantially.

It seems doubtful whether the flight leader tied to command tasks has the proper equipment with the costly PAH-2 weapon system. Therefore, besides the preconditions for secured long-range information transmission and situation display in the cockpit, a "command and escort helicopter" with a night flight capability is among the necessary command resources for the employment of the PAH-2's.

Defense Against Enemy Attack Helicopters

In the 1990's, the threat by Warsaw Pact attack helicopters will reach a level that can limit the use of the antitank helicopters. This threat will be met by arming the PAH-2 with air-to-air missiles.

In combination with the weapon systems of the army air defense forces as well as the automatic guns of the combat forces, "fire-and-forget" missiles afford the necessary "stand-off" distance to the tube weapons of enemy attack helicopters.

Airmobile Logistics

Operational mobility requires a logistics that can adapt to the requirements of large-area movements. Only airmobile supply can follow the operations of the antitank helicopters. It is provided through the helicopters of the army aviation group and is suitable for maintaining the reaction capability of the antitank helicopters through the rapid delivery of fuel and ammunition and through the removal of interference.

Layout of the PAH-2

In the future as well, it cannot be expected that one can equip a "small" antitank helicopter having a low takeoff weight and a small silhouette and preferred by most of the armies of the Western alliance with effective systems for night combat. Any compromise in this respect is at the expense of the efficiency of the weapons platform and has decisive disadvantages for the viability of the weapon system.

The Helicopter

The configuration of modern helicopters is determined by the expected characteristics and the tasks intended for them. Among other things, the sensor packet to be installed in the nose for night flight and operations led to a tandem cockpit in the form of steps with task-optimized work areas and improved visibility for the crew. A hingeless four-blade main rotor with a head made of fiber composite is, in addition to a long working life, also to provide for lower maintenance costs and tolerance against enemy fire. The basic prerequisite of the weapons platform is high stability, especially in hovering. This is realized through an up-to-date flight control system and the FEL (fiber-elastomer-bearing)-rotor system.

Detectability

As a "standoff fighter," the PAH-2 is designed with a weapons range over 4,000 meters. The resulting more difficult visual detectability is further reduced through additional measures. The reduction of the sound development of the rotors, as the greatest noise producers, is taken into account through low top blade speed and optimized blade profiles.

Vulnerability/Survivability

The reduction or increase, respectively, in the two criteria can be realized through armor, redundancy or concept selection. Armor and redundant system design add weight; redundancy also finds its limits in the cost-benefit compromise.

The concept selection for each element is aimed at the required period of survival as a result of damage. Thus rotor blades have become largely insensitive to enemy fire through the application of fiber composite materials and the sandwich type of construction of the airframe offers a favorable solution against hits with an explosive effect.

Against the effect of NBC weapons, it was decided to protect the crews individually through a pressurized ventilated protective suit.

ECM Concept

The specifications require basic equipment composed of:

- radar warning device,
- Laser warning device,
- IFF (Identification Friend/Foe),
- volume for growth potential

To make effective use of our own weapons under the threat of the 1990's as well, a reasonable mixture of passive warning devices with active jammers is to be preferred.

Mission Equipment

For the gunner, the Visionik installed in the nose is composed of:

- direct-vision optics,
- television camera,
- thermal imager with automatic missile and target tracking device,
- Laser-E meter.

The pilot has a thermal-image channel with a large field of view. Both thermal-image channels and the television sensor are controlled through a helmet sight and display system.

The antitank armament of the PAH-2 consists of eight antitank guided missiles. The HOT guided missile already available in the army will be used until the introduction of a true third-generation guided missile (fire and forget). A mix of both types of guided missiles in accordance with the value of the target can be advantageous. Guided missiles of the third generation have longer ranges, shorter exposure time, an autonomous homing head, and the possibility of engaging multiple targets.

The armament for self-protection is composed of four air-to-air guided missiles of the "STINGER" type with an infrared homing head and thus it has fire-and-forget qualities. Because of the time requirement for locking the search head on the target, however, it is not the ideal armament for duel situations at close ranges. The operational concept must take this situation into account.

Maintainability/Reliability

Reliability is also expressed in mission success. Demands of less than 95 percent for the probability of mission success are unacceptable. The design philosophy is that of defining so-called "breakdown operating modes" with the user, which permits a reduced serviceability under exceptional conditions but in any case ensures the certain return of the system. The most important demands on maintainability are:

- no time spare parts, durable structures,
- modular design of the subsystems,
- overhauling on condition and
- good accessibility of all modules.

With an up-to-date long-range guided missile in accordance with the fire-and-forget principle, the PAH-2 becomes a weapons platform optimized for antitank defense. An essential feature is the full night operations capability.

Within the scope of the limited takeoff weight determined by the combat range, survivability and staying power are ensured through ECM measures and partial armor. The thoughts on the operational principles are initial conclusions from the threat situation in the 1990's and from the "second generation antitank helicopter" concept. They will be refined in the course of the development of the weapon system.

9746

CSO: 3620/684

MILITARY

NORWAY

UNIFORM FOR PREGNANT ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL APPROVED

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 6 May 86 p 56

[Article by Paal-Andre Schwital]

[Text] Of course, the Armed Forces have to have a uniform for pregnant personnel. The maternity uniform will therefore now appear.

The production can start this year, if everything goes as scheduled. The maternity uniform will consist of a coat with shirt and pants. The coat and the pants will be made of the same material as the service uniform. And the pants will become 'flexible' with a ribbed section in the front.

The female inspector of the Navy, Navy Commander Elisabeth Westeng, says that the uniform is important because women may be detailed for duty somewhere else because they do not have suitable uniforms during their pregnancy. Many are not able to perform operative duty or watch duty either. They thus lose money. "Pregnant personnel are today able to use civilian clothes, but that solution is not satisfactory," says Peter A. Moe of the Norwegian Union of Officers and Noncommissioned Officers. Pregnant officers are not able to participate in maneuvers or perform watch duty. They lose service as qualified officers and thus money.

7262
CSO: 3639/116

MILITARY

..ORAI

BRIEFS

SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY REFURBISHING CONTRACT--The branch of Kongsberg Arms Factory at Narvik has received a contract for the refurbishing of the Armed Forces' park of self-propelled artillery, the so-called M109. The contract also comprises supplies of parts to West Germany, which is scheduled to modernize its artillery of this type. "This will ensure employment in the workshop at Narvik for some years," the chief of the Armed Forces division at the Kongsberg Arms Factory, Jens Charles Widt, tells AFTENPOSTEN. The contract means that the Kongsberg Arms Factory at Narvik will need an additional one hundred employees in the future. That means an increase in the work force by 50 percent. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 May 856 p 21] 7262

CSO: 3639/116

MILITARY

SPAIN

DEFENSE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCES PARTICIPATION IN NATO ARMS PROJECTS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 8 May 85 p 26

[Text] Yesterday, Spain signed five plans for cooperation in the manufacture of weapons and communications systems with other NATO countries, utilizing a special U.S. financing fund amounting to \$200 million, as the undersecretary of defense, Eduardo Serra, announced yesterday.

Spain will participate in three electronic identification systems (Nis, Ada, and Yilinz), in the manufacture of 155 millimeter ammunition with precision guidance, and in a system of guided weapons with a computer launched from the air toward ground targets.

These plans will be carried out starting in 1988 or 1995, and are the ones of most military and technical interest to Spain out of seven plans approved yesterday at a meeting of the NATO general directors of armament, reinforced by the attendance of the Alliance's defense vice ministers.

U.S. Senator Sam Nunn introduced an amendment to his country's defense budget to finance these weapons cooperation plans with \$200 million.

At a press conference held at the conclusion of the meeting, Serra said that Spain is moving from underdevelopment to a European level in arms manufacture and technological development.

Serra added that Spain has expended an unprecedented effort on research and development of weapons systems, increasing the pertinent share of the budget by 500 percent.

Serra declared that his country would make a leap forward to reinforce the most competitive area of the Spanish industry.

2909

CSO: 3548/56

MILITARY

SPAIN

GENERAL STRESSES MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF CANARIES ARCHIPELAGO

Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 May 86 p 28

[Interview with Canaries Military Zone chief, Lt Gen Francisco Ferrer Fores, by Luis Bencomo, in Santa Cruz de Tenerife; date not specified]

[Excerpts] In an interview granted on the occasion of Armed Forces Week, the celebration of which has been moved to the archipelago this year, ABC was told by the commander in chief of the Canaries Military Zone, Lt Gen Francisco Ferrer Fores: "The Canaries' most pressing military problem is that of low-level antiaircraft defense, which is being solved."

[Question] What is the current state of the islands' defense?

[Answer] It is associated with what has been established in the Joint Strategic Plan, which we can describe as a medium defense capacity. In any event, it should be clearly realized that this cannot be considered in an isolated fashion, and that the same thing is going on on any part of the national territory.

[Question] What force does the theory of the Balearic-Gibraltar-Canaries axis have?

[Answer] This (allow me to correct you) is not a theory; it is a result of a geostrategic situation marked by greater responsibilities. We are located at an end of Europe, straddling the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, where we have archipelagos under our sovereignty, in other words, interests; and, on the other hand, we are located on both shores of the Strait of Gibraltar, which is the most heavily traveled maritime route in the world, and a necessary passage to the Atlantic. Therefore, the axis formed is nothing but a result of our situation and the defense of our interests. This has permanent force.

[Question] What are the requirements in the defense area existing in the archipelago?

[Answer] Defense, like all the activities subject to budget figures, always presents more necessities than possibilities. That holds true here, and among the great powers of the world. The problem that is probably most pressing in the Canaries, among others, is that of low-level antiaircraft defense, which is being solved.

Roland Missiles

[Question] Are you referring to Roland missile mobile batteries?

[Answer] The Roland missile, which Spain already has on order, will meet that low-level antiaircraft defense requirement. Let's hope that the Canaries will be given this equipment as part of the Strategic Plan's provisions.

[Question] Will Spain's remaining in NATO in any way change the theory of the defense of this southern flank of Spain?

[Answer] Absolutely not. The archipelago's strategic importance, by now explained more than sufficiently, has not changed because of our remaining in NATO. What has unquestionably changed is the potential of this defense, which has improved substantially, as it has in the rest of the national territory.

[Question] Is there any kind of monitoring of the nearby war in the Sahara, between Polisario and the Moroccans, on the part of the Canaries' commander in chief's office?

[Answer] That monitoring and its assessment are incumbent on the highest ranking institutions of the nation.

[Question] Could a crisis such as that involving Libya in any way affect the Canaries, apart from the possible future repercussions that it might have on the rest of Spain?

[Answer] The Libyan crisis cannot affect the Canaries any differently than the rest of the national territory. I have already told you that defense affects the entire country. It would be something else if the Canaries were to be in any way threatened and there had to be a response to this rejecting it.

[Question] How is the fact that the Canaries have more clearly become a border region considered from a defense standpoint?

[Answer] The Canaries' strategic role has not changed; conditions have been placed upon it by leaving the Sahara "hinterland." You see, when we had the Sahara, the archipelago was a logistical base for that territory; there arrived there what the Canaries ordered, coming mainly from the peninsula or other parts of the world. There has been an improvement in this aspect, since we have one less concern. From an operational standpoint, the problem has become more acute, since we have our potential reinforcements at a greater distance; and it has improved if we realize that the peninsula's ports of embarkation have far greater guarantees than the Saharan ones. In short, the difference is not substantial.

Base in Arinaga

[Question] There has been much talk about an alleged base in Arinaga. What is the status of that plan, if such a situation exists there?

[Answer] The alleged base at Arinaga is, to date, nothing more than that, a plan. The decision on its construction is beyond my authority, and it will be a government decision.

[Question] A high-ranking Air Force official declared at the Gando base while taking office that there were aircraft available in the Canaries capable of operating on Moroccan soil and returning to their base within a short time. How can such statements be interpreted at the present time? What radius of action does the military apparatus located in Gando have?

[Answer] Of course, the airplanes that Wing No 46, based in Gando, has are the F-1's, a plane with remarkable features, capable of exceeding Mach 2, with an endurance of over 3 hours. With such features, you can presume that it is equipped to operate on the African continent.

[Question] From a military standpoint, is there any concern over the presence of groups demanding the archipelago's independence, claiming that they do not feel that they are Spanish? Do you consider them capable of attempting to disturb some of the ceremonies marking the coming Spanish Armed Forces Week?

[Answer] There is truly not the slightest concern over the presence of those groups which I would dare to describe as "little groups." What they do evoke is indignation, by their desire to upset the sentiments of a people in which the sense of being Spanish is as great as or more intense than that of any region of the peninsula; particularly if their arguments are filled with pomposity, demagoguery, and inadmissible interests.

2909

CSO: 3548/56

MILITARY

SPAIN

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ARMS EXPORTS SAID LACKING

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 26 May 86 pp 57-63

[Article by Juan Cacicedo: "Arms Exporting Eludes Government Control"]

[Text] Various dictatorships, countries at war, and racist regimes are currently using weapons and ammunition "made in Spain." The government, in its time, pledged stricter legislation concerning the end control of exports, but it has not yet appeared. Meanwhile, the Spanish weapons industry is faced with the challenge of new technologies and urgently needed reconversion of its product lines that will force it to export everything possible in order to be really competitive.

The Spanish weapons companies are exporting military equipment to over 50 countries. Some of them make a good profit from such purchases, because they do not delay in making use of them, or reselling them to third countries. The Spanish Government can hardly prevent this, because the final destination of those exports is completely beyond its control.

It is now over a year that the government has planned new legislation to increase control over arms exports, but it has been delayed indefinitely.

Apolonio Ruiz-Ligero himself, general director of trade policy and chairman of the Interministerial Board to Regulate Foreign Trade in Arms and Explosives, claims not to know any feature of the regulations being prepared by the Defense Ministry, and takes it for granted that, in any event, "we shall have to wait for the next legislature."

At present, this board, comprised of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Commerce, is responsible for granting permits for weapons exports, and can require of exporters a "certificate of final destination."

Such certificates are not difficult to procure, because there are countries willing to issue them, since they serve as legal protection for suspect operations. Therefore, organizations with peaceful purposes, such as Amnesty International, have for some time been calling for stricter legislation of the Spanish administration.

Among the controls proposed is a so-called "human rights clause," regarding the end use of weapons, the existence of a public register of such exports in the General Bureau of Customs, and the creation of a commission for parliamentary control of the final destination of the sales.

Until this arrives, dictators such as Augusto Pinochet or King Hassan II are using Spanish military equipment, rifles and pistols from our country are being unloaded in the racist South African Republic, and "made in Spain" bombs are exploding in conflicts such as the one currently being held by Iran and Iraq.

Decline in Exports

Despite everything, during 1985 the Spanish weapons industry exported arms valued at 86 billion pesetas, with a sizable decline from the previous year, when exports totaled 130 billion pesetas. The crisis among some of its traditional clients and the competition from countries such as Greece, Yugoslavia, and South Korea, with cheaper labor, were to blame.

Spanish weapons exports have essentially Third World countries as a destination, with 50 percent sent to Latin America, 45 percent to the Arab countries, and a scant 5 percent divided between Africa and the rest of the world.

Last year, those exports were concentrated basically on ammunition (30 percent of the total sales), aircraft (25), machine guns (10), recoilless guns (10), and short-barreled weapons (5).

Over 50 percent of the export figures is shared among only four public enterprises: CASA [Aeronautical Construction, Inc], Bazan, Santa Barbara, and ENASA [National Motor Truck Enterprise]. Oddly enough, all those enterprises registered losses in 1984, although in the case of ENASA-Pegaso, the problem lies in the civilian vehicle division.

During recent years, Aeronautical Construction (CASA) has delivered to Chile about 20 C-101 Aviojets, a basic training aircraft, but equipped to carry out attack action. Four of these planes, equipped with six cargo points under their wings, were supplied to Honduras during 1984, despite that country's conflict with Nicaragua.

Chile, which pays for this equipment through a barter operation, supplying Spain with Pillan aircraft, has also received military and all terrain trucks from Pegaso. Some of them have been used as antiriot equipment to suppress demonstrations.

Last year, Morocco received four patrol boats built by the Bazan National Enterprise. Two years earlier, this enterprise had sold the North African country a corvette of the "Descubierta" type, now christened "Colonel Errahmani."

Spanish equipment is playing an active role at present in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Whereas Iraq uses the BO-105 helicopters made by CASA in

Getafe, under a German license, Iran is using Land Rover-Santana vehicles arriving from our country.

In such instances, the manufacturers usually claim that the supplies of the military equipment used were provided before the conflict began. This does not appear to have happened in the case of Somalia which, during its war with Ethiopia, received half a dozen Aviocar C-212 transport planes which are versatile for civilian and military use, two Bazan "Cormoran" patrol boats, and BMR 600 amphibious vehicles from ENASA.

Argentina too, during the military dictatorship, has been a recipient of Spanish weaponry. Ammunition, explosives, and Bazan's "Halcon" type coast guard vessels left Spain with that destination at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the current one.

The Private Business

While the public enterprises are losing money despite their voluminous transactions assessed at hundreds of millions of dollars, the private firms are doing business that is difficult to quantify, owing to the confidentiality that prevails in this sector.

Alaveses Explosives (EXPAL) manufactures different types of fire bombs and explosives used widely in the most recent military conflicts.

Bombs from this firm with headquarters in Vitoria were dropped by the Argentine planes on British ships during the Falklands War, and the Iraqis have used them in its war with Iran. EXPAL's bombs operated 4 years ago in the Vietnam War, used by the United States, and Hassan II's Army has used them against the Polisario Front.

It is also private companies which control the exports of short-barreled weapons, sub-rifles and hunting rifles to the Republic of South Africa. Llama Gabilondo, Astra Unceta, Aguirre Aranzabal, Star, Lander Arms, and Zabala Brothers, combined, bill that country about 300 million pesetas annually.

The short-barreled weapons, ammunition, and explosives are the leading products of private companies, also prominent among which are Rio Tinto Explosives, with 10 percent of the volume of Spanish exports, Esperanza & Co., Placencia Arms, Inc, and Instalaza, the latter engaged in making rocket launchers and ammunition.

But the big business in this sector, as in many others, lies among the marketing firms and the middlemen. The most important one, different from the rest, is Alkantara Iberian Exports Limited, founded 8 years ago with 50 percent public capital (INI [National Institute of Industry] and Focoex) and the remaining 50 percent from the Saudi firm Triad International.

Wielding considerable control over Alkantara is the Arab multimillionaire Adnan Shashoggi, who is very well connected in Spain and has procured major contracts for arms supplies to Arab countries.

Included among his leading operations is the so-called contract of the century, whereby Spain sold Egypt, during 1982, 600 BMR 600 armored vehicles, 1,200 buses, and 10,600 Pegaso all terrain trucks, for a total of \$859 million (over \$120 billion at the current exchange rate).

This contract, financed on very advantageous terms by the Exterior Bank of Spain, included an agreement on payment for installing in Egypt individual systems for assembling BMR trucks and vehicles. Later, two "Descubierta" frigates were sold for 70 billion pesetas, and 2,000 Land Rovers for 3 billion.

In addition to subsequent transactions with Egypt involving "Cormoran" ships and "Agosta" submarines, Khashoggi has also participated in supplying transport planes to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Also sold to the latter country were the C-101 Aviojets and air bombs suspected to have had Iraq as a final destination.

Other marketing firms are Gamesa, with considerable activity, and Defex, with the participation of the leading public enterprises in the sector, whose activity is claimed to be concentrated more on publishing brochures than on selling arms.

Spain, a Bridge Country

The possibility of controlling the end destination of arms exports is really difficult in an industry heavily dependent on exports, in which there prevails the view that "if I hold my nose without seeing, others will do it for me."

Libya is one of the countries suspected of serving as a bridge for sending arms to warring zones. Recently, the supply of ammunition originating in Spain and Italy from Tripoli to Iran was charged internationally.

But Spain is not exactly a country that can complain of such practices, because it has on occasion also served as a bridge for exporting to rather undesirable areas.

Last year, the trial began in Germany against Rheinmetallwerke, a manufacturer of anti-aircraft guns and ammunition which, according to the charge, had supplied equipment (through Spain, Paraguay, and Italy) to countries such as Argentina and South Africa.

In UNESCO's Yearbook of Studies on Peace and Conflicts, which appeared in our country a few days ago, note is made of our share in the illegal transfer to South Africa of howitzers and combat tanks in transactions carried out at the end of the 1970's through the firm Barreiros Brothers International. The equipment originated in the United Kingdom.

During the next few years, the Spanish arms industry, which currently has 56,000 workers and an annual billing of over 200 billion pesetas, will be facing a major reconversion, to provide it with a higher technological level.

Contributing to this transformation will be the participation in such European projects as ACE (European Combat Airplane), the frigate of the '90s, the third generation missile, or the joint manufacture of combat tanks. There will emerge from this a capacity for developing new advanced weapons systems, the profitability and competitiveness of which will be created by the capacity for raising export rates.

The medium-term goals of the Spanish weapons industry are to sell guidance systems, both with ammunition and missiles, (radar) detection systems, missiles, ACE program equipment, combat tanks, armored vehicles, high-caliber artillery, and information processing techniques. To procure access to the technology that would allow for the development of these systems, Spain has been requiring, in the purchases that it makes abroad, compensation entailing the nationalization of the systems purchased.

At a meeting with business owners from the sector, the state defense secretary, Eduardo Serra, warned them: "The challenge that you face is that of exporting an increasingly higher percentage of your own production." The idea is to attempt to export advanced weaponry to countries within the NATO orbit; something that will take time to achieve.

Meanwhile, Spain will have to continue to be commercially linked to countries with dubious intentions; which, in the future, will demand an increasingly more stringent control over exports. Because no business owner in the sector is willing to miss a good opportunity to sell, regardless of who the recipient may be. No one wants to be like Germany which, at the beginning of the 1970's, refused to sell its tanks to Spain because this country was still a dictatorship. France had no qualms about providing us with the AMX-30, which is currently being manufactured by Santa Barbara with a license. Where arms are concerned, everyone wants to be France.

Those Who Sell the Most (in billions)

	Sales	Exports	Employees	Profits and Losses
Bazan				
1983	76,772	39,460	14,087	-6,374
1984	76,896	28,309	13,571	-12,717
CASA				
1983	41,199	27,691	9,803	469
1984	43,365	36,741	10,037	-270
Santa Barbara				
1983	16,191	9,881	4,148	-3,631
1984	24,095	14,084	3,870	-3,636
2909				
CSO: 3548/56				

30 June 1986

ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

KEMPINAIRE ON DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY, FINANCES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 30 Apr 86 pp 40-44

[Interview by correspondent Kris LeLievre-Damit with Andre Kempinaire, secretary of state of Cooperation for Development: "Whoever Does Too Much Does Nothing"]

[Text] Of all the ministers or state secretaries who have headed the Department of Cooperation for Development, since Zaire's independence, Andre Kempinaire (PVV) is undoubtedly the most well traveled. He was previously, among other things in China, Thailand, Washington, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Zaire. That provided him with a great deal of practical experience, from which the lines of force of his policy are now gradually visible. Below is an interview with Andre Kempinaire, hardly back from Zaire, and already hastily preparing for a trip to Ruanda and Burundi.

[Question] You now have been Secretary of State of Cooperation for Development almost 6 months. In that short time, you have already clashed several times with the CVP faction in the Chamber. The first collision is the notorious 0.7 percent of the GNP that our country would be obligated to give for Third World assistance according to previous international agreements. Is that no magic number for you?

[Answer] It is written in the governing agreement in so many words that Belgium should try to reach the figure of 0.7. Naturally that is my goal. But we now must consider the budgetary limitations in our country. If in the Saint Anna Priory, certain sacrifices are sought in all sectors of the national revenue budget, the Department of Cooperation for Development cannot be an exception. There is no other way if we again want to make our country financially healthy around 1988 or 1989. Just as the economic reform is realized, it will be easier to convert the goal of 0.7 percent into a fact.

[Question] Other ministers try to limit the damage as much as possible if it involves economies in their ministry. In your case, it seems more like a definite hint to the minister of the budget, Guy Verhofstadt, that several billions are there to be picked up?

[Answer] Certainly not. I have always said that the governing agreement is my most important ally and that means that we must be with the 0.7 percent at the end of the session. I only assume that, in view of Belgium's bad financial situation, we cannot have everything for the moment. And we must not be ashamed of that. Of all the countries which are doing something for the Third World, we are in sixth place, after the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. We have already reached for some time an international goal, namely 0.15 percent assistance for the least developed countries.

[Question] At the moment, your budget is an insignificant 15 billion francs. Johan Van Hecke, the spokesman for development cooperation of the CVP parliamentary fraction would prefer to operate gradually. He wants to let expenditures increase by 5 billion each year, instead of having to find 15 billion all at once in 1989 to reach the 0.7 percent.

[Answer] We must also consider that other ministries are involved in development cooperation, such as finance, education and defense. Consequently each one must contribute his mite over several years to live up to the governing agreement.

[Question] A second point about which a clear disagreement exists between you and the CVP parliamentary fraction is whether or not to split up ABOS [General Administration for Development Cooperation]. Johan Van Hecke himself says you refuse to split it up, in spite of a clear consensus in all Flemish parties.

[Answer] In my party, which moreover is a government party, we want to preserve foreign policy unity. Consequently, I flatly dispute that a consensus about splitting up ABOS would exist in all Flemish parties. As a matter of fact, when I was abroad, I felt very strongly that all community aspects of foreign policy have not disappeared in it, certainly when I was on a visit with Belgians. Therefore, we must try at the top to step outside united. There do exist some actual divisions, such as the VVOB [Flemish Association for Training Abroad] and its Walloon counterpart, the APEFE, [not further identified] but those are policies which my predecessors have selected and which I want to observe.

[Question] Do you not think that the Flemings have an obviously different view of development cooperation, compared with the Walloons?

[Answer] I think, on the contrary, that more and more consultation is taking place. When I consider the level of cofinancing of the NCOS [not further identified] and its Walloon counterpart, then I ascertain that there are many contacts there. The same must be true in ABOS. It would still be stupid to have to conduct the evaluations of the projects in a divided administration twice. The standard for granting assistance also remains the same for both communities. It involves in the first place humanitarian assistance and in the second place the improvement of food production in the Third World. Those are things in which certainly no division must arise between Flemings and Walloons.

Formal Agreements

[Question] Your predecessor De Donnea, was constantly at loggerheads in the previous government with his tutelary minister Leo Tindemans at Foreign Affairs. How is your relationship with Tindemans?

[Answer] I have no problem with Leo Tindemans. The difference with my predecessor is that he actually was a newcomer and had to develop an image in Brussels. I have been in politics a long time and I do not feel the least need to express myself.

[Question] De Donnea had always refused to sign a so-called agreement with Tindemans. That is really a sort of division of labor. You have probably done that and moreover a policy note has reached your cabinet which states that you may not come out with new foreign initiatives, especially before Tindemans is informed about that.

[Answer] I do not attach so much importance to all those formal agreements. I consider dialogue more important, both from my standpoint with Leo Tindemans, as well as vice-versa. Every time I take a foreign trip, for that matter, people from his ministry go with me. I do not regard that as Moscow's eye spying on me, but a way of preventing misunderstandings.

[Question] The minister of foreign affairs can sleep soundly about one matter. You want to end once and for all the abuses about the language proportions in your department.

[Answer] The language proportions are right at ABOS in Brussels. On the other hand, in the field, 1,790 French-speaking development workers operate compared with only 1,418 Flemings. That difference is partly to be attributed to the large number of French-speaking teachers who were employed in the initial period of our cooperation in French-speaking education in Zaire, Ruanda and Burundi. A second cause is that over the years an average of fewer Flemings than French speakers have applied for cooperation. I give you the latest figures: from 1983 until now, a total of 67.2 percent French speakers applied, compared with 32.8 percent Dutch speakers.

[Question] Can that not be eliminated with an active appointment policy in favor of the Flemings? It is really not true that no Dutch-speaking applications come in at all?

[Answer] First of all, I want to say that the number of applications through ABOS is rather limited, approximately 125 per year. Moreover, I must take into account a number of statutory priorities which prevent such an active appointment policy. In 339 appointments, my predecessor could really only choose in 87 cases. In those he appointed 40 French speakers and 47 Dutch speakers. There were naturally no Flemings here during the previous legislature. I myself want to do better. In the past 5 months, I had a real choice in four cases. Of those, three positions went to Dutch speakers and only one to a French speaker.

[Question] How long will it be before the balance is restored?

[Answer] It is naturally impossible to do everything in 1 or 2 years. In view of the Belgian situation, it is out of the question that not another French speaker would go to the Third World in the near future. Still I have asked that ABOS should allow the nomination and selection of candidates to take place on two lists, so that I have somewhat more room to operate.

Dispersion

[Question] Is there not also the possibility of making somewhat more effort regarding nongovernmental development cooperation? Interest there among the Flemings is apparently a bit higher. At the moment there are 614 Flemish volunteers compared with 519 French speakers.

[Answer] In the NGO's [nongovernmental organizations] other criteria must be taken into account, such as the value of the project. I would consider it a pity if more money would be spent for NGO's, only to achieve language balance. During my travels, I have seen NGO projects which were outstanding and others which operate less effectively. There are obviously other criteria besides language balance to stimulate NGO projects.

[Question] Is it therefore that you recently have decided that the NGO's from now on would pass by in the inspections of finances and that for each new application, you must first wait on a favorable recommendation from our Belgian Embassy on the spot. That would result in a delay of months.

[Answer] Budget inspection was thoroughly changed by the previous government and as a result of that I was forced to have the NGO's inspected by the finance services. But that is an insignificant loss of time. As regards the recommendation of our ambassador, I have assumed a period of a month. The NGO's operate to a great extent with government money and it is consequently not unjustified to first find out the opinion of people who are informed about the situation in the developing country. If our embassy thinks that a definite project is not really viable, I can better support other projects.

[Question] On the other hand, a third of your budget goes to the so-called multilateral sector. You have not so long ago given 1.5 billion to IFAD [International Fund for Agricultural Development] for projects in the poorest countries south of the Sahara. Inspection is also minimal there. In IFAD only 4 Belgians work among 80 cadre personnel.

[Answer] Those projects were included in large organizations which can boast of a certain experience and have, moreover, a much larger infrastructure to successfully carry out their assignments. For that matter, I consider it difficult how we could control projects of that scope ourselves. You must not ask Belgium to join by itself the struggle against, for example, the desertification on the African continent.

You were previously State Secretary for Foreign Commerce. Many probably knitted their eyebrows when you transferred to cooperation for development. In recent years there has been so much criticism of the increasing commercialism in our granting of assistance. Do you consider it justified, for example, that money from development assistance is involved in Manila's giant metro project or in the new telephone exchanges in China?

[Answer] I believe that such projects in those types of countries contribute to further development. In Manila, 250,000 people are now transported daily. That is also important in the light of the social advancement of the people. Only it is on quite a different level from our assistance to poor farmers in Zaire.

[Question] One of the lines of force of your predecessor's policy was to first successfully complete the existing or approved projects, instead of always only making new promises. You have already announced a new development policy for Thailand and Zaire and you are probably going soon to the Philippines and Haiti. Will we be able to fulfill all those new promises in the future?

[Answer] What is in progress must naturally be completed successfully. But we also intend to phase out certain projects in some countries and not to renew them in the foreseeable future. That will be the case in Zaire, among other things, where we want to concentrate on projects more from the geographic and sector standpoint. My thinking is always: whoever does too much, does nothing. I want to restrict the dispersion. In this way, money is released for other countries.

Fish in the Sun

[Question] You have discussed Zaire. During your latest visit to that country you again confirmed that our agricultural expenses there must be increased from 4 to 20 percent of the budget. Those are subjects with which your predecessor, Daniel Coens, was already busy. What guarantees do you have that it now finally will succeed?

[Answer] According to my program, it must be attainable about 1987. But that will naturally take place at the expense of the reorientation of the educational sector. In the coming academic year a total of 44 teaching positions will be eliminated.

[Question] There is talk of a certain panic among the teachers in Zaire.

[Answer] During my stay in that country, representatives of the trade unions clearly said to me that they are accepting the staff reduction of educational cooperation, but they would like to know well enough in advance who is being considered for gradual discharge. Consequently people should not be placed from day to day before the chopping-knife and they should have time to re-adjust. However, I would like to add that the 44 people will not all be eliminated as cooperation workers. Part of them will be included in other sectors of our assistance work in Zaire.

[Question] Will you also release money in Zaire through the Fund for Development Cooperation for joint ventures between Zairian enterprises and Belgian KMO's [not further identified].

[Answer] Someone from the Economic and Social Institute for the Middle Class will soon leave for Zaire on our instructions to observe on the spot what opportunities exist there and for what sectors we could risk that experiment. However in the initial period, there will not be too many, at the most two to three.

[Question] They probably will all remain in the neighborhood of the large centers?

[Answer] That is not necessary. I myself have visited a fishing village on Idi Amin Lake which is highly active in the fishing field, but does not have the opportunity to transport the fish to the large centers. Cooperation with a Belgian KMO, through participation of the Fund for Development Cooperation would do wonders there. For what is the problem? The fish are still dried in the sun and not stored in cold storage warehouses. If one wants to go from that village to the large market in Gomma or elsewhere, in the burning sun, then not a single fish is still edible.

[Question] Is this not the beginning of a new privatization initiative in the Agriprom [not further identified] manner?

[Answer] Not at all. It is only my intention to sub-contract a limited number of assignments, such as transportation and shipment items. If more interesting initiatives appear, those can naturally always be investigated.

8490

CSO: 3614/110

ECONOMIC

GREECE

DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING HOUSING CONTRACT WITH ALGERIA

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun. 86 pp 1, 3

/Text/ The operations of the state firm EKETE /Greek State Company for Technical Projects/ have created serious problems for Minister of Public Works and the Environment Evan. Kouloubis, under whose responsibility the firm lies, because of bad management of projects it undertook in Algeria.

According to completely reliable sources, the minister has voiced great concern over the entire matter. He has asked for explanations both from EKETE officials and from Mr Frangoulis, our ambassador in Algeria.

Moreover, it has become known that the Algerian ambassador to Athens visited Mr Kouloubis at the latter's office following an invitation to obtain necessary information on the Algerian Government's position vis-a-vis EKETE and other Greek construction firms that work with EKETE in Algeria. The Algerian ambassador, who affected ignorance on the overall issue, undertook to inform his government.

As is known, in accordance with a contract signed in the summer of 1985, EKETE and the Greek Construction Companies Partnership, that work as subcontractors to EKETE, undertook construction of 3,000 housing units (and not 10,000 as was initially and noisily announced when the prime minister had visited Algeria in 1983) in the cities of Biskra and Zizel. According to exclusive information of I KATHIMERINI, serious problems have arisen at the Biskra work site due to the inability of the EDOK /as published/-ETER /as published/, Makedoniki, EKTER /as published/ and PSYKTIKI firms to meet construction requirements. The inability of some of the above-mentioned firms to come up with the necessary letters of guarantee because of financial difficulties has brought to a standstill all operations for the construction of 1,500 housing units in Biskra province. The overall project has therefore been significantly delayed with the result that the competent Algerian Government services have undertaken a radical review of all Greek projects. (In the meantime, foreign technical circles in Algeria have made it known that the Algerian Ministry of Construction has already begun negotiations with a French multinational construction company to handle part of the Biskra project).

As a result of the inability of EKETE's subcontractors (EDOK, etc.) to carry out the project and since EKETE has not been able to find other subcontractors, the Algerians no longer approve of continuing the Biskra project and have considered EKETE as having forfeited on its obligations. There are also serious suspicions that the

abnormal situation in Biskra will carry over into the Zizel prokekt (another 1,500 housing units are scheduled to built there) where the main work has not yet begun due to the delays on the part of the Algerians (cleaning up of the area, demarcation of housing sites, etc.). Fair questions, therefore, have cropped up as to EKETE's manner of operations, its being staffed by experienced technicians and more generally its management.

5671

CSO: 3521/162

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BRIEFS

MEASURES FOR AILING FIRMS--The implementation of the plan providing corrective measures for problem companies has begun with the announcement of the firing of workers and the breakup of the biggest ailing firm (Peiraiiki-Patriaki) into 10 smaller firms. Yesterday Deputy Minister V. Papandreou announced the government's policy in this critical sector involving over-indebted firms. The announcement admitted that the tactics followed by the government in recent years were proven to be particularly damaging to the economy and led to the wasting of dozens of billions of drachmas for preserving non-viable companies. Mr Papandreou's admission and similar declarations the day before yesterday by the government spokesman (that was attributed to the minister of labor) brought about a strong reaction from former Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis who handled these matters up to 1985. In a statement issued yesterday, Mr Arsenis strongly defended the proposals he had enunciated and he pointed out that "if they had been implemented we would not now have to face the problem of worker firings." Because of the developments taking place and the political dimensions assumed by the issue, Mr Arsenis called on the government to open a dialogue on television to discuss ailing firms. Indeed, following a personal attack on him and because of the importance of the issue, he said that he would himself submit an interpellation to the Chamber of Deputies. /Text/ /Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Jun 86 p 1/ 5671

CSO: 3521/162

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

PAPER REPORTS ON 1985 FOREIGN INVESTMENT DATA

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 6 May 86 p 16

[Text] In 1985, direct foreign investment in Portugal totaled 42.4 million contos compared to 27.6 million the previous year, representing an increase of 53.2 percent.

In escudos, the increase for the period was 29.3 percent, thus confirming the rising trend that has remained consistent since 1983.

In dollars, the increase was 31.7 percent compared to previous years, a figure that can be considered substantial despite the negative evolution of U.S. currency.

In terms of sectors, noteworthy are: the contribution of the banking sector and other financial institutions (21 percent), paper industry (20 percent), chemical industries (10 percent), ore mining (9 percent), and electromechanical industries (7 percent).

By country, the ranking of the first nine places was as follows: United Kingdom, 42 percent; United States, 15; France, 8; Switzerland, 6; Netherlands and Belgium, 5 percent; Federal Republic of Germany and Spain, 4 percent. Macau also contributed with an investment of 4 percent. The leading position occupied by the United Kingdom is explained by three large projects: Soporcel, Somincor, and Barclays Bank.

By type of operation, the creation of companies and the increases of capital continue to represent more than 80 percent of total investment, 24.6 percent pertaining to new companies and 60.1 percent going to increases of capital.

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CSO: 3542/103

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

POPULATION STATISTICS SHOW SMALL INCREASE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 21 May 86 p 13

[Text] In 1984, Portugal had 10.129 million inhabitants, 4.887 million of whom were of the male sex and 5.242 million of the female sex; representing an increase of 0.8 percent.

The growth is due essentially to the movement of returning emigrants, according to a report from the National Statistics Institute distributed yesterday. The natural growth was 45,800 persons, and the immigration growth total was larger than during the previous year, reaching 33,400.

Owing to this return of emigrants, the imbalance in the male-female ratio declined, standing at the level of 93.2 men for every 100 women in 1984.

The group of individuals aged under 15 years accounted for 23.8 percent of the population, while those aged over 55 represented 11.8 percent.

The birth rate dropped from 144,300 in 1983 to 142,800 in 1984, but an increase was recorded in the number of first births in comparison with the previous year, representing 46.4 percent of the total. In contrast, the proportion of births out of wedlock continued to rise, while the fertility rates declined among all age groups, with a maximum rate of 116.9 live births recorded per 1,000 women in the age group of 20-24 years.

An increase also occurred in the absolute number of deaths, although the gross mortality rate remained stable, at a level of 9.6 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, the infant death rate continued to decline during 1984, dropping from 19.2 to 16.7 deaths per 1,000 live births.

With regard to marriage, the average age at the first marriage rose, and the frequency of first marriages underwent a 7 percent reduction.

Although the demographic statistics showed that the number of marriages dissolved by divorce declined from 8,000 in 1983 to 7,000 in 1984, an increase was recorded in the divorce rate during the period 1975-84, rising from 1.5 to 7.0 per 1,000 inhabitants.

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CSO: 3542/110

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

EDITORIAL SAYS EEC AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE NEEDED STABILITY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 28 Apr 86 p 1

[Editorial: Three Years of Stability in Textiles"]

[Text] The textile agreement signed in Brussels 2 weeks ago with the European Economic Community, in addition to allowing easy breathing in this "favorite" of export sectors through the end of 1988, also represents a process of change, since the perspective in foreign trade relations has changed.

Practically everything in international relations seems to have changed after the idea of expecting too much from diplomacy, the bad experiences and the loss of certain advantages. The agreement signed in Brussels will make it possible for this sector to plan investments, production and exports for the next 3 years. The agreement, for 3 years renewable each year, represents 3 years of stability in the textile and garment industry.

Another distinctive aspect of the agreement is that it has changed the way of looking at textile disagreements. Turkey, unlike the Western trading system, looks at commercial and diplomatic relations together, but this time did not respond emotionally, "confusing the two issues," as the West sees it. At first, in the textile negotiations first with the EEC and later with countries such as Sweden and the United States, the Turkish thesis was something like, "We have a deficit in our foreign trade with you and the only way we can make it up is with textile exports. The exchange rate you apply to all other countries should not be binding upon us," to which the other side always responded with mystifying logic. Concepts such as "friendship and alliance" could not affect the outcome, so unilateral restrictions were targeted. First, the loss of the Swedish textile market and then the ongoing quarrel with the United States and the GATT brought about the reality of getting to know and accept the Western system. Turkey ignored the political implications of the Autolimitation Agreement and recognized that, in a sense, it is not political, but primarily economic.

According to the export staff at the Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat, Turkey no longer has a problem in textile exports to the EEC. Turkey's EEC textile exports are not limited only by the quotas. According to the staffs, who say, "Country A, for example, has a quota from the EEC, but cannot fulfill its quotas. We can sell goods cut out and ready to be sewn to that country. Those goods go to the EEC as a shirt or whatever, bearing the

labels of that country," Germany represents an open road. Since Germany usually overlooks exceeded quotas for Turkish textile products, the quotas set for Turkish textile exports to the EEC are not the only determining factor.

Although the Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat officials' confidence, expressed in the remark, "Turkey is learning this business," seems to have solved the problem on the foreign front, the recent upward slide of cotton prices to 300 liras higher than on the foreign markets makes it necessary to be ready for significant problems at home. Otherwise, the textile sector, which is one of Turkey's "comparative advantages," may have to rely for superiority on "cheap labor" alone, and, in that, Turkey is not alone.

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CSO: 3554/59

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

OFFICIALS COMMENT ON EFFORTS TO OPEN SEE'S TO PUBLIC

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 28 Apr 86 p 4

[Article by Bayram Basaran in "Capital Market" section]

[Excerpt] Treasury and Foreign Trade Under Secretariat officials, after watching the stock sessions at the Istanbul Securities Exchange said there were not enough bidding stalls. Halit Kara, director of the State Industry and Worker Investment Bank [DESIYAB], said that the SEE [State Economic Enterprises] Commission's efforts to put the SEE's on the market were inadequate.

Among observers at the exchange were Treasury and Foreign Trade Deputy Under Secretaries Yener Dincmen and Mahir Barutcu, Treasury and Foreign Trade Exchange Rate Branch officials, DESIYAB General Director Halit Kara and officials from exchange members' liaison bodies.

DESIYAB General Director Halit Kara, visiting the Exchange, pointed out that they were looking for an office location in Istanbul in order to begin actual operations. He said:

"We at DESIYAB have completed our efforts. We have only one problem. We have to find a location in Istanbul, then we will begin active operations on the exchange. We are considering selling shares of eight companies that we hold as our first offering. I do not wish to reveal the names of them at present "

Halit Kara said later, in answer to a question, that the SEE Commission's work was progressing very slowly and added:

"As a member of the SEE Commission, I do not think the work that ought to be done to open the SEE's to the public is being done adequately. The efforts are inadequate. USAS [expansion unknown], Turkish Airlines and Northern Electric Telecommunications Corporation are first in line for going public. However, financial analyses of these companies have not even been conducted yet."

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